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Abstract
There is a need to distinguish two questions in the philosophy of persons. 
One of these Is the factual question of Identity. This is the question of the 
conditions of personal identity over time. The other is the first person question of 
survival. This can be expressed as, “Under which circumstances should I 
consider a person at another time to be my survivor, who I have reason to care 
about just as much if he were me?” This second question does not presuppose 
that the survivor is numerically identical with her predecessor and is the 
question considered in this thesis.
Answering this question requires us to resolve the tension in our concept of 
a person between, on the one hand, the view of persons as purely physical 
beings, no more than the sum of their particular parts, bound to the here and 
now, and on the other hand, as somehow transcendent, beings who exist 
beyond the here and now.
The conception built upon is that offered by Derek Parfit in Reasons and 
Persons. Two errors in Parfit’s account are explained and amendments 
suggested. The first is Parfit’s explanation of the unity of a mental life over time 
in terms of connectedness and continuity between individual, independent 
thoughts, and secondly his account of connectedness and continuity itself. I 
suggest that psychological connectedness and continuity must be between 
persons-at-a-time, not individual thoughts, and that a unified mental life over 
time is not just a product of enough connections, as Parfit argues, but Is 
determined by the kind of connectedness there is.
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Introduction 5
Introduction 
Philosophy and Persons
It seems odd that although we would all of us agree that we are all persons, 
it is notoriously difficult to say just what a person is. Currently, there are two 
general types of accounts of what persons are which attract significant support 
among philosophers. One is that a person is simply a human being. On this 
view something qualifies as a person on the grounds of its biological genus, i.e. 
what specie it is. The other is that a person is any rational, self conscious being. 
On this view, something qualifies as a person on the grounds of certain 
attributes and capacities it has. These two views have very different implications 
for what constitutes personal identity over time. If a person is simply a human 
being, then the conditions for the identity over time of a person are the same as 
the conditions for identity over time of the particular homo sapiens that person 
is. If a person is conceived as a being with certain mental attributes and 
capacities, then there are grounds for believing that psychological, not physical, 
continuity is the basis of personal identity over time. If these were the only 
disagreement concerning the term ‘person’ we would have arguments enough. 
But the waters of this debate have been further clouded in recent years by 
Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons. In this book. Parfit claims that the debate 
concerning what persons are and what their conditions for survival over time 
are, is not only a debate concerning facts, but also about “what matters”. This 
phrase, “what matters” is far from unambiguous. But it at least suggests that 
philosophical questions concerning persons are questions as much of value as 
of fact. If in her treatment of the subject of persons the philosopher has to pay 
due regard to questions of fact and value, which also requires identifying just 
what that ‘value’ is, her task is yet more difficult.
Considering these questions myself, I became increasingly convinced that 
the centre of gravity for the debate had become obscured by the rapid
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developments in the subject. The emphasis on the concept of mattering by Parfit 
had left a real confusion as to just what was at issue in the area of what I call 
philosophical anthropology -  the philosophy of persons. What I felt was needed 
was a re-examination of just what questions this subject is trying to answer. 
Without such an examination, the suspicion would remain that philosophers 
who were ostensibly asking the same questions in fact understood these 
questions in quite different ways.
I believe that there are in fact two main, distinct questions in philosophical 
anthropology. One of these is what I call the factual question of identity. This is 
the question of the conditions of personal identity over time, traditionally 
expressed in the form, “What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
person at one time and a person at another time being the same person?" 
However, I believe there is another, distinct question which is equally pertinent, 
namely the first person question of survival. This can be expressed as, “Under 
which circumstances should I consider a person at another time to be my 
survivor, who I have reason to care about just as much if he were me?" This 
question does not presuppose that the survivor is numerically identical with her 
predecessor. “Survival” here has a special meaning which does not entail 
identity. In chapter two I argue that the factual question of identity and the first 
person question of survival can be distinguished and that the latter question is 
not only a pertinent one, but one which is at least as central to the philosophy of 
persons as the question of identity. It is also the central question of this thesis.
One challenge for the philosophy of the persons is therefore to answer the 
first person question of survival as a question distinct from the factual question 
of identity. In chapter one I set out a further challenge. There is a tension in our 
concept of a person between, on the one hand, the view of persons as purely 
physical beings, no more than the sum of their particular parts, bound to the 
here and now, and on the other hand, as somehow transcendent, beings who 
exist beyond the here and now. In the work of Soren Kierkegaard, we can see
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how important this tension is and how difficult it is to resolve. Kierkegaard not 
only formulates this tension very well, but he also shows why it is necessary to 
resolve the tension, if our understanding of persons is to be complete. In 
chapter one, I explain in more detail what this tension is, and why the challenge 
to resolve it is one we cannot ignore.
I believe that the philosophical approach to persons best equipped to meet 
the challenges set out in the first two chapters is psychological reductionism, 
and in particular, the version set out by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. In 
order to even get off the ground with Parfit’s position, we have to consider two 
foundations upon which his arguments rest. The first is the use of thought 
experiments in argument. Parfit’s discussions of teletransportation and fission 
have helped make his work one of the most engaging, colourful and fascinating 
works of contemporary philosophy. But it has also lead to the suspicion that 
somehow these thought experiments have made the philosophy of persons too 
speculative, or that they have lead us to rely too much on our untrustworthy 
intuitions. In chapter three I consider the main objections against thought 
experiments in the philosophy of persons and defend their use in the debate.
Also in Chapter three, I consider objections against the use of the term 
“person” at all. Some see this as a concept so ill-defined and vague that it is not 
a suitable object of study. Many argue that “human being” would be a much 
more favourable substitute. I resist these claims and argue that we must talk of 
persons if we are to answer the first person question of survival.
Part one establishes the challenges of philosophical anthropology and 
defends a certain approach to the subject. In part two, I turn to Parfit’s particular 
thesis to see if it can meet the challenges set out in part one. Parfit’s position 
includes many claims. Which of these are central to his conception is clearly a 
subject of debate. However, I see three basic tenets of Parfitianism which 
together mark it out as a distinctive conception of persons. The first of these is 
an explanation of what is required for a unified mental life over time in terms of
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psychological connectedness and continuity. This explanation consists of a 
relation, which Parfit calls relation R. The second feature of Parfitianism is that 
this relation is distinct from the identity relation. The third feature is that it is this 
relation, not the identity relation, which is required for our survival. The way I 
define “Parfitian”, if these three features can be retained, then no matter how 
much we change Parfit’s account, we will still have a distinctly Parfitian 
conception of personal survival. This thesis, although a critical development of 
psychological reductionism, still aims to retain such a Parfitian conception.
However, we do need to make some important changes to Parfit’s account. 
Parfit explains the unity of a mental life over time in terms of connectedness and 
continuity between individual, independent thoughts. This is, I believe, his 
greatest error. Firstly, as I explain in chapter four, thoughts cannot be entirely 
independent of the subjects that think them. And secondly, as I argue in chapter 
five, Parfit’s account of connectedness and continuity is inadequate. I suggest in 
these two chapters that psychological connectedness and continuity must be 
between persons-at-a-time, not individual thoughts, and that a unified mental 
life over time is not just a product of enough connections, as Parfit argues, but is 
determined by the kind of connectedness there is.
In chapter six I show how an alternative to the Parfitian conception can be 
formulated that follows these suggestions and thus avoids the errors of Parfit. I 
do this by replacing Relation R with what I call the I* relation, which sets out the 
ways in which persons-at-a-time must be related in order for there to be a 
unified mental life which joins them. The formulation of the r  relation does not 
pretend to be definitive or final, but what it does show is how it is possible to 
formulate a relation that can do the work of Parfit’s Relation R without 
committing Parfit’s errors, whilst retaining the distinctive features of Parfitianism.
I conclude in chapter seven by assessing the revised Parfitian view and 
seeing if it meets the challenges set out in part one.
There is one perhaps surprising upshot of my argument. In attempting to
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develop psychological reductionism, it is possible that I have actually eliminated 
the more reductive elements of the Parfitian account. I have tried to avoid the 
question of whether or not my final position is a reductive one, because I have 
come to the conclusion that this is not an important issue. I believe that my 
revision of Parfit is still close enough to his view to be considered Parfitian, but 
the question of its reductiveness I leave to one side.
The core of my argument can be expressed briefly. There are various ways 
in which persons at different times can be related. One relation is that of identity. 
Another is biological relatedness. And another is that the persons are 
psychologically connected and continuous with each other. In the latter case, 
the persons in question need not be identical. Even so, the person at the earlier 
time can view the latter person as their survivor. Furthermore, when I hope that I 
continue to exist, what is important in this hope is fulfilled by my survivor. Such a 
position is tenable even if we overthrow the particulars of Parfit’s reductionist 
account of psychological connectedness and continuity. How and why this 
could be true is the subject of this thesis. 1
1 It is unfortunate that at the time of writing, I have not been able to see Dancy’s forthcoming 
volume, Reading Parfit, which contains Parfit’s first major set of responses to criticisms of his 
position in Reasons and Persons, together with some new essays on Parfit. The opportunity to 
have seen this book would have been extremely useful in assessing how far Parfit has already 
gone to accommodate some of the criticisms of his position discussed in this thesis.
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Chapter One 
The Kierkegaardian Requirement
The worst readers are those who behave like plundering troops: they take away 
a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder and revile the
whole.
Nietzsche, Assorted Opinions and Maxims
The first two chapters of this thesis argue for two requirements that any 
philosophical account of persons, including the one put forward in this thesis, 
should meet, if that account is to be a convincing one. 1 have developed the first 
of these requirements from the work of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). 
Although Kierkegaard does not belong to the analytic tradition in philosophy, 
this thesis does. By looking at his work 1 aim not to abandon but to to enrich the 
analytic debate. The structure of this section is as follows: Firstly, because the 
fairly lengthy inclusion of the thought of a religious ‘existentialist’ thinker in a 
work of this kind may seem incongruous, 1 offer a brief explanation of the role 1 
wish it to play. There follows a short exegesis of the central idea of 
Kierkegaard’s on which 1 wish to concentrate, that of his concept of Stages. This 
leads to the main dilemma 1 am interested in; a dilemma that an account of 
personhood must solve. 1 follow this by looking at some more familiar 
philosophical ideas that are very closely related to those of Kierkegaard, in 
order to make the relevance of his ideas clearer. 1 then return to Kierkegaard’s 
work to see how he answers the challenge laid down to philosophies of 
persons. Although I will not be recommending Kierkegaard’s own solution to the 
problem he sets, I will suggest that there is plenty we can learn from his 
response. My hope is that when we then turn back in the next section to more 
familiar arguments and positions, we will have gained valuable new insights 
and tools.
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1. Why Kierkegaard?
Like it or not, be it desirable or not, the post-Kantian split between 
‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ philosophy is a real one, that is say, intellectually as 
well as politically. Without justification, one can no more easily draw on a 
continental philosopher as a source than one can the work of a sociologist or 
anthropologist. But, of course, philosophy does draw upon other disciplines, 
even technical ones such as quantum and chaos theory, and this is perfectly 
acceptable just so long as we can clearly say how they connect. In the case of 
Kierkegaard, there are at least two reasons why I think what he wrote can help 
illuminate our inquiry.
Firstly, whatever method of philosophy is employed, most of the great works 
of philosophy contain what I will call “insight”, by which I do not mean to imply 
the necessity of any blinding flash of inspiration. By insight I mean a central 
tenet or maxim which can be understood self-sufficiently, independently of any 
system of thought to which it may belong. A good example of this comes from 
one of the great system builders, Kant. Kant’s insight was that it only makes 
sense to think of the world as it conforms to our perceptions: his ‘Copernican 
revolution’. We can understand and debate this maxim without ever needing to 
talk of categories, antinomies or paralogisms.1 Hume’s famous discussion of 
causation contains the insight that no empirical observation can be used as 
grounds for logically deducing that causation took place. This is not, of course, 
to say that Kant and Hume’s works were nothing but insights, or were simply the 
working out of consequences that followed from such insights. It is simply the 
case that these insights are not necessarily part of a wider ‘take it or leave it’ 
package. Phenomenologists could have, and indeed have, taken the same 
starting points and developed their philosophies in quite different ways. Analytic 
philosophers can build upon the insights of Continental philosophers just as 
continental philosophers can build upon the insights of analytic philosophers.
1 By doing so, we may move away from Kant’s particular position, but I hope the reader can see 
that the idea of the Copernican revolution can have application outside of Kant’s system too.
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This is indeed why I have found Kierkegaard so useful. It is not so much the 
whole picture his philosophy paints that interests me, it is some particularly 
brilliant brushstrokes. His philosophy provides insights that I believe are acute 
and which can play a part if transferred over to the analytic debate.
Secondly, we would be wrong to automatically dismiss all continental 
philosophy as being totally ‘other’. Much of Kierkegaard’s work is taken up with 
a rejection of Hegel, a rejection that depends upon highlighting contradiction 
and inconsistency. In this respect, a certain amount of what is actually done with 
the insights is compatible with the analytic method. So I aim to do rather more 
than simply borrow an insight or two. I am also going to examine at least some 
of the arguments Kierkegaard utilises.
The next question must therefore be; is what I say meant to represent 
Kierkegaard’s thought faithfully or am I simply acting like Nietzsche’s plundering 
troops, cutting, pasting and interpreting as suits my purpose? The answer is that 
there shall be a little of both. When, in parts two and four of this section I discuss 
Kierkegaard’s own texts, I hope I am being faithful to what he himself argued for. 
But in the remainder I shall assess what we can take away from it and from 
there on our route shall diverge from Kierkegaard’s. I hope that any exceptions 
to this schema will be sufficiently sign-posted to avoid any confusion between 
Kierkegaard’s position and my own.
In summary then, the answer to the question, “what is the place of 
Kierkegaard in this thesis?’’, the answer is that we are seizing upon some of his 
insights and arguments in order to shed new light on our enterprise, although in 
uprooting them from the soil of Kierkegaard’s own thought, they shall grow in a 
different manner and bear different fruit.
2 .Kierkegaard’s Stages.
There are various factors that make a brief exposition of Kierkegaard’s 
thought difficult. Much of his work is written under pseudonyms, each of which
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has a distinct personality, based on their metaphysical world views. The 
epistemological reason for this is that Kierkegaard rejected the idea of objective 
rationality, and therefore held that theories can only be looked at from inside, 
from particular points of views. There is also a methodological reason in that, 
like his hero Socrates, Kierkegaard believes that one only begins to 
philosophise when one enters a debate oneself, and holds that the writing of 
tracts is a barrier to such participation. Thus each individual work by 
Kierkegaard does not provide a self-contained exposition of one area of his 
thought. Each work needs to be read in the light of other works if we are to fully 
understand what each work really says. It is only when the works are brought 
together that one can see his philosophical position truly emerge. What follows 
therefore has an ordering and explicitness not found in Kierkegaard's own 
writing, although I hope to have remained true to his arguments.
Kierkegaard is concerned are as much, if not more, with how we should live 
as with what we are, though both issues feature in his work and are strongly 
connected. It is easier to approach his work through what he says about how we 
should live. We must begin with a look at Kierkegaard’s conception of the 
different Stages within which we can live; the aesthetic, the ethical and the 
religious, the last of which I shall deal with in section four. There is a minor 
disagreement as to whether the term ‘sphere’ or ‘stage’ is the best to describe 
these three realms.2 ‘Sphere’ has the advantage of implying neither a need to 
pass through all three nor total exclusivity between them. However, ‘Stages’ 
importantly implies a hierarchy of importance and for this reason is the favoured 
translation. The first of the three stages is the aesthetic. The aesthetic is 
concerned with the immediate and the instant, with what is finite in the human 
condition. The paradigm of the aesthetic life is described in Stages on Life’s 
Way, in the section entitled in vino veritas. It describes a banquet to which a 
variety of characters are invited. No-one is told of it in advance, everything is
2 See Collins [1954], pp42-50, especially p45.
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prepared only for that banquet and what is left is destroyed afterwards, 
epitomised by the throwing of a glass against the wall by Constantine. During 
the meal, each of the guests makes a speech. It is here that the irony of the title 
comes in, as unwittingly, each speaker reveals the limits of the aesthetic life. 
While in the very throws of the aesthetic, their words reveal its emptiness.
The most famous slogans of the aesthetic life are ‘seize the day’ and ‘live for 
the moment’. This is often taken to be an appeal to hedonism, although this is 
not necessarily the case. Although there is a seducer at the banquet, there is 
also a young man who cannot bring himself to make advances to the women he 
desires. This is because such a move would take him beyond the instant into 
some kind of commitment, however small. His long speech can only produce a 
list of the pros and cons of a relationship, based on particular observations. But 
none of these particulars can provide a universally valid reason, nothing can 
persuade him to go beyond the moment. What unites all the characters is a lack 
of inner fulfilment and a despair that is a result of permanently having to 
reinvent oneself. “Live for today because you could be dead tomorrow.” But 
when tomorrow comes and you’re still alive the process has to begin again.3 
This relentlessness demonstrates the futility of ever trying to ‘‘seize the day”.
Hannay’s description of the aesthetic life as being “a life ensnared in or 
dedicated to immediacy.”^  therefore seems accurate. The only time that really 
matters, or has any reality is now. Therefore life is directed towards the now. 
This does not mean that an aesthetic individual does not think of the future or 
have any plans. In attempting to live for the moment, the wise aesthete will 
realise that all moments of time, past, present and future, are for a moment the 
now, and that therefore the future is not irrelevant. Thus in the seducer’s diary of 
Either/Or, we see a scheme to attain a young woman unfolding over quite a
3 Dorothy Parker expressed this succinctly In her poem The Flaw in Paganism:
Drink and dance and laugh and lie,
Love, the reeling midnight through,
For tomorrow we shall die!
(But, alas, we never do.)
4 Hannay [1982], p56
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long period of time. But the goal of this scheme is a moment of pleasure and not 
anything else. Thus it is quite possible to desire only that which has immediacy 
and yet work towards attaining that thing some time in the future.
The aesthetic life is not too difficult to comprehend. But it is less clear how 
one leaves the aesthetic sphere and enters the second stage, the ethical. Judge 
Wilhelm, in Part two of Either/Or reinforces the point that it is not enough to think 
long-term to truly live ethically, as the seducer’s planning has already showed. 
Here, he comments on the validity of “contracting marriages for a definite period 
of time"
It is already clear...that associations of this kind are not marriages, 
since although contracted in the sphere of reflection they have 
nevertheless not attained the consciousness of the eternal, as has the 
ethical way of life, which is what makes the alliance a marriage.^
So consciousness of the eternal is clearly an essential element of living 
ethically. But in what does this consciousness consist? Primarily it is concerned 
with the consciousness of ethics as universal law, that there are such things as 
right and wrong and that these things are right and wrong for all people at all 
times. By realising that we are proper subjects for these laws, we acknowledge 
the eternal within ourselves.
But the ethical has problems of its own. The ethical, by laying claim to 
universality, immediately uproots itself from the instant and attaches itself to the 
eternal. And yet it is fundamentally unable to do so. Man is attached to the finite. 
No ethical system can be created by appealing to universal values, because the 
infinite and the universal are beyond reach. We therefore find our universal 
ethics to be founded not in the infinite but the temporal, as for example, 
embodied in tablets of stone delivered from Mount Sinai. This is the paradox of 
the eternal made finite and temporal. This is also the paradox of Christianity. 
What is eternal - God’s truth - depends upon the temporal and the historical -
5 Kierkegaard [1843a], p396
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the resurrection of Jesus Christ. But it is not just religious conceptions of 
morality which suffer these paradoxes. Any ethical claim, for example, “murder 
is wrong” cannot be a claim that murder is wrong here and now but that it is 
wrong in an absolute sense. As Kierkegaard saw it, universality is what makes 
ethics ethics. And yet we have no absolute basis for this rule-making. As finite, 
historical beings we simply cannot reach over to this infinite sphere. So for 
Kierkegaard, certain forms of ‘moral relativism' would be a contradiction in 
terms, if moral relativism means that any moral rules we may have are 
provisional and thus subject to change at any instant, without attachment to a 
permanent framework. For the ethical presupposes a rule, and a rule by 
definition cannot be something created just for the instant.
I would now like to make explicit the difference between the aesthetic/ethical 
distinction as concerns the way we live and how it concerns the way we are. 
When I talked about the aesthete living for the instant and the ethical person 
living under a universal law, I was clearly talking about the way we live. But 
certainly for Kierkegaard, whether or not such ways of life are appropriate 
depends very much upon whether these ways of life are appropriate for the kind 
of beings we are. Kierkegaard believes we cannot detach the question of what 
we are from the question of how we are to live. In order to understand this, we 
first need to consider how the categories of the aesthetic and the ethical apply 
to the ontology of persons as well as to the ways in which we live our lives.
The aesthetic way of life is concerned with the moment. Persons conceived 
aesthetically are likewise beings trapped in the moment. On this view, a person 
has no existence beyond the here and now. Kierkegaard places the body in the 
aesthetic category. The body, being a physical thing, is seen as limited, finite 
and bound to the moment. Persons conceived ethically, however, are beings 
whose existence spreads out over time. Kierkegaard goes so far as to say 
eternally. Kierkegaard places the soul in the ethical category. The soul, as a 
non-physical thing, is not bounded by time, nor in some sense by space either.
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It is pure, Indivisible and eternal. The ethical person receives the data of 
experience in the here and now but his existence is not confined to the moment. 
The aesthetic person is so confined, and has no existence beyond current 
experience. The aesthetic is thus characterised by the finite, the temporal and 
the body, while the ethical is characterised by the infinite, the eternal and the 
soul. These crude caricatures of the aesthetic and the ethical as applied to 
ontology will be more fully explained as we consider their significance in the 
rest of the chapter.
Kierkegaard believes there is a necessary connection between the ontology 
of persons and the way persons live. There are two reasons for this, neither of 
which entirely convince. The first reason is that the way we are determines the 
way we should live. If we make the aesthetic assumption, that we are just finite 
consciousnesses, bound to the instant, then what reason could there be to live 
ethically? I am not eternal, ergo, I am not bound by eternal laws. Who cares if I 
do something that is, from the point of view of ethics, wrong? I have no immortal 
soul to be punished for it, nor any existence beyond the moment that can suffer 
the consequences. And what is more, how can a finite intelligence even 
understand what these universal moral laws are? Therefore, to live ethically 
would be absurd. Similarly, if we are in some way infinite, then it would be 
equally foolish to live life on the principle of grasping the fleeting moment. To 
misquote the Bible, what good does it do a man to have all the world (a vast, but 
finite space) if he loses eternity? So the ethical question of how we live is 
supposed to follow from the ontological question of how we are.
The second reason is, conversely, that the way live determines the way we 
are. This follows quite closely the form of a Kantian transcendental argument, 
although this is not explicit in Kierkegaard's texts. That is to say, starting from 
the way something actually is, Kierkegaard deduces something which must be 
true in order for it to be possible. The argument is that in order to live a life in a 
certain way, one must be constituted in a way that enables one to live in that
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way. This is as obvious as the claim that, in order for a piano to be played in a 
certain way, it must be constituted so as to make playing in that way possible. 
Through the pseudonymous texts, Kierkegaard shows the possibility of living 
ethically and aesthetically. Therefore, persons must be constituted in such a 
way as to make both the aesthetic and ethical ways of life possible.
Neither of these arguments are strong. In the first case, there seems nothing 
incoherent in a finite being committing themselves for a finite period to a moral 
law, nor for an eternal being living in the here and now. As for the second 
argument, the conclusion that we are constituted in such a way as to make 
living ethical and aesthetic ways of life possible is too general for Kierkegaard’s 
purposes. There are many ontological theories of personhood which would 
allow such lives, as is clear from the observation that an ethical being can live 
aesthetically and vice-versa. So it is in vain that we look in Kierkegaard for a 
logically necessary link between ontology and the way we live. We should 
rather concentrate on asking ourselves if Kierkegaard is right when he says that 
man can be conceived ethically and aesthetically, and that there is a tension 
between these views, just as there is a tension between the aesthetic and 
ethical ways of life. I believe he is, but in order to make this convincing, we need 
to make a further distinction.
This distinction is best understood by considering whether Kierkegaard’s 
dichotomy between the aesthetic and the ethical is really the either/or choice 
Kierkegaard presents it as. The immediate and the eternal are not so much two 
opposites as two extremes on a spectrum. Between them would be moments of 
time of varying lengths, better called periods of time. At one end is the 
unbounded period of time, the infinite, and the other, that length of time which is 
capable of being grasped immediately in consciousness, the moment. There is 
therefore something between the instant and the eternal, which I call the finite 
continuous. The question now is, is the finite continuous subsumed into one half 
of Kierkegaard’s dichotomy, or is it truly separate? This is where ethics and
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ontology come apart. From the ethical point of view, the either/or remains the 
eternal or nothing. For the ethical person, unless they can live by universels, 
somehow connected with the eternal, then there is no ethical basis for life, as is 
pointed out by the Judge’s comments on fixed-term marriages quoted above. 
The finite continuous is as problematic a base for morality as the immediate. But 
from the ontological point of view it is slightly different. For the person who 
conceives of life and himself aesthetically, it does not matter if they think of 
eternity or a period of time; what is still apparent to them is the sense in which 
they are bound to the moment. The temporal continuous is therefore sufficient to 
break away from the immediate. The idea of persons as finite-continuous 
beings would create many problems for the Kierkegaardian. In place of the 
simple finite/infinite dichotomy that existed both ontologically and ethically, 
there would be two dichotomies; the infinite and finite for ethics, and the 
immediate and what could be called the transcendent or finite continuous for 
ontology. I am not going to examine how or whether the Kierkegaardian 
conception could accommodate this upheaval. I would suggest, however, that 
the possibility of the finite-continuous reveals an over-simplification in 
Kierkegaard’s either/or.
Kierkegaard’s original dichotomy was interesting because it pointed to a 
fundamental tension between two characteristics of the self which seems 
impossible to resolve. The tension is still present in my reformulation. If the 
aesthetic is bound to immediacy, then how can an aesthetic individual also be 
finitely continuous? This is the dilemma which seems to me to be at the heart of 
Kierkegaard’s dichotomy between the aesthetic and the ethical. It is not so 
much that fact there are two different alternatives, take them or leave them, but 
rather a seemingly insoluble problem: How does one go beyond the aesthetic? 
Let us look closer at the nature of this problem with particular regard to persons. 
Conceived aesthetically, a person seems little more than a succession of 
moments. More precisely, a person is a series of particular, immediate
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experiences. All we can ever get from such a series is simply a series. The 
complete series which makes up the life of a person is still simply an aggregate 
of particular experiences. An aggregate remains an aggregate and does not 
become a whole simply through there being enough elements in the aggregate. 
This is the problem that forced Hume to say that there is no single, unified self, 
only an illusion of one due to the contiguity and connectedness of particular 
instances. In this case Hume resolved the tension between the immediate 
(aesthetic) and the finite continuous (ethical). But his resolution was 
unsatisfactory, as he recognised:
But all my hopes vanish when I come to explain the principles that 
unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I 
cannot discover any theory which gives me satisfaction on this head.6 
This reinforces the point that we do not need the strictly Kierkegaardian 
distinction between finite and infinite to keep hold of the tension between two 
ways of viewing the self. Nor do we need to maintain the strong line that both 
the aesthetic and the eternal have a place in reality. Hume's theory failed 
because it failed to explain how we are able to perceive of our perceptions as 
being unified in one consciousness. Had he been able to do this, there would 
have been nothing wrong with his claim that the single consciousness is an 
illusion. What is given is not that reality is both aesthetic and ethical, but that we 
have ethical and aesthetic perceptions of ourselves. Any account of how 
ourselves are needs to explain how this is possible.
It must also be remembered that it is as wrong to leave the aesthetic 
unaccounted for as it is for the ethical. Kierkegaard’s puzzle is: how can you go 
beyond the aesthetic and at the same time preserve it? For it is doubtless true 
that we are in a very real sense bound to immediacy. By focussing on 
immediacy, Hume let the continuous slip. It is just as bad a mistake to explain 
the continuous and let immediacy slip. So we are caught between two
6 Hume [1739], Bk1, R 4 , p331
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seemingly irreconcilable impulses: the impulse to accept ourselves as bound to 
the moment and our impulse to view this as too limiting and to want to hold that 
there is a part to being a person which is more than just being a series of 
immediate consciousnesses. The challenge remains for us today to explain 
how these two can co-exist. This challenge is no less real if we replace the 
infinitude of the ethical with the notion of the finite-continuous.
This is a departure from Kierkegaard, who talked of the infinite, but I hope it 
can now be appreciated that we do not need to go so far with Kierkegaard to 
keep a grip on the fundamental tension. As the tension arises from an apparent 
incommensurability, it would appear that one of the two aspects of the self must 
be illusory. This would be the Humean line, mentioned above. It is also possible 
that, rather than being both ethically and aesthetically constituted, we simply are 
constituted such as to make it possible for us to live in both ways, although this 
seems to be equally contradictory. However, Kierkegaard decides that both 
must be real and attempts to account for how the two can be brought together, 
and this is where he goes beyond rationality and into “the absurd". It is tempting 
to choose this as the point at which to part ways with Kierkegaard. But I feel that 
how Kierkegaard tries to resolve this contradiction is instructive, and I will go on 
to discuss his attempt shortly. But first, a little stocktaking is in order.
Kierkegaard talks about the finite and infinite within us. Taken literally, to 
suggest this is useful in the current debate in personal identity would be 
eccentric and hard to defend. But I have suggested that the real problem is not 
so much attaining finitude’s opposite as finding a way of breaking away from the 
immediate. The historical aspiration towards an ethical view of man may show 
an excess of ambition to reach infinity, but it does reveal the feeling of being 
much more than just the being here and now. But what the weak transcendental 
argument shows is that there must be something in us which allows us to have 
this thought. Memory and contiguity are but two of the candidates put forward to 
suggest how we are able to think of ourselves as, as these accounts would
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have it, more than we actually are. I will return to the problems in these 
arguments in part two. What I feel Kierkegaard does is make the necessity of 
accounting for the continuity of the self appear as important as it should. 
Persons are such that they are able to think of themselves as both locked to and 
in some way free of the now . Any account of the self that fails to explain this, 
fails, period.
3. Two Elements To Be Resolved: Some Familiar Analogues.
Kierkegaard presents two given aspects of the self and asks how they can 
be synthesised. Let us look further into the nature of the two givens. The first is 
the aesthetic, which includes finitude, the temporal and the physical body. One 
thing interesting about this is that it ties in very closely with the idea of the self 
viewed empirically. When Hume applied empirical observation to himself, all he 
could find were particulars at particular times:
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble upon some particular perception or other... I never can 
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any 
time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly 
be said to not exist. 7
There was no self beyond the immediate content of consciousness and no 
way of deducing the existence of one. The extreme finitude of being a person 
became apparent. For this reason, persons, when viewed empirically, seem to 
belong to the aesthetic.
This is confirmed when we take a brief look at the successors of Hume. 
There has been a long tradition, starting from Locke, of accounts of personal 
identity which rest on memory criteria. In these, the locus of the self is taken to 
be conscious experience, and what makes two mental events at two times those
7lbid. Bk1, R 4 , p301
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of one and the same person is the link of memory. Of course, this view has 
come in many shapes and forms, some quite sophisticated. But what all the 
forms have in common is that the building blocks of a person over time are 
taken to be specific instances of conscious mental activity. The memory event of 
a past event links those two events to the same person. Here again though, 
despite attempts made to provide continuity through memory, the conception of 
the self can be said to be ensnared in immediacy, in that whole selves are mere 
aggregates of specific instances. This whole approach to the self can thus 
easily be seen as being essentially aesthetic, in Kierkegaard’s sense. The 
notorious problem for this approach is how it accounts for the unity of 
consciousness and of persons, a problem which Hume for one admitted he 
could not solve.8 Such an incompleteness in the account is only so much as 
Kierkegaard would expect. His account of the aesthetic focussed more upon 
psychological and existential incompleteness. Hume finds the same 
incompleteness, although this time it is discovered through a rigorous critique of 
his own arguments, which were based on empirical observation.
The ethical category is comprised of the infinite, necessity and the non­
physical soul. Looking back over philosophy’s past, it appears that persons 
have been conceived of in this ethical way when viewed as subjects rather than 
objects of consciousness. As thinking subjects, we by necessity think of 
ourselves as wholes over time and cannot simply conceive of ourselves as a 
series of particulars. Possessing such a unity is part of what it means to 
consider oneself as a subject of experience. Descartes’s method of 
investigating the self conforms to this approach in that, rather than try and 
undertake empirical self-observation, he considered what it meant to be the 
thinking thing he knew himself to be. This method, in direct contrast to Humean 
empiricism, yields the result of a necessarily existent, indivisible, unperishable 
soul:
8 See page 11
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We cannot understand a body except as being divisible, while by 
contrast we cannot understand a mind except as being indivisible. ...even 
if all the accidents of the mind change, so that it has different objects of 
the understanding and different desires and sensations, it does not on 
that account become a different mind; whereas a human body loses its 
identity merely as a result of a change in the shape of some of its parts. 
And it follows that while the body can easily perish, the mind is immortal 
by its very nature.9
This account too has its problems. How can we move from pure reason to 
facts about the world, especially facts about infinity and eternity? This question 
echoes Kierkegaard’s point concerning the unattainability of the ethical. And 
also, how can we find room in Descartes’s account for the empirical truths 
concerning persons that suggest finitude and divisibility? Again, this echoes the 
inability of the ethical to leave behind the aesthetic.
What this shows is that Kierkegaard’s dichotomy has very striking parallells 
in other philosophies. The big difference is that Kierkegaard tries to unite both 
types of approach, whereas the more usual thing has been for philosophers to 
latch onto one or the other. One exception to this is Kant, who distinguished 
between persons as empirical objects and transcendental subjects. But the big 
difference between Kierkegaard and Kant lies in the fact that Kant concluded 
that the two ways of viewing persons had to be kept separate, whereas 
Kierkegaard attempted to draw them together. What is also interesting is that 
Kant explains the so-called contradictory nature of persons by distinguishing 
the different ways of looking at persons. As has been remarked, it was 
necessary for Kierkegaard to make us see the aesthetic and the ethical from the 
inside. This also accords with the idea of there being different ways of looking. 
The paradox arises when we try to see both at the same time from a neutral 
viewpoint.
9 Descartes [1641], para 14
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The parallells I have suggested here between Kierkegaard’s thought and 
those of perhaps more familiar philosophers should neither be over stressed 
nor ignored. That there are striking similarities is more than just interesting, but 
this should not be taken to be a claim that the positions are the same. But what 
makes Kierkegaard unique is that he endeavours to find some way of linking 
the two approaches. He also expresses with some urgency the importance the 
issue has for selfhood, ethics and rationality. So finally we must turn to see how 
this “impossible” reconciliation is made.
4. Kierkegaard’s Solution.
Kierkegaard failed to find satisfaction, intellectually and personally, in the 
either/or of the aesthetic and the ethical. So what could the next stage be? The 
answer is the religious, and although to explain this will initially divert us from 
the self, a proper explanation requires this short digression.
The religious enters the fray when we consider the limits of the ethical. The 
attachment of the ethical to the eternal comes through the telos of the ethical 
system, an absolute end to which all points in the system have their reference. 
Kierkegaard’s most thorough examination of the ethical comes in Fear and 
Trembling, a work which Kierkegaard himself saw as his most important. It is, 
like all his pseudonymous works, described as an “aesthetic work”. This is 
because the ethical, although concerned with the eternal, actually fails to 
reconcile itself to the eternal, and it is therefore examined through the eyes of 
the aesthetic. Kierkegaard’s paradigm case for this is Abraham’s attempted 
sacrifice of his son, Isaac. The central problem for the book is to explain how 
this sacrifice can be justified when the ethical maxim is “thou shalt not kill”. 
Kierkegaard writes “The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it 
applies to everyone, which from one angle means it is applied at all times. It 
rests immanent in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its telos but is itself the
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telos for everything outside itself" JO On this definition, Abraham’s act was one of 
attempted murder, pure and simple. There can be no question of it having an 
ethical validity, as ethics is universal and therefore exceptionless. The answer 
to this apparent problem is to say that we must accept Abraham not as a 
paradigm of morality, but as the paradigm of the man who goes beyond ethics 
altogether and thus overcomes the insoluble paradoxes of the aesthetic and the 
ethical by entering the religious sphere. Hence the religious is not a form of the 
ethical, but a distinct sphere of existence.
To show that religion goes truly beyond ethics, Kierkegaard asks whether 
there can be a "teleological suspension of ethics” that can allow for Abraham’s 
actions. On this account there cannot. The reason is that if Abraham had to 
suspend the ethical system in order to fulfil its highest telos - obedience to 
God’s will - then the ethical is not an ethical system at all per se. It would lose its 
universality, which is essential for any ethical system, and would merely be a 
tool to some higher end. Hence ethics looses its universality, leaving it as an 
incomplete system that requires something more, the religious, for its fulfilment.
The author of Fear and Trembling, Johannes De Silentio, cannot express 
what Abraham did in ethical terms. Hence the pseudonym - De Silentio; mute in 
the face of a deed that goes beyond the ethical. This is because the deed can 
only be understood from the religious sphere. Note once more the inability and 
futility of trying to analyse the deeds executed in one sphere from another. The 
reason why it is inexplicable is that it can only make sense by appeal to an 
absolute that lies beyond the temporal and hence beyond the reach of 
humanity. And yet humanity has to make that connection for the ethical system 
to have any basis. This is what induces the “fear and trembling" into Abraham 
and us. The religious basis for ethics can only come through faith and faith is a 
leap into the uncertain. To return to the ethical without the religious is to return 
to a castle built on sand. To return to the aesthetic is to dive into a void.
10 Kierkegaard [1843b], p54
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Kierkegaard concludes that having exhausted all possibilities in the ethical 
and the aesthetic, only the religious is left. But if the other two are exhaustive, 
what is left? With two elements, the finite and the infinite, there are four 
possibilities; one or the other, neither or both. For Kierkegaard, having accepted 
the reality of both, the only solution can come through a synthesis of the finite 
and the infinite. Logically, this is an absurdity. But Kierkegaard believes that it is 
an absurdity we are forced to confront. The aesthetic and the ethical logically 
exhaust all possibilities, and yet neither one can provide the complete account 
required. Therefore we must go beyond what logic can offer if we are to 
complete our understanding of ourselves and our lives. The next question then 
is, what is this thing that we can choose that is both finite and infinite? This is the 
religious sphere. Religion, for Kierkegaard, meant Christianity, and it is certainly 
a criticism of his work that no other religious doctrine was even considered. By 
the standards of rationality, religion is absurd. Jesus Christ was supposed to be 
both man and God. But how can anything be both finite and infinite, historical 
and ahistorical? It is precisely this absurdity, however, which for Kierkegaard 
marks the religious life out as the true way forward for man. Man considered 
aesthetically is incomplete, man considered ethically lacks the necessary 
finitude. But in Christianity we have a meshing of the two, a reconciliation of 
both diverse elements into one world-view. However, the price of accepting it is 
that it lacks rational foundation. To become a Christian takes a true leap of faith. 
Reason says it to be absurd. Nothing can prove it to be true. This is why, 
Kierkegaard believes, Abraham’s deed is the supreme act of faith which 
commands such respect from Christians: Abraham had the faith to do God’s will, 
even though it mean transgressing the objective moral law. Although anyone 
would do something if God actually asked them to do it, how could one know it 
was God? Could it be some mischievous demon? Think of all the crimes, the 
Yorkshire ripper cases being most notorious, that have been committed by 
people who claimed God had told them to do it. How does Abraham know he is
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different to these deluded psychopaths? He doesn’t know, he simply makes an 
act of faith. Any Christian who has said, "I take it all on faith" and smiles should 
read Kierkegaard, and know that the correct reaction to faith is not a smug 
smile, but Fear and Trembling.
How does this apply to the self? In The Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard 
discusses this by considering what he calls “despair”. But this is not what we 
ordinarily mean by despair. It is rather an existential despair that comes from 
contemplation of what we are. One of Kierkegaard’s formulations of this is: 
Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and so can have three 
forms: being unconscious in despair of having a self (inauthentic 
despair), not wanting in despair to be oneself, and wanting in despair to 
be oneself. 11
Why should anyone despair of being oneself? More puzzling yet, how can 
anyone be unconscious of having a self? The answer to both these questions 
comes from the idea that we are often in ignorance of what we ourselves really 
are. But then to realise what we are is not to end the despair, but rather the 
beginning of a more authentic despair, as the reality is hard to accept. 
Continuing the passage above, Kierkegaard explains this reality:
The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what 
is the self? The self is a relation which relates to itself.... the human being 
is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, 
of freedom and necessity. In short a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation 
between two terms. Looked at in this way, a human being is not yet a self. 
Expressed more briefly in The Concept of Dread, the thought is:
[Man] is a synthesis of soul and body which is sustained by spirit. 12 
This is an interesting variation on traditional Christian dualism, in which a 
third element, spirit, is added as the relation between the body (the aesthetic) 
and the soul, (the ethical). However, this spirit is not a third ‘thing’, it is rather the
11 Kierkegaard [1849], p43
12 Kierkegaard [1844], p44
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relation itself.
There is thus a sense in which selfhood is something to be attained, as is 
suggested by the line “a human being is not yet a self”. Ergo, spirit is something 
not automatically resultant from the combination of soul and body, as spirit is the 
self. Indeed, Kierkegaard’s main criticism of the Denmark of his time was that it 
lacks spirif3. Throughout The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard describes true 
attainment of the self as being reached through increased self awareness, 
culminating in the realisation that "the heightened consciousness of the self is 
knowledge of Christ, a self directly before Christ". 14 it is only when we are aware 
of ourselves as being before God and Christ that we can truly understand what 
we are. It is important for Kierkegaard that entering into the religious sphere is 
necessary for true self understanding. The discussion of Fear and Trembling is 
his explanation why: only Christianity is able to attain the synthesis between the 
ethical and the aesthetic. Without Christianity, it is simply inconceivable that a 
synthesis is even possible. But once one accepts Christianity, the synthesis 
becomes possible.
It is for this reason, according to Kierkegaard, that man needs to enter into 
the religious to truly understand his own nature. By accepting the contradiction 
inherent in religion, man accepts the contradiction inherent in himself and then 
can truly be said to have found spirit, the true way of synthesising soul and 
body. The state of man prior to achieving this synthesis is summed up in the 
expressions “Finitude’s despair is to lack infinitude”is and “infinitude’s despair 
is to lack finitude”. 16 The former case is easier to understand. The despair of the 
person who considers themselves only aesthetically is caused by failing to get a 
grip on any permanence within themselves. The second case is perhaps 
subtler. If we consider ourselves as eternal, then we are. In a sense, denying a
13 See prologue to Hail [1993]
14 Kierkegaard, [1849], p146  
16 ibid, p63
16 ibid, p60
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part of what seems to make us really ourselves. Our lives have chiselled out the 
personalities we now have, our desires and projects are based around our 
limits. This is why so many religions make sense of eternal life as being some 
kind of dissolution of the ego. Kierkegaard puts it succinctly in The Sickness 
unto Death:
The self is simply more and more volatized and eventually becomes a 
kind of abstract sensitivity which inhumanly belongs to no human, but 
which inhumanly participates sensitively, so to speak, in the fate of some 
abstraction, for example, humanity in abstracto.i^
The aesthetic/ethical distinction thus leads to an impossible two pronged 
dilemma. On one prong, you're trapped in the moment, on the other you loose 
individuality. Either way, you’re not a complete self. That can only come through 
the religious.
5.Creating a Self.
To show why this is of relevance, I would like to offer an interpretive 
summary of what we have just discussed. In contemporary philosophy, one 
would be expected to clearly differentiate what was meant by the different terms; 
person, human being, man and self. Indeed, the critical reader may have 
questioned the apparently slack use of these terms in this section. However, it is 
not at all clear that Kierkegaard himself applied his terms with the degree of 
consistency we would hope for. However, one distinction which does seem to 
be clear is that between “human being" and “self”, as brought out by the phrase 
in The Sickness Unto Death, “a human being is not yet a self”. Kierkegaard talks 
of the self as a synthesis of two elements; the aesthetic (the finite and the body) 
and the ethical (the infinite and the soul). Two elements combine to form a third, 
the self. But the self is not an automatic result of the combining of these two. A 
person contains both within them. But becoming a self requires action on behalf
17 ibid, p61
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of the person, based first on despair and then entering religiosity. In this way, 
we can see that the ethical and the aesthetic are the givens, but the self is 
created.
The given is simply a person. In order to truly become a self, a person has to 
synthesise the aesthetic and ethical, elements within themselves. But what does 
it mean to say that prior to this synthesis there is no self? Kierkegaard is clearly 
talking about some form of high-redefinition of what the self is, it cannot be what 
is ordinarily meant by that term, that is, something like a being, conscious of 
itself and its environment. He says, for example:
The biggest danger, that of losing oneself 18, can pass off in the world 
as quietly as if it were nothing; every other loss, an arm, a leg, five 
dollars, a wife, etc., is bound to be noticed.19
Self, for Kierkegaard, is rather the full recognition of what a person is, a 
recognition that for him can only come through recognition of being a self before 
God. Becoming a self is therefore a kind of life project, something that should be 
aimed for.
However, this seems to be getting ever further from what we are doing in the 
present debate over persons. When we ask the question, “What is a person?” 
we are asking either a factual or conceptual question. Either way, the analysis is 
of the given. It would certainly cause puzzlement if we were to suggest that the 
philosophers job was to construct a person. But if Kierkegaard is right, then the 
project of simply analysing the given is going to hit a dead end. We cannot 
simply answer the factual question because there are two aspects of the given 
person which are in contradiction. The enterprise will end either missing one 
half or in contradiction. So in order for our understanding of the notions of 
person or self to be completed, we will have to find some way of reconciling the 
two elements. What was a life project for Kierkegaard becomes a philosophical 
project for us. Kierkegaard saw it as uniting two elements to become a self; our
18 More accurately, tailing to attain the self, as one cannot lose what one does not yet have.
19 Kierkegaard [1849], p62-63
Chapter One 32
project is to unite the two elements to give an account of the self. What 
Kierkegaard saw as a matter of existential urgency becomes a matter of 
intellectual urgency. I do not mean to suggest that the two can be made totally 
separate. Harrison Hall, in this interpretive summary of Kierkegaard’s thought, 
makes it easier for us to see the connection between the existential and 
intellectual concerns:
The human self consists, in part, of two opposed sets of needs: needs 
for the finite, the temporal and the necessary on the one hand, and needs 
for the infinite, the eternal and the free or possible on the other...one 
solves the problem and becomes a self in the full sense only if he 
recognises and satisfies all of his contradictory needs.20 
Existential satisfaction requires recognition of what our needs consist in. But 
unless we can make sense of what we are, of why we have these different sets 
of needs, then it is difficult to truly comprehend what these needs are. 
Intellectual satisfaction is one of those human needs.
Would not satisfying this need to make sense of two apparently mutually 
incommensurable ways of looking at the self be best met by junking them and 
finding a third, more consistent one? Not exactly. We can’t just junk the 
aesthetic and ethical viewpoints. They are not constructs but givens. I have 
revised somewhat the sense in which they are givens. Firstly, I have argued 
that, ontologically speaking, the ethical need not be seen as necessarily 
eternal, but is best viewed as being that which goes beyond the immediate. 
Secondly, although I take it that it is given that we view ourselves and the world 
in these two ways, that does not mean the world necessarily is both aesthetic 
and ethical. What we need is a way of understanding that allows us to keep 
hold of the necessity of seeing the world in both these ways. The self conceives 
of itself and the world both ethically and aesthetically. The question is not 
whether this is true but how can this be true? We start from what is true, the
20 Hall [1984], p i 81
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Kierkegaardian givens, and have to answer how they can be true, if we are to 
avoid contradiction, the answer must take one of the following forms: Only one 
is really true of the world, but the other is a necessary illusion in our conceiving 
of it, which means we cannot but see it as true. This works rather like the Müller- 
Lyer illusion, where two lines of equal length appear as different lengths. They 
are the same length when measured, different when looked upon. When we 
understand that the latter is simply an inescapable illusion, we can understand 
how, while both must seem true to us, one is really an illusion. Another solution 
states that neither are true of the world and that both are necessary illusions. 
This solution is clearly less economical than the previous one, and in general it 
is best not to postulate more phenomena to be illusions than is absolutely 
necessary. A third solution is that both are true, but whereas they necessarily 
appear to apply to the same thing, in fact they apply to different things which we 
confuse. A fourth solution is that both are true and apply to the same thing, but 
to different aspects of that one thing.
6. Conclusion.
Kierkegaard does not offer any conclusive arguments as to why we can 
consider persons as both aesthetic and ethical beings, but he rightly spotted 
that there are these two conflicting ways of looking at the self and that the 
aesthetic and ethical characterisations of the self follow from these different 
approaches. I have given the Humean and Cartesian accounts of the self as 
examples of the two ways of seeing the self in action. Kierkegaard’s great 
contribution to the debate on selfhood is not only to point out these two different 
views but also to make their resolution a fundamental requirement of any 
explanation of what a person is.
The conclusions of this section are three: (1) A person can be seen as both 
aesthetic and ethical, and this is the given in that a person will be seen in this 
way simply by virtue of being considered from a certain viewpoint and not
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through being understood in a theoretical way. The most well known paradigms 
of this are the Humean and Cartesian accounts given above, in section 3. There 
is a kind of necessity in these viewpoints in that, no matter how we may go on to 
understand the self, seeing the self in these ways will still be unavoidable, so 
long as we adopt the relevant viewpoint. (2) As the self can appear to us in both 
the aesthetic and ethical ways, and that these views exclude each other, to 
explain the truth in both these positions, understanding must go beyond the 
given. This means an account of the self cannot simply describe the self as it 
appears to us, as it appears to us in a contradictory way. (3) Such an account 
may reject one or both of the aesthetic and ethical, but is obliged to explain why 
it is we are forced to see ourselves in these ways. This obligation is what I call 
the Kierkegaardian requirement. Any account of persons which does not 
explain the aesthetic and ethical in persons does not meet this requirement and 
consequently, it leaves too much unexplained for us to be able to embrace that 
account.
Explaining the Kierkegaardian requirement and why it is important is a more 
lengthy and difficult task than seeing whether a theory meets it or not. 
Furthermore, it is best employed to judge a completed theory. For these 
reasons, the requirement will not be used until the end of this thesis when we 
look at my critical development of psychological reductionism and pass 
judgment on it.
Our first requirement has thus been formulated. I now turn to the second.
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Chapter Two 
The Relevance Requirement
Most recent work on persons in philosophy has focussed on the issue of 
personal identity over time. This is usually understood as being the search for 
the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a person X at one time and a 
person Y at another time being the same person, or a demonstration of the 
impossibility of formulating these conditions. Conditions of identity are sought, 
and only if an impasse is reached with identity are other ideas of, as Parfit puts 
it, “what matters in survival” examined. This approach seems natural. When we 
consider the future, we generally want to know if I will survive and this seems 
straightforwardly to be a question as to whether or not myself and any future 
person will be the same person.
However, we have to be careful when we undergo this investigation not to 
lose sight of our primary concern. If our primary concern is not identity, but 
persons, then we have to be careful as to how relevant the concerns of identity 
are to our endeavour. To put it simply, a study of personal identity which is 
focused on the personal should not emphasise identity at the expense of the 
personal. And if it could be shown that any investigation was indeed telling us 
more about the nature of identity than the nature of persons, we should 
reconsider the importance placed on personal identity. In this chapter, I claim 
that there are indeed reasons why sometimes, when we appear to be interested 
in personal identity, in fact, it is not identity which is our primary concern. In my 
discussion I distinguish between survival and identity. I take personal identity 
over time to be token identity of the individual person. Any view which 
abandons token personal identity in favour of type personal identity, abandons 
the idea of personal identity as it has been understood historically. Survival, 
however, is a broader concept. Something can be said to survive not only if 
there is a token identical continuer of it, but also sometimes if there is a type
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identical whole or part continuer of it. I explain in more detail the differences 
between these different sorts of identity in section one.
There are two types of cases which support my claim. Firstly, I would like to 
consider hypothetical cases of fission. I contend that in such cases, 
considerations of personal continuity and survival are more relevant to our 
concern in persons than considerations of personal identity are. By considering 
fission in terms of identity we are lead to solutions which are either 
indeterminate or unsatisfactory. Much more satisfactory solutions can be offered 
if we abandon talk of identity altogether. Secondly, there are cases when the 
nature of identity over time in general requires us to deny personal identity 
where a good claim could be made for personal survival. Here, there is a 
solution to the problem which is clear for the identity theorist, but which leaves 
other problems unresolved, problems of great importance when we consider 
our survival. What these illustrate is that there are at least two sorts of cases in 
which judgments concerning personal survival are best based on 
considerations other than those of personal identity. The fact that this is possible 
shows that personal survival and personal identity can be considered 
separately.
These arguments exemplify the importance of what I call the Relevance 
Requirement. This is because what my argument fundamentally depends upon 
is the idea that if any account of persons is to be sufficient for our purposes it 
has to be directly relevant to our interests in persons. When we talk about 
personal survival, identity or continuity we are not engaged in a merely abstract 
debate, but are dealing with concepts of direct relevance to the way we see 
ourselves and our place in the world. It is not enough to provide a 'solution' to 
the problem of personal identity if that solution fails to address our concerns as 
persons ourselves in our future existence. To talk of identity if identity does not 
pertain to what is most relevant to our interests is thus to fail to meet the 
relevance requirement. These ideas and the reasons for holding them should
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become clearer as the arguments of this chapter progress.
Two things are necessary for the line of argument outlined above. Firstly, we 
need to go back right to the start and ask just what my present concern is in the 
debate over personal identity. Secondly, it is necessary to look at how the 
concept of identity over time works in general. By doing this at some length in 
the first two sections of this chapter, the arguments of the subsequent two 
sections can be presented more easily.
1.The Issue.
We must make clear what the concern of this thesis is. If the concern were for 
personal identity, then clearly I could not deny that identity is what matters. But I 
am discussing personal identity for a purpose and not just for its own sake. It is 
this purpose, this underlying interest that the subject has for us which I want to 
get clear on. Parfit appears to try to address this fundamental interest when he 
uses the expression "what matters in survival”. But he fails to make clear just 
what this means, which frustrates many readers who wish to know in what way 
and for whom “what matters” matters. 1 There is not a great deal in the literature, 
therefore, to help us define this basic interest.
There are, of course, many things about survival which may concern us. 
Reputations, legacies, families, our own health and soundness of mind, to name 
but a few. Obviously, the debate over personal identity cannot address all these 
concerns. But nor is it very illuminating simply to state that the debate is about 
identity or survival. So perhaps it is best to start with the question, just what is it 
about personal identity which seems to be so important and of such interest to 
us? We, as persons, are beings who are aware of our existence over time. Our 
existence over time is something which we usually take for granted. We also 
take for granted the maxim that ‘people change’. There are many differences 
between a person at one time and a person at another, distant time. If there is
■> 1 try to dispel this confusion in chapter six, section 5.
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an afterlife, these differences may well be even greater. Senile dementia also 
preys on our minds, threatening our sense of self-identity. And with the advent 
of artificial limbs and brain surgery, there are future prospects for quite 
extensive change in our material make-up. Even now, with drugs such as 
Prozac, we are confronted with issues of how much we can be altered by 
circumstances and technology and still be us. All of these are real issues which 
are truly puzzling. Add the thought experiments of brain-swaps, 
teletransportation and fissions and the possibilities are bewildering. When we 
consider ourselves undergoing these various changes, the natural question to 
ask is, “will that person still be me?" However, this question is slightly 
ambiguous. There are at least three different interpretations of the question. 
Firstly, and most obviously, this is a factual question of identity. It is either true or 
false that a person at time X and a person at time Y are numerically the same 
person. However, it is far from obvious that this can always be a matter of fact.3 
Given that people can change to many different degrees, there are reasons for 
believing that in some cases, there is no factual answer. Even if there is a 
factual answer, there is still a second interpretation of the question: Should I, 
now, and that person, then, consider the later person to be my survivor, who I 
have reason to care about just as much if he were me, regardless of whether we 
are numerically identical? I call this the first-person question of survival. It may 
be the case that the facts dictate that there are two, not one persons in this 
situation, but that the connection between the two is so strong and of such a 
kind that the persons involved cannot but think of themselves as the same in all 
important respects, no matter what the facts concerning their numerical identity 
are. In section four I argue that this is the case in teletransportation. Related to 
this question is the third person question of survival: Should other people 
consider myself and that future person as if we were numerically the same
2 See chapter three for a description of these various thought experiments.
3 The most convincing argument for this is Parfit’s discussion of the combined spectrum. Parfit 
[1984] PP236-243.
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person?
On some views, these three ways of putting the question all hang together. 
That is to say, the reason why I and others should (or should not) view a person 
at time X and a person at time Y as if they were the same person is that as a 
matter of fact they are (or are not) the same person. However, my claim is that, 
although there is a factual question of identity, when many of us consider the 
issue of personal identity, it is not this question, but the first person question of 
survival which really is of concern to us. When we consider the various 
transformations that can occur, we want to know, if that were to happen to me, 
should I have the same concern for that resulting person as I would for a 
numerically identical survivor? This is why the problem of personal identity is of 
interest to those other than philosophers interested in the logic of diachronic 
identity; because we are persons ourselves who are interested in how we 
should view our own future and past existence. My intention in this thesis is to 
weaken the link between the factual question of identity and the first person 
question of survival and to show that the second question is the more pertinent 
to the general concerns of persons. Put another way, I intend to show that our 
view of personal survival does not entail personal identity. In this section I show 
that personal survival does not necessarily entail personal identity. In the 
remainder of this chapter I show how addressing the question of personal 
identity may not address the first person question of survival, and that if this is so 
it fails to address the concerns relevant to this study. And in the thesis as a 
whole I develop a view of personal survival from the Parfitian conception which 
attempts to address the first person question of survival without needing to 
answer the factual question of identity.
Firstly then, how can it even be possible for the first person question of 
survival to be separated from the factual question of identity? To begin to 
answer this, we must distinguish between token identity and type or qualitative 
identity. If X and Y are token-identical it means that they are materially and
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qualitatively the same, and that everything that is true of X is true of Y. It is the 
form of identity that Leibniz’s Law deals with. If two things are type-identical it 
simply means that they are qualitatively identical. Some believe that this is a 
real, absolute identity of universels whereas others claim it is more of an identity 
by analogy to the real identity of tokens. It doesn’t matter for us which view is 
correct. Type identity is usually thought of in terms of whole objects. For some 
reason, billiard balls seem to be the paradigm. Two billiard balls of the same 
size, colour and construction are type identical. But type identity can equally 
hold with respect to parts of objects. The vitamin C in an orange is type identical 
to the vitamin C in a potato, despite differences in distribution, concentration 
and so on. Type identity is also a very broad notion in that it doesn’t only apply 
to measurable, material objects. It is possible for two people to have type- 
identical political beliefs, or senses of humour.
These features of type-identity are very important when we consider how the 
importance of identity can depend on our particular interest in each case. If we 
set before us a plate of potatoes and an orange, obviously the orange is not 
token identical with the potatoes. Nor are they type identical food items. But now 
let us consider the situation from the point of view of a person who wants a 
certain amount of vitamin C. There is a type identity of the vitamin C in both 
foods. So, all other things being equal, for the purposes of this person, there is 
nothing to choose between the two different foodstuffs. For her purposes, they 
are identical. All other features of the foods can be disregarded and what we 
are then left with is equal amounts of vitamin C. For this reason, we often utilise 
something like the following principle:
The Principle of type-identical parts: Two non-type identical wholes 
that contain type identical parts can, ceteris paribus, be treated as type- 
identical from the point of view of someone whose interest in those 
wholes lies solely in those type-identical parts.
When I say “can be treated as type-identical ” I mean that the two wholes are
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as substitutable for each other as two type identical wholes are. The ceteris 
paribus clause is also important. It will, of course, make a lot of difference if, in 
order to get the same quantity of vitamin C, a person has a choice between 
eating half an orange and a kilo of raw fish, or if a person doesn’t like oranges.
This principle is a kind of lazy shorthand we use, when strictly speaking 
there is no identity of wholes, but because we are only interested in certain 
parts, we treat the wholes as identical. We should now look at how this principle 
operates in practice. Imagine someone whose love of Britain is based on a love 
of the British national character, which he thinks consists in our sense of 
humour, losing gallantly at sport and the enjoyment of fish and chips. Here, the 
whole is Britain and the parts, those items on his list. This person could also be 
a staunch Euro-federalist and support the dissolution of the British state into a 
European super state. That region that remained Britain would be neither type 
nor token identical with the Britain of today. But as long as the remaining British 
region continued to have its sense of humour, fish and chips and gallantry in 
defeat, ceteris paribus, that person would have no reason to prefer the old 
British state to the new European super-state. Indeed, he may be prone to say, 
“It’s still the same old Britain." Similarly, a former member of the Social 
Democratic Party could feel the party’s identity remained after the merger with 
the Liberals. As long as the distinctive features which that person felt vital to the 
SDR continued with the Liberal Democrats, it can make as little difference to her 
which party it is as it does which tea-bag she picks out of the box each morning. 
Again, she may be prone to say, “It’s still the SDR, really.” In both these cases, 
we have two non-type identical wholes (British state/British region; SDR/Liberal 
Democrats) with type identical parts (national character; distinctive policies). 
Therefore to the person whose interest lies in the type-identical parts, the
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different wholes can be treated as type-identical.4
Such a principle may seem not too important philosophically, as it is no 
more than an elliptical way of referring to type-identity of parts. But it does reveal 
something quite important about the way we think. The fact is that we are prone 
to talk about wholes as identical even when it is only type-identical parts we are 
really concerned about. Someone going to a certain restaurant for the first time 
in years who says, "same old restaurant,” does not need to be told that, in fact, 
much of the decor and menu has changed quite considerably. Only certain 
features need to be type-identical for her to think of it as the same old place. 
Could it be possible that when we talk about our survival, we are also talking 
somewhat elliptically? This seems to be the implication of Parfit’s conception of 
personal identity, and if so, understanding this could neutralise certain criticisms 
directed at Parfit’s claim that personal survival consists in Relation R -  
psychological continuity and connectedness^. Some have tried to criticise Parfit 
along the following lines.
(1) Persons are of type X. (e.g. human beings)
(2) Relation R can survive transformation of type X to type Y
.-. (3) Relation R can survive transformations which human beings 
cannot.
.'. (4) Personal survival cannot consist in Relation R.
The idea is that, if persons just are human beings, but relation R can hold 
between a person and say, a machine, or between two different persons, then 
Relation R cannot be all that is required for survival. The problem is that the 
phrase “personal survival” may be being used here somewhat elliptically. It may 
not refer to survival of the person, but only to survival of that part of the person
4 There is also the analogous principle of type-identical effects; Two non-type identical wholes 
that have type identical effects can, ceteris paribus, be treated as type-identical from the point of 
view of someone whose interest in those wholes lies solely in those type-identical effects. 
Although I think this is a natural extension of the principle of type-identical parts, I do not require it 
for my thesis and thus keep it as a separate claim.
5 See Part Two for a more detailed discussion of Relation R
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which is of importance to us, which Parfit claims is Relation R. To say a person 
survives a certain transformation may simply mean that there is a type identity of 
certain vital parts of that person before and after the transformation, rather than 
that there is strictly survival of the whole person.
This possibility emphasises my point that when we are concerned with 
personal survival, it is not obvious what precisely this concern is for. It could be 
for token identity, type-identity of wholes or type identity of certain parts. Without 
good reasons, we cannot presume that the desire that I continue to exist 
presupposes one rather than the other. We often have a desire for something to 
continue to exist when in reality a type identical whole or part will do. X may 
want his political party to continue to exist, but finds that an apt merger will do 
just as well. Y wants her £100 to continue to exist, but of course doesn't mind if 
the bank gives her new coins. Z wants himself to continue to exist. Why must we 
assume that this is a desire for token identity of the human being? If it is not, 
then we may find that our natural propensity to employ the principle of type- 
identical parts leads us to make misleading statements about sameness of 
persons, even though these statements are natural and in some sense perfectly 
acceptable, if taken to be what they actually are; elliptical references for type- 
identity of parts.
The possibility that a type-identity of parts is what counts raises many 
curious issues. For example, nothing in such an identity entails uninterrupted 
continuation of existence. Some of these issues will be discussed in this thesis. 
For now I only wish to establish that, if our concern in the personal identity 
debate is for our continued existence, this in itself does not, contrary to 
appearances, entail that our concern is for token identity.
2.Identity Over Time.
Heraclitus was the first to throw doubt on the possibility of identity over time. 
The apparent paradox of identity over time is how anything can change and yet
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remain the same. There are two main conceptions of how an object continues to 
exist over time. The first view is that objects endure, which is to say that an 
object exists in its entirety at any one moment in time and so long as it does not 
cease to exist from moment to moment, it continues to exist. On this view, 
objects are three-dimensional wholes that move through the fourth dimension of 
time. The alternative view is that objects perdure. That is to say, objects are four 
dimensional and thus have temporal as well as spatial extension. Just as a slice 
of salami is a space slice' of a longer, whole salami, a stick of salami at one 
time is just a ‘time-slice’ of a whole salami that exists over a longer period of 
time. I would agree with Lewis that in fact objects perdure rather than endures, 
although nothing in my arguments depends upon this. However, it will be easier 
when discussing identity over time to work on one model or another, so I will 
discuss identity over time in terms of perdurance. Where it is helpful or important 
to do so, I offer an endurance view of what I am discussing
Although what follows is not an argument in favour of the four-dimensional 
perdurance conception, I hope to show its attractive neatness. The following 
statement is necessarily false:
Fa & -»Fa
However, the following is not:
Fa at V & -iFa at t2 
where t predicates temporal or spatial location. So the deduction:
John is Ugly 
Smith is handsome 
John ^ Smith 
is valid, but we cannot argue:
John at V is ugly 
Smith at tz is handsome 
John ^ Smith
6 On the Plurality of Worlds, 4.2
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Adding a temporal or spatial qualifier allows us to attribute opposing 
properties to one single object. In the spatial case, the reason for this is obvious. 
Take for example the Greenwich meridian. It is true both that the Greenwich 
Meridian at 550 latitude is in the North Sea and that at 45o latitude it is in 
France. If we had two different singular terms, (The Greenwich Meridian at 550) 
and (the Greenwich Meridian at 4 5 0 ) then the fact that one is in France and one 
is in the North Sea would mean that they could not be the same thing. But, of 
course, this is not the case. There is rather one meridian which has a part in 
France, which is not identical with another part, which is in the North Sea. The 
two parts are non-identical, but this does not imply the existence of two different 
wholes. By accepting that a spatial object has parts, it is easy to see how one 
object can have two conflicting properties, just so long as those properties are 
assigned to different parts.
The perdurance view treats time the same way as space and attributes to 
any four-dimensional object temporal as well as spatial parts. So, John can be 
ugly and Smith can be handsome, yet John can be Smith. This is because John 
Smith can have one temporal part, which is an ugly pre-pubescent and another 
temporal part which is a handsome young man. This is neat, but it does entail a 
strange ontology where what exists at any moment of time is not a whole person 
but merely a time-slice of a four-dimensional person. The question of identity 
over time is therefore not “What makes X and Y at two different times the same?” 
but “What is it that makes two time-slices at two different times part of the same 
perdurer?"
Before turning back to the particular case of persons, we need to consider 
the general problem of individuation of perdurers. Perdurers are ordered series 
of time slices. This means any number of time-slices can be arranged into an 
ordered series. So there exists an object of which my pen today is one part and 
the crown jewels tomorrow is another. The universe is filled with such strange 
objects, but all of these exist as surely as do my pen and the crown jewels. Two
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time slices can be part of a whole perdurer no matter how tenuous the link 
between them is.
Fortunately, we have good reasons for preferring some perdurers to others. 
We can see why by making use of the distinction between natural kinds, which 
have real essences, and non-natural kinds, which have only nominal 
essences. 7  For a natural kind to have a natural essence means that there are 
natural laws which explain its individuation and essence. As Wiggins puts it;
When there is a dispute concerning an object identified under a 
natural kind, then one can readily conceive of getting more facts. [...] 
Identity questions about members of natural kinds can be expected to 
find the notion of identity at its best.8
In other words, there is something which it means to be a natural kind 
regardless of how developed our understanding of that thing is. On the other 
hand, something has a nominal essence if it is individuated or classified under 
functional descriptions. There are no natural laws governing what things are 
clocks or cars and so likewise there are no natural laws governing their identity 
as clocks or cars. In this case, if we are in disagreement about a non-natural 
kind, the dispute is not likely to be solved by getting hold of more facts. To see 
how this affects identity conditions, some examples will help.
Things which belong to a natural kind, such as Tibbies the cat, form natural 
four-dimensional 'worms' and we can give good non-arbitrary specifications for 
what it would mean for a time-slice to be part of Tibbies. These conditions would 
doubtless involve contiguity in time and space and certain causal relations. In 
this way, we can see how there is a difference between gerrymandered 
perdurers such as the ‘pen-jewels' and natural objects, such as cats. Only those 
time-slices which are linked in the necessary nomic ways can be apart of
7 Locke [1694] introduced this distinction, but I am basing my use of this distinction on Wiggins 
[1988]. In making use of this distinction I am not committing myself to Wiggins' wider doctrines. It 
seems to me, however, that any ontology must account for the distinction that Wiggins makes 
between natural and non-natural kinds.
8 Wiggins [1988], p i59
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Tibbies. This also rules out the possibility of Tibbies having any gaps in her 
existence. If there is a period of time where there is no Tibbies then that means 
that perdurer has come to an end, and any perdurer that turns up at a later date 
will have to be a different one. Thinking along spatial lines will help us again 
here. A petal in Edinburgh and a stem in Glasgow cannot be part of the same 
whole, living flower, unless this is one very large flower's
But for anything that is not a natural kind, identity is more problematic. Take 
Hobbes’ famous example of Theseus’ ship. 10 This ship is put into dry docks for 
repairs. Parts are removed and replaced. It is a long process, but actually, by 
the end of the process all of the parts have been replaced. As it happens, 
someone has been collecting all the old parts and has reconstructed the ship 
from them. So which is Theseus’ ship? Here, we are in possession of all the 
facts concerning the time slices. But several conflicting four dimensional 
perdurers can be constructed from them, depending upon what we take the 
nominal essence to be. Firstly, we could say Theseus’ ship is whatever ship 
fulfils a certain role for Theseus, which would mean it is the one that was 
repaired. Secondly, we could say it is the ship which was originally built at such 
and such a time and it is the one that was, in effect, dismantled and 
reconstructed. Thirdly, we could say it is the ship that was originally built up until 
the time of its dismantling, in which case we would say the ship was destroyed, 
and that a new replica and a reconstruction were made. 11 There are possibly 
other explanations. The four dimensional ontology alone does not help us 
decide which is the correct answer. The way to decide seems rather to depend 
upon what nominal essence we attribute to the ship which in turn depends on 
what our interest in the ship is. As an object that fulfils a particular function, it is
9 On the endurance view, the identity of natural kinds appears simpler. Tibbies falls under the 
natural kind ‘cat’. For Tibbies to continue to exist over time entails that the three-dimensional cat 
Tibbies’ not only continues to exist but continues to be a token of the natural kind ‘cat’.
10 Hobbes [1839], pp135-138
11 On the endurance view, the same dilemmas arise. But it is not now a question of which 
perdurer is Theseus’ ship but rather under which circumstances the ship ceases or continues to 
exist.
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best to see the ship as having undergone repairs. If we are more concerned 
with constitution, because, for example, we need to get forensic evidence, the 
reconstructed original would be the one to go for. If it is ownership we are 
concerned with, it will be the repaired one. If our interest is sentimental, again 
the original may be more truly Theseus’ ship’ than the other, and so on. No one 
of these claims is more or less supported by the four dimensional ontology. 
Their justification is rather dependent upon where our interests lie. Identity over 
time is not given as it is with natural kinds.
Nor is there the same restriction on contiguity. Consider first a spatial 
example of a road that has been interrupted, usually by development, but which 
re-appears on the other side of the development. A temporal example is the 
Azores High, a high-pressure weather system which is part of Northern 
Europe’s meteorological map every summer, but which simply does not exist for 
the rest of the year. These both have nominal essences. The Azores high is that 
high pressure system which fulfils a particular role at a particular time of the 
year, while a particular road is whatever stretch of tarmac, concrete, brick or 
whatever that links certain places. Both the road and the system are 
individuated by their fulfilling a functional role. This gives us a freedom to 
legislate concerning their identity which we don’t have with Tibbies. 
Meteorologists could decide that naming this weather system is misleading, and 
they could instead give each annual Azores-functioning system its own name. 
Similarly, it is possible for the council to decide that a road which has been 
divided should one half renamed. Our ability to legislate is restricted by custom, 
practice, convention and so forth. But in no such cases is identity determined by 
natural laws.
We do not need to decide whether this means there is no real identity here 
at all, although there is an identity of type or universal, which certainly doesn’t 
contravene Leibniz’s law. What is important here is that only tokens of 
continuous, uninterrupted natural kinds can have any claim to a natural identity.
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The identity of anything with only a nominal essence is either a useful fiction, a 
matter of linguistic, social or conceptual legislation, convention or practice.
What I have so far said has concerned the question of how identity over time 
in general can be possible. I have concentrated on the perdurance conception 
of identity, on which diachronic identity is a matter of time slices forming a single 
perdurer. A natural-kind perdurer must be continuous in space and time and its 
time slices must be contiguous. A natural kind endurer, on the other hand, is 
simply an object that continues to exist over time and continues to be a token of 
the same natural kind. I will start from the assumption that persons have real 
essences and therefore real identity conditions. I will then go on to show that if 
this is true, then facts concerning identity will not be relevant to certain concerns 
we have in problem cases of personal survival. Instead, we have to fall back on 
more fundamental questions about persons and in doing so, we challenge the 
view that identity is the main concern of persons in their survival. The 
conclusion then must be that either persons have only nominal essences or that 
identity cannot be what is important to persons about survival.
What if persons are non-natural kinds? Would it then make sense to claim 
that personal identity is important? For non-natural kinds in general, whether or 
not the time slices form a single object is a matter for one or other of stipulation, 
legislation, convention, or culture. As we saw with Theseus' ship, the criteria we 
set down for identity of a non-natural kind depends upon our interest in the 
object. In the case of persons, the fact that we would have to decide what our 
interest in persons is before we can establish the criteria of identity already 
suggests that there are concerns prior to that of identity. But it could still be 
argued that despite all this, identity is still very important indeed. Consider an 
analogous case of the embryo and the child. Most would agree that there is no 
fact waiting to be discovered which would reveal to us when the embryo 
becomes a full-blooded person. But it can still be argued that it is very important 
indeed how we legislate, in the conceptual and legal sense, to distinguish
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between foetus and child. This is certainly a possibility, but in such cases we 
need to be given additional reasons as to why such legislation is important. It 
doesn’t automatically follow from the fact that identity conditions can be given 
that these identity conditions are important. Similarly, if persons are non-natural 
kinds, we would need to know just why personal identity is important. Until such 
reasons are given, I am happy to settle for the conclusion that there is no reason 
for supposing that non-natural kind identity is important in itself. There certainly 
may be reasons we could offer to show why it is important, but even if they are 
good ones, they would follow indirectly from what our interest in persons is 
rather than from the fact of identity itself. The importance of identity is weakened, 
if not refuted. So for the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss personal identity 
on the assumption that persons are natural kinds.
3.Fission and the Impotence of identity.
Many recent discussions on personal identity have focussed on hypothetical 
cases of fission. We are to imagine the possibility of a person splitting amoeba­
like into two separate organisms. This has been taken in many different ways to 
pose problems for personal identity. On both psychological and physical 
criteria, it seems that neither of the two resultant persons can be identical with 
the original person. Parfit argues for this view persuasively using the traditional 
endurance model. 12 The arguments on the perdurance view are very similar. 
There is a series of time-slices before the split and another series after, and it is 
of course impossible for any series of time-slices to be identical with any other. 
The meaningful question that remains is, which of these series are part of a 
single perdurer? There are at least four possibilities all perfectly compatible with 
the four-dimensional ontology. Firstly, we can say that what we have here is a 
single, branching perdurer. All the time-slices, before and after the split, belong 
to one, single object. Of course, this does not mean that any time-slice on one
12 Parfit [1984] pp253-266
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branch Is identical with any time-sllce on the other. A second possibility Is that 
the perdurer consists of all the time slices up until the split, and thereafter all the 
time-sllces on one branch only. The second branch can then be seen as a 
breakaway, separate perdurer. The fact that both branches are equally 
contiguous with the original Is Irrelevant, as the same could be said for a mother 
and child. However, the obvious difference In this case Is that there Is no 
significant difference between the two branches. A third possibility Is the same, 
except that we choose the other branch as the continuer. The last possibility Is 
that at the point of branching, the original perdurer ceases to exist and two new 
ones come Into existence.
The problem Is that each of these four possibilities is equally supported by 
the four-dlmenslonal ontology. Indeed, there are more. Lewis’ own solution to 
the problem Is to claim that there are two persons present all along. It Is simply 
that the two people share a common stage. 13 This Is rather like there being two 
roads which share common stages. I believe this is actually the case with the A2 
and the M2 roads. I do not wish to discuss the merits of Lewis’ solution. All I 
wish to say Is that the perdurance view of existence over time no more favours 
this view than any of the others. Therefore, If we wish to talk about personal 
identity In this case -  understood as concerning the question: which series of 
time slices form a single person? -  there will be several views to consider. We 
are now In the same position as we were with non-natural kinds. As with 
Theseus’ ship, there are simply different perdurers from which we must choose 
which one Is the single person. Nor does the endurance view make anything 
easier. In such a case, there just doesn’t seem to be a natural law which 
determines which. If any, of the fission products Is Identical with the pre-flsslon 
person.
From this point, I see two ways of proceeding. We can make what I shall call 
an Identity-affirming response or an Identity-neutral response. The first of these
13 Lewis [1976] p27
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entails simply taking up the challenge of answering the identity question as 
framed above. There are a number of different bases upon which we can make 
our choice between the various competing perdurers. One of these requires us 
to adopt a stance based upon our interest in persons, in much the same way as 
we need to decide what our interest is in Theseus' ship before we can make an 
identity judgment there. What exactly this interest is would be a subject for 
further debate. But as I argued in section 1, it seems rash to assume that our 
interest as persons ourselves is in survival of the token. I suggest that our 
interest is in fact simply survival, which as I said earlieri4 is a broader concept 
than identity, and so we would have to see which of the competing perdurers 
ensures the greater degree of survival, without prejudging the need for token, or 
part or whole type identity. However, my argument does not hinge upon what 
we decide our interest is in this case and I certainly don’t think that what I have 
said establishes that survival is our real interest. All I wish to establish here is 
that the strategy of deciding our interest and then determining which ordered 
series of time-slices constitutes an individual person on that basis is a coherent 
one.
The problem here though is that we are now in a situation indistinguishable 
from that of the identity of non-natural kinds. We are put in the position of 
legislators who are not out to discover which series of time slices is a single 
individual but deciding which series is to be considered a single individual. The 
same problems thus occur here as I pointed out at the end of the previous 
section. Firstly, our main topic of enquiry becomes persons’ own interests in 
their survival and identity is relegated to a secondary concern. And secondly, 
the importance of identity becomes questionable and requires establishing 
independently. With the identity of a person resting upon a decision or custom 
rather than a fact, we need to know why our decision is an important one.
Alternatively, we could make an identity-affirming response based, not on
14 page 25 (First page of this chapter)
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the stance we adopt in relation to persons, but on our prior idea of what a 
person essentially is. On this view, the function of puzzle cases such as fission 
cases is to provoke deeper thinking into the nature of persons, so that we revise 
our view of what persons are until we reach a solution to the puzzle case. So 
we ask, which of the competing perdurers that can be consistently constructed 
from this case matches the concept of a person?is if we could answer this 
question, then we would be able to say what is required for a series of time 
slices to form a single person and would therefore have solved the problem of 
personal continuity over time. For example, Carol Rovane has argued that what 
it means for us to be persons entails a unique continuer and therefore 
concludes that fission, for us as we are now, would destroy a lot of what it 
means for us to be persons. I do not wish to discuss the merits of this view 
here. 16 | mention Rovane as an illustration of how resolving the dilemma of 
identity posed by fission requires us to start from what being a person really 
means. Having done this, we can then choose which of the perdurance options 
is best and then come up with an account of identity. But in this case, identity 
again loses its place as the primary topic of investigation. We do not discuss 
identity to learn about persons, but we study persons and thus discover their 
identity. And, of course, it still leaves open the possibility that when we consider 
what a person is, diachronic identity is not that important for persons. So 
although this sounds like a strategy that will lead to a sensible answer to the 
identity question, what it really does is leave a lot open whilst shifting the nub of 
debate away from identity and back to persons themselves.
Now to the second, "identity-neutral" response. We have already 
acknowledged that solving the puzzle case requires us to go back to thinking 
about what persons are and/or what our interest is in them. If this is our starting 
point, why not ask a question like this one: If I were faced with the prospect of
15 It seems to me that such an approach would entail abandoning the view that a person is a 
natural kind.
1 6 1 consider Rovane’s views in more detail in §6.4.
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fission, which, if any of the perdurers would I have good reason to view as a 
continuer of myself? There are possible answers to this which do not require 
token identity. It is possible for me to consider a whole or part type-identical 
continuer as a continuer of myself. Of course, in these cases we would not have 
a single, natural-kind perdurer or endurer, and we are currently working on the 
assumption that person is a natural kind. But there is absolutely no reason to 
believe that if we are natural-kinds, the fact that we are such creatures is what 
matters. In section one, we saw how the sort of continuation of existence we 
want for things can vary from case to case. Token identity continuation is just 
one of those. If what is important about being me is preserved in a different form 
of continuation, then the fact that the continuer is a numerically different person 
to the one I am part of now need not necessarily matter. While personal identity 
was the primary topic of investigation, this approach would have appeared 
radical. But when we consider the fission case, it seems that we cannot but be 
pushed back to considering other issues surrounding persons and their survival 
before we can go on to consider the identity question. Having made this step- 
back from identity, the possibility is opened up that our next step forward may 
not take us back to identity. Of course, nothing I have said so far shows that 
identity may not turn out to be important. All I wish to show is that this is far from 
self-evident. And certainly the fission case offers no reason why it must be 
important.
To summarise, the dialectical response to the fission case leads to the 
rejection of the primacy of personal identity. To decide whether there is an 
identity between pre- and post-fission persons, we need to examine more 
closely what it means to be a person to solve the puzzle. This is the normal 
procedure. But, once invited to examine what it means to be a person, we also 
need to consider what is our concern here, as I outlined in section 1. When we 
do this, we will question whether there is any need for our continuer to be part of 
the same perdurer or endurer as the question of identity demands. We will then
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be able to validly question whether the issue of personal identity is the crucial 
one. The more fundamental question is, I believe: what sort of continuer 
satisfies a person’s interest in his or her future and past? An identical perdurer 
or endurer then becomes just one among many possibilities, and we have 
managed to move away from the idea of the primary importance of identity. 
Then, even if we do conclude that identity is important, we will have been in a 
position of demonstrating that it is so and not just assuming so.
4.Teletransportation and the Limits of Identity.
Some may not be convinced that the identity requirement can be eliminated. 
They would reject the idea that a natural kind can have an adequate continuer 
which is not numerically the same. They would argue that although the fission 
case leaves open several possible candidates for the single, perduring person, 
at least restrictions of identity narrow down the possible candidates for persons.
I would now like to suggest that in fact it narrows down the possibilities too
much. To illustrate this we must look at Parfit’s science-fiction thought 
experiment, where a person is teletransported from earth to Mars. The facts 
about what happen are clearly laid out:
When I press the button, I shall lose consciousness...The scanner 
here on earth will destroy my brain and body, while recording the exact 
states of all my cells. It will then transmit this information by radio. 
Travelling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to 
reach the replicator on Mars. This will create, out of new matter, a brain 
and body exactly like mine. 17
The question is, is the person who walks out of the replicator the same 
person who entered the teletransporter on earth? The answer to this should be 
apparent from what we have said already: no. In section two of this chapter, I 
concluded that if persons are natural objects, then requirements of contiguity
17 Parfit [1984] p i 99.
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and connectedness must apply. These conditions are not met in 
teletransportation. So if identity is what matters in survival it would seem the 
teletransportation case would hold little interest for us. The simple fact is, the 
person who walks out of the teletransporter is not the same as the person who 
walked in. But I would contend that, on the contrary, there is plenty to interest us 
in the case. Let us imagine that Star Trek is not a work of fiction but an accurate 
representation of what is going on in outer space. The Starship Enterprise 
returns to earth and the crew members go to be reunited with their families. But 
they are stopped by law enforcers who tell them that, since they have been 
away, philosophers have shown that the teletransporter they have been using 
destroys personal identity. Therefore, the crew of the ship is not the same as the 
crew that left earth previously. They are not biologically related to the families 
they thought they had and the high court has ruled that they have no claims on 
the property of the original crew. Doubtless the crew would be stunned. From 
their point of view such a declaration would be absurd. And it is also hard to 
believe that the families, no matter how intellectually convinced by 
philosophers, would find it hard not to think of these people as their relatives 
returning from space. The crew would doubtless conclude that, no matter what 
lack of formal identity there is between them and the original crew, everything 
that matters in ordinary survival was present within them and that they have the 
right to be treated in the same way as those original people.
Who is right? By the end of this thesis perhaps we will be in a position to tell. 
But there is certainly nothing in the fact of non-identity which automatically 
dispels the puzzling issues surrounding teletransportation. The reason for this is 
that we have not been offered any reasons why identity should be all that 
matters. The problem is that it has been assumed too easily that by solving the 
problem of personal identity we will have found out what matters about our 
futures. What this science fiction case shows is that we can think of the identity 
issue as being solved without giving us all the answers. What if I discovered that
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I was the result of such a process? Does this mean that I must think of ‘my’ 
family and ‘my’ past differently to others? The fact of non-identity does nothing 
to eliminate a posteriori the fundamental questions that would face those who 
underwent, or knew someone who underwent, the teletransportation process. 
These questions about what matters about being a person and what matters in 
survival, which I put in section one, still apply. Identity may play a role in the 
answers, but it is not our starting point. Insistence that identity must be what 
matters fails to explain why teletransportation seems so problematic.
My argument could be criticised for being emotive. But in this case, we 
cannot detach the emotive elements in the issue, because the issue concerns 
what matters for us in survival. If it was identity that mattered, then the fact of 
non-identity should make us view teletransportation as death. But when we 
know all the facts, the issue is not so clear cut. So it is hard to see why identity 
could be all that matters. Again, it may well be part of what matters, but all that 
means is that it is one factor amongst others and is not in itself the key focus of 
our study.
5.Conclusion.
In this chapter I spent some time outlining some of our concerns in the 
personal identity debate and what it means for something to be identical over 
time. Once I did this, I discussed two cases. In the fission case, in deciding 
which perdurer should count as a person, or whether there is a single endurer 
before and after fission, we were forced to question more deeply whether we 
were right to assume our continued existence depends on a single person 
continuing to exist. In teletransportation, identity was a clear cut matter, where 
what matters for us, as persons, was not. What do these cases together show? It 
shows that identity cannot be assumed to be the crucial factor when we 
consider our futures. My approach does share some common features with 
Parfit. In particular. Parfit claimed that the fact that there are cases where
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questions of identity are empty -  which is to say that there are cases where 
there is no determinate answer to the question, “does X at = Y at tz?" -  
supports the view that identity is not always what is important about our 
continued existence. My approach differs in two ways. Firstly, because I have 
argued that the factual question of identity can be distinguished from the first 
personal question of survival, the former question does not arise only when 
questions of identity cannot be solved, but rather as a question worth answering 
in its own right. Secondly, I have argued that even when there is a determinate 
answer to the question of identity, which I believe there is in the 
teletransportation case, important questions concerning our first personal view 
of survival are not necessarily also answered. So even if there could be some 
way, in the fission case, of resolving the identity issue, there is no reason to 
believe that this would resolve what is important when we consider ourselves in 
the fission situation. To sum up, Parfit’s arguments rely heavily on the supposed 
indeterminacy of identity. My arguments, however, rely not so much on the 
indeterminacy of identity, but on the logical distinctness of the factual question 
of identity and the first personal question of survival.
This conclusion has important consequences for how we approach the 
philosophical issue of persons. Personal identity may well turn out to be 
something that is very important and is certainly a distinct area of study. But we 
cannot simply assume that all of what we refer to as “the question of personal 
identity" is primarily concerned with identity at all. Parfit concluded that personal 
identity was not what mattered. In my view, what we should be trying to clarify is 
to what questions identity is relevant and to which questions other factors, such 
as survival, are relevant. The debate which started with Locke must not just be 
slavishly continued. We must distinguish the different questions and decide 
which are relevant to our particular concerns.
As my concern is with the first person question of survival, the relevance 
requirement can be stated thus: Any account of personal identity which solves
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the factual question of identity but not the first personal question of survival falls 
to meet the relevance requirement. This Is not to say that the Identity question Is 
not Important. But as I claimed In section 3, from our point of view as persons 
ourselves, the Identity question does not appear to be In Itself the most 
Important one. Unlike the Klerkegaardlan requirement, the relevance 
requirement will be used throughout this thesis as well as at the end to assess 
the final position reached.
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Chapter Three 
Persons and Thought Experiments
In the previous chapter I introduced some examples from Derek Parfit’s 
Reasons and Persons. As I indicated in the introduction, this thesis is to a large 
extent a critical development of Parfit’s work. Before we look at any of the details 
of his arguments, we have to consider his general approach to the subject, 
which several philosophers have found objectionable. They have done so 
primarily for two reasons. The first is his reliance on the concept of ‘person’. 
What kind of sortal term is this supposed to be? Does it refer to a natural kind, 
for example? The second is the importance of thought experiments to his 
arguments. We have already been introduced to the ideas of fission and 
teletransportation in chapter two. But how much can we infer from these 
fantastic science fiction stories? Several writers have wanted to deny the 
validity of both features of Parfit’s approach and many, notably Johnston, 
Wilkes, Williams and RobinsonT have seen the two ‘errors’ as being somehow 
related. Their unease can by summed up in the idea that fanciful thought 
experiments about ill-defined ‘persons’ lead us too far away from what we 
actually are and how we actually do continue to exist. Thus the critique can be 
seen as an attempt to make the philosophy of persons less speculative and 
more empirical. In particular, they recommend ditching ‘person’ in favour of a 
more naturalistic sortal such as ‘human being’.
In this chapter I defend the Parfitian approach against such objections. With 
such a growing body of criticism directed at these foundations, it is necessary to 
check if they are sound. First, I describe the thought experiments that feature 
most prominently in the remainder of this thesis. At this stage I do not draw any 
conclusions from them, as our present concern is the validity of using them in 
argument at all, not what conclusions they are taken to support. Then I consider
1 Johnston [1987], Robinson [1988], Wilkes [1993], Williams [1973],
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two objections from Wilkes and Robinson against thought experiments before 
turning to Mark Johnston’s critique, which looks more broadly at how thought 
experiments are used by Parfit in what he calls The Method of Cases'. Finally, I 
turn to the concept of person and consider criticisms made by Wiggins in 
particular.
I.The Thought Experiments.
(i) Fission.
In Chapter Two we considered a person dividing amoeba-like into two. 
Some would ask if this possibility is really imaginable. It requires us to allow that 
a hitherto single, unified conscious life may branch out in two directions. Parfit 
claims that “psychological continuity has, in several actual cases, taken a 
dividing form"2, and that what has actually happened must be possible. This 
claim is rooted in some interesting actual experiments on sufferers of severe 
epilepsy3. It was found that by cutting the neural connections between the two 
hemispheres of the brain (performing a commisurotomy), the fits suffered by 
epileptics could be significantly reduced. But an unintended result was that 
patients ended up with what appeared to be “two separate spheres of 
consciousness”^ . Parfit describes an experiment which, while it was not one of 
the tests actually done, gives an accurate representation of what can occur:
One of these people is shown a wide screen, whose left half is red 
and right half is blue. On each half, in a darker shade, are the words 
‘How many colours can you see?’ With both hands the person writes, 
'only one’. The words are now changed to read, ‘which is the only colour 
you can see?’ With one of his hands the person writes ‘red', with the
2 Parfit, p259
3 As described by Nagel [1971], Sperry [1966] and Ecoles [1965].
4 Partit p245. Parfit’s interpretation is backed up by Sperry’s own reports. "Everything we have 
seen so far indicates that the surgery left these people with two separate minds, that is, two 
separate spheres of consciousness’’ Sperry [1966], p299.
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other he writes ‘blue’ s
The startling thing about this case is that each sphere of consciousness 
seems unaware of what the other side is aware of. Each hand, ‘speaking’ for 
one sphere of consciousness only, reveals via their reports that the colour one 
side of the brain sees, the other does not.
A second empirical discovery Parfit uses is the fact that people can survive 
the destruction of one of their hemispheres. Parfit takes these two discoveries to 
show that, despite the fact that we normally do use both sides of our brains, only 
one is required for us to be fully-conscious human beings. The two 
hemispheres are usually responsible for different functions. Speech, for 
example, is controlled by the right hemisphere. But it is possible for the other 
hemisphere to take over these functions, although this does usually require 
complete relearning. Parfit also notes, although he doesn’t quote his source for 
the claim:
It is also believed that, in a minority of people, there may be no 
difference between the abilities of the two hemispheres.6 
So, the scientific evidence shows that, each hemisphere can be fully 
conscious without the other and that the two hemispheres can be separated so 
as to create two separate centres of consciousness each unaware of what the 
other is perceiving, at least for some set of experiences. There is at the moment 
one limit on this. There is only one brain stem, and at the moment it has not 
been shown that a brain hemisphere can survive separation from the brain 
stem, or that the stem itself can be divided. Parfit does not worry about this 
possibility, noting:
Given the aims of my discussion, this does not matter. The 
impossibility is merely technical. The one feature of the case that might 
be held to be deeply impossible - the division of a person's 
consciousness into two separate streams - is the feature that has
5 Parfit, p245
6 ibid p246
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actually happened ?
In the light of these facts, Parfit borrows a thought experiment from Wiggins^ 
It is to be assumed in this case that the person Involved is one of those people 
with no difference in the abilities of each hemisphere and is one of three 
identical triplets;
My body is fatally injured, as are the brains of my two brothers. My 
brain is divided, and each half is successfully transplanted into the body 
of one of my brothers. Each of the resulting people believes he is me, 
seems to remember living my life, has my character, and is in every 
other way psychologically continuous with me. And he has a body that is 
very like mines
Henceforth, when I refer to the fission thought experiment, this will be the 
one I am referring to.
(ii) Teletransportation.
This thought experiment has already been described in sufficient detail in 
§2.4. However, in addition to this ‘simple’ teletransportation. Parfit also 
describes the ‘branch-line’ case. Here, everything works as in normal 
teletransportation, except that, instead of destroying the original body, the 
scanner leaves it intact. What we now have is the original person still on earth 
and an exact replica walking around Mars.
(ill) The Combined Spectrum
Parfit develops the combined spectrum thought experiments from an 
objection to his personal identity thesis put forward by Bernard Williams. 10 Here 
we must imagine that we have a machine which is capable of replacing certain 
features and/or constituents of a person. It can do this in one of three ways. The 
first is to alter the neural arrangements in the subject’s brain so as to bring
? ibid p255
8 Wiggins [1971], p50
9 Parfit, p254
10 “The Self and the Future," in Williams [1973].
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about a change in that subject’s psychological characteristics. After such a 
change, the person is still made up of the same substance. It is just that the 
substance, specifically the neural connections, have been rearranged. To 
employ a computing metaphor, the hardware has been reprogrammed with 
different software. This machine can operate to any degree. That is to say, it can 
alter 1% of the person’s neural connections right through to 100% of them. 
Assuming that our psychologies are dependent on these neural wirings, it can 
then alter our psychologies very slightly or change them completely. If we 
imagine a line which represents the degree of change undertaken, with 0% at 
one end and 100% at the other, this line represents what he calls The 
Psychological Spectrum. The machine which executes these changes could 
rearrange the neural connections in the brain so that they are exactly like those 
of a different person, or it could rearrange them according to the whim of the 
operator.
The second machine alters the physical substance of a person, without 
changing the psychology: a change of hardware that preserves the same 
software. Thus parts of the body are removed and replaced with exact replicas. 
This would result in an analogous physical spectrum. There are also two ways 
of going about these changes. One would be by replacing the original physical 
parts with synthetic replacements, the other would be by swapping parts 
between two subjects. The third machine combines physical and psychological 
changes to produce a combined spectrum. In this case, both ‘hardware’ and 
software’ are replaced to varying degrees, ranging from replacement of parts of 
the brain and body with different parts right up to a total change of brain, body 
and psychology. The possible outcomes of this process form The Combined 
Spectrum.
(iv) Brain Transplantation.
This is self-explanatory. The most discussed example is the one given by
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Shoemakerii :
Two men, a Mr. Brown and a Mr. Robinson, had been operated on for 
brain tumours, and brain extractions had been performed on both of 
them. At the end of the operations, however, the assistant inadvertently 
put Brown’s brain in Robinson’s head, and Robinson’s brain in Brown’s 
head. One of these men immediately dies, but the other, the one with 
Robinson’s head and Brown's brain, eventually regains consciousness.
Let us call the latter "Brownson"... When asked his name he 
automatically replies "Brown.” He recognises Brown’s wife and family... 
These are the four sets of thought experiment upon which much of Parfit’s 
thesis is built. We must now see why many have argued that we are wrong to 
base any conclusions on them.
2. Two Types of Objection to Thought Experiments.
Kathleen Wilkes and Carol Rovane share similar similar misgivings about 
what we can learn from thought experiments. 12 They are both worried that 
thought experiments often leave out the background conditions against which 
the thought experiments take place. Wilkes offers the most developed version of 
this objection. She starts by asking us to consider how a scientific thought 
experiment works, for example, Einstein imagining what someone would see if, 
as is actually impossible, one could travel at the speed of light;
Experiments, typically, set out to show what difference some factor 
makes; in order to test this, other relevant conditions must be held 
constant, and the problematic factor juggled against that constant 
background. If several factors were all fluctuating, then we would not 
know which of them (or which combinations of them) to hold responsible 
for the outcome. 13
11 Shoemaker [1963], pp23-24
12 Wilkes [1993] and Rovane [1990].
13 Wilkes [1993], p7
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So, if In a thought experiment we want to be able to deduce something from 
the altering of a constant, we must be sure that all the other relevant constants 
are unchanged. We should also be careful that it is genuinely one constant only 
which is being altered. We cannot justify any thought experiment by declaring 
that there is only one way in which the thought experiment alters reality, and 
that is that the world is not as it actually is. Wilkes’ accusation is that in many of 
the thought experiments listed above, such attention to the background 
constants is severely lacking. Consider the case of amoeba-like fission. Wilkes 
lists all the unanswered questions about this case:
How often? Is it predictable? Or sometimes predictable and 
sometimes not, like dying? Can it be induced, or prevented?...The entire 
background here is incomprehensible.14
Rovane makes the similar point that whether we know we are going to 
branch or not is crucial to how we would react to the prospect, in fact and in 
thought experimenti5.
Interestingly, this is not an argument against thought experiments per se, but 
rather a demand that if we are going to use them, then we’d better be sure that 
we’ve got our background conditions sorted. Do Parfit’s thought experiments 
meet this demand?
Wilkes’ choice of amoeba-like fission for her example is certainly not a 
random one. Of all the thought experiments it is the most outrageous. But 
although Parfit does indeed use this caseie, it is not one of the key thought 
experiments which I described above. In the key cases described above, the 
control of the background conditions does strike me as very careful. Brain 
transplantation requires only that we allow one variable from our actual world 
now - that this operation has been perfected. The experiment requires no other
14 ibid, p i 1
15 In Chapter Six, especially section 4 , 1 consider how important the differences between fission 
and ordinary survival are.
16 Parfit, §100/101
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change from our actual world. Fission, brought about by operation, again only 
requires that certain things are possible in the operating theatre that are not so 
now. The combined spectrum and teletransportation cases require much more 
technological development. But even here, to use the experiment, we need only 
imagine one thing being different from our current world - that the technology 
exists to perform these operations. These do indeed seem to entail the 
alteration of one constant and one constant only which Wilkes demands of 
thought experiments. (But see the second objection below).
Wilkes’ and Rovane’s objections sound persuasive because they ask us to 
consider the wider social and personal differences that a world in which we 
divided, teletransported and who knows what else, would entail. But in all four 
thought experiments, there need be no consequences for society or people in 
general. All four can be conceived as one-off possibilities for single individuals. 
We could imagine that two scientists have been working on these technologies 
in a private laboratory and only performed the experiments on themselves. The 
question of their identity over time would still arise even though they lived and 
grew up in a society where such changes are alien.
So, if Parfit asks “what if I was teletransported?’’ there is no requirement for 
him to spell out the wider implications of this weird technology on society for the 
question is equally valid when applied to the first and maybe only person to use 
the device.
There is, however, still a sense in which there is room for doubt over the 
background conditions. We might wonder whether the laws of physics have to 
be changed in order for us to imagine these cases. If they would, then we might 
not have a case of just one fact about the world being altered but something 
more like “several factors all fluctuating". This thought leads onto the second 
type of objection, based on considerations of imagination and possibility.
Again, Wilkes is the clearest on this issue. She first considers different types 
of possibility. First, there is logical possibility. Anything which doesn’t entail any
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contradiction is logically possible, such as pigs that fly, or sheep living on Mars. 
But this puts only a small constraint on what is possible. Most philosophers do 
not accept that everything that is logically possible is actually, or in Wilkes’ 
terminology, ‘theoretically’ or ‘in principle’ possible. This could also be called 
physical or nomological possibility, but I shall stick to Wilkes’ terminology. Take, 
for example, the case of iron floating in water. There is certainly nothing 
contradictory about this, but with all we know about iron and water, many would 
like to argue that this is not in fact a real possibility. Although we can say we can 
imagine iron floating on water, this is not enough to make this possible. Either 
what we are imagining is something like iron floating on (something like) water 
or imagination is simply no guide to possibility at all.
These issues of imaginability and possibility are complex and involve 
considerations of meaning and reference, externalism and internalism that 
neither Wilkes nor I have given much time to. Certainly, for Wilkes’ point to be 
truly conclusive we have to take a lot of other philosophy on faith. But Wilkes 
doesn’t depend upon us reaching any firm conclusions about this. Indeed, the 
very contentiousness of these issues works in her favour. Her point is really that 
any thought experiment which does not work within the parameters of what is 
known by the physical sciences is open to the charge of depending on an 
impossibility and thus being at best inconclusive and at worst, irrelevant. For 
example, a thought experiment that requires us to hold that pigs can fly may not 
to convince us of very much. Whether or not we decide this a real possibility or 
not, the charge can still be made that this is irrelevant because in our world pigs 
can’t fly.
In essence, this point is an extension of the first criticism about specifying 
background conditions. Here, the laws of physics are considered relevant 
background conditions. If a thought experiment flouts these laws, then we may
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not learn much from iti?, as there Is no single factor being altered against the 
constant background which any form of experimentation requires. An example 
of this sort of objection at work can be seen in John Robinson’s critique of 
Parfit’s argument from fission, who claims:
Recent experimental work by Colwyn Trevarthen and his associates 
suggests that such a conclusion [there are two streams of 
consciousness in commisurotomy patients] is incorrect.
Here, it is taken as read that establishing the actual possibility of the 
phenomena of divided consciousness is important for the thought experiment. 
Parfit is ambivalent about this. Although he uses the commisurotomy 
experiments to refute the objection that divided consciousness just isn’t 
possiblei9, he also says “it can be useful to consider impossible thought-
experiments.’’20
In order to clear up the issue of the relevance of possibility to thought 
experiments, we first need to get clear on the different sorts of possibility. We 
have already seen Wilkes' distinction between logical and theoretical 
possibility. Let us now turn to Parfit’s conceptions. Parfit distinguishes between 
that which is “deeply impossible" and “mere technical impossibility”.21 In the 
fission case, it may be technically impossible to divide the brain, as perhaps the 
brain stem cannot be cut or divided. But according to Parfit, what is still deeply 
possible is that consciousness can take a dividing form. In both cases, empirical 
data can be important. The importance of the commisurotomy cases is that it 
shows something which might have been deeply impossible to be possible. As
17 It is possible that a thought experiment might require the laws of physics to be broken, if this is 
precisely what the thought experiment is concerned with. For example, when Hume discusses 
causation and the logical possibility of something not causing its usual effect, he imagines the 
laws of physics not holding. But in the cases discussed above, it is clear that alternative laws of 
nature are not part of the thought experiments.
18 Robinson [1988], p325. Eccles also agrees with Robinson against Parfit and Sperry, claiming 
“The goings on in the minor hemisphere, which we may refer to as the computer, never come into 
the conscious experience of the subject.” Eccles [1965], pp30-31
19 Parfit, p259
20 ibid, p255
21 ibid
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long as that’s established, if it turns out to be technically impossible to divide the 
brain, Parfit thinks that’s unimportant.
It is unfortunate that there are so many terms used here to describe two 
types of modality:
(1) Logical possibility. X is possible because it entails no contradiction.
(2) Technical possibility (Parfit) or theoretical possibility (Wilkes). X is 
possible because it doesn’t break any natural laws, even if X cannot 
be achieved now.
By ‘natural laws’ we mean more than the laws of physics. Wilkes uses the 
example that a fish cannot be a whale as being theoretically impossible, on the 
assumption that this is not analytically true. Where does “deep possibility" fit in? 
The most likely explanation is that it is Parfit’s term for logical possibility, but 
because there is some uncertainty over this, I have omitted this term.22
Technical possibility can be important for a thought experiment, but not 
always to all parts of it. Sometimes a thought experiment as a whole can be 
technically impossible, but the part of the experiment which is truly vital may be 
technically possible, and that the rest of the thought experiment is merely a 
device to highlight this one, crucial feature. Perhaps the best way to understand 
this notion is to consider how science fiction works. Consider H.G.Wells’ story. 
First men on the Moon. In this delightfully whimsical tale, man first travels to the 
moon by using a substance called “anti-grav", which enables their spaceship to 
escape gravity and rise up to the moon. One could dismiss this story as 
impossible. It is technically impossible, because there is no technically possible 
substance “anti-grav". This is true, but then, it could be replied, “anti-grav" is
22 It is possible that Parfit uses “deeply possible” simply to mean “technically possible in all crucial 
respects” He says, “Does It matter i f ... this imagined case of complete division will always remain 
impossible? Given the aims of my discussion, this does not matter. This impossibility is merely 
technical. The one feature of the case that might be held to be deep/y impossible -  the division of 
a person’s consciousness into two separate streams -  is the feature that has actually happened.” 
(Parfit, p255). Here, we could substitute “technically” for “deeply” and the explanation would still 
make sense, the point being that division of consciousness is technically possible, but not by 
completely dividing the brain. Hence the crucial part of the thought experiment is technically 
possible, even though the thought experiment as a whole isn't. See present discussion for 
importance of this distinction.
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merely a device employed by the author to get his men on the moon. What is 
still technically possible is that man could go to the moon. What is important 
here is distinguishing the relevant from the irrelevant aspects of the story. In this 
case, it could be argued that the mechanism is simply a device and what is of 
real relevance is the possibility of moon travel.23
In the fission thought experiment, the fact that brain division may be 
technically impossible doesn't matter because branching consciousness is 
technically possible in human persons. The relevant part of the thought 
experiment is divided consciousness. Parfit believes that the commisurotomy 
cases have shown that divided consciousness is possible. The point of 
considering fission is to enable us to consider the consequences of divided 
consciousness for personal identity as clearly as possible. Thus, even if the 
mechanism Parfit employs in the thought experiment -  brain division and 
transplant -  is technically impossible, the relevant detail of the thought 
experiment, i.e. divided consciousness, is not. Hence, the thought experiment 
remains useful. The same applies to teletransportation. Though perhaps 
technically impossible, the relevant feature of the thought experiments are 
technically possible, namely, that the physical matter out of which a person is 
constituted can be changed without effecting their psychologies.
However, such a defence is not enough to save all of Parfit’s thought 
experiments. Consider the combined spectrum. The transfer of type-identical 
mental states from one person to another is far from obviously technically 
possible. And even in the teletransportation case, the technology to perform it is 
far beyond our reach. Wilkes’ criticism is that accepting these far-fetched 
thought experiments as technically possible, even in their essential elements, 
takes too much for granted. Can we really accept these possibilities so readily 
when they concern matters where our knowledge is so limited? The criticism is 
pertinent, but what it really does is to urge caution rather than invalidate the
23 As a matter of fact, it matters not a jot to Wells’ story whether moon travel is possible or not.
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thought experiments. Given what we know about the human body, mind and 
brain, none of Parfit’s thought experiments strike me as being technically 
impossible even though to actually perform them would require technology at 
best way beyond our current capabilities and at worst beyond all human 
attainment. But it must be accepted that they may strike others less favourably, 
and in those circumstances, resolving our differences would be very difficult. 
Certainly we would have to consult scientific experts.
If it is uncertain whether a thought experiment is technically impossible, is it 
enough that it is logically possible? Technical impossibility is not automatically 
an obstacle to thought experiment. Wilkes discusses Einstein’s thought 
experiment about travelling at the speed of light. Here, the experiment is still 
admissible because the experiment is not telling us about what it is like to travel 
at the speed of light but rather something else about the nature of light, speed 
and time. Wilkes tries to explain how this is acceptable by saying that the 
impossibility in question is not relevant to the experiment’s purpose. However, 
she doesn’t explain this concept of relevance in any detail. So what is relevant 
in the hypothetical thought experiments involving persons? When we imagine 
what would happen if we could divide, be teletransported and so on we are not 
so much interested in what that tells us about such hypothetical phenomena, 
but what it says about ourselves. What is relevant is what the thought 
experiments reveal about what we think ourselves to be, not what they tell us 
about what may happen in far-fetched scenarios. After all. Parfit is not of interest 
because we think we may divide, just as Einstein’s thought experiment is not 
interesting because we think we might travel at the speed of light. Considering 
fission is interesting because it reveals interesting things to us about the way we 
actually are. Without wishing to preempt the remainder of this thesis, we could 
see how such considerations may tell us something about the importance of 
one-one relations with future selves, the relative unimportance of bodily over 
mental continuity and the unimportance of identity. By stretching our concept of
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a person and asking us to consider ourselves in perhaps impossible 
circumstances, we can learn something about the way we actually are. In 
thought experiments, we can isolate elements which we consider important to 
our survival and see whether they are as important as we believe them to be.
Consider a parallel in the philosophy of language. Wittgenstein famously 
claimed, “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" .24 a  talking lion must 
surely be as impossible as a dividing person. The brain power and vocal 
apparatus of lions would make it as impossible for a lion to talk as it would for us 
to divide the brain stem. Indeed, it may be more impossible, as for a lion to ever 
be able to speak would require changes in lions themselves to the extent that it 
would doubtful whether we still had the same animal, whereas it is possible that 
dividing the brain may only require advances in technology. But Wittgenstein’s 
interest was not in talking lions, but in the importance of shared social practices 
for meaning. Imagining the impossible case of a talking lion is merely a way of 
crystallising the issue. In the fission case, we could equally imagine the perhaps 
impossible case of a divisible brain. But our interest isn’t really in dividing 
persons but how much importance we give uniqueness, our bodies and our 
mental lives in personal survival, and therefore how important such factors are 
in ordinary life.
To summarise; Wilkes’ makes some telling criticisms of the use of thought 
experiments. Against this attack I have put up three lines of defence. Firstly, on 
the requirement that the background conditions must be fully specified, I answer 
that in Parfit’s key thought experiments they are. In all of them, we need only 
imagine one type of operation existing which does not exist now. There is no 
reason to suppose that they are not technically possible. But it can also be 
argued that the thought experiments rely on our accepting certain scenarios as 
technically possible when there are not convincing reasons to suppose that 
they are so possible. Varying one constant, for example, may entail a greater
24 Wittgenstein [1953 ], p223
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departure from our world than is at first apparent. Therefore they may not be 
technically possible. The second line of defence is that sometimes the thought 
experiments as a whole are not technically possible, but the crucial elements of 
the thought experiments, such as the division of consciousness and the 
replacement of physical parts of the body, are technically possible. This, too, 
can be called into question, particularly in thought experiments where mental 
states are transferred. Given our limited knowledge, it is too early to say whether 
these processes are technically possible. Given this uncertainty, it is unwise to 
trust their conclusions too much. The last line of defence is to argue that even if 
they are technically impossible, the experiments are not concerned with 
dividing people but with our actual selves. By imagining ourselves in even 
technically impossible situations, we can learn as much about ourselves as 
Einstein did about the nature of the world by imagining himself travelling at the 
speed of light, which is also technically impossible.
Wilkes has another sort of objection. She claims that there are plenty of real 
cases that can furnish our debate, including foetuses, commisurotomy and 
multiple personality. Given this rich source and the problematic nature of 
hypotheticals, why bother with thought experiments at all? I think we should 
judge by results. Her own work eschewing thought experiments, though 
fascinating, is too inconclusive too often. One feels that the value of thought 
experiments is that real phenomena can be pushed further to a logical 
conclusion and in so doing, the issues can be crystallised. All of Parfit’s thought 
experiments have their start in real life. Fractured consciousness, bodily 
transplants and tissue renewal all exist. To see how important these are, we 
imagine them going that little bit further. If mental continuity is all that counts, 
what if there is only mental continuity and none of body (teletransportation)? If 
identity is what matters, what if there is continuity without identity (Fission)? 
Even if these are technically impossible, considering them is a way of isolating 
the factors we consider to be important and seeing if they really are the crucial
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factors in identity or survival.
3.The Method of Cases.
Mark Johnston’s criticisms of Parfit’s methodology isn’t so reliant on a 
criticism of the use of thought experiments in general. Johnston is more 
concerned with how ‘puzzle cases’, be they actual or imaginary, are used to 
further argument. Johnston refers to this way of argumentation as “the Method of 
Cases”. Firstly, we must see what this method of cases actually is. Johnston 
describes it thus:
Cases real and imaginary are produced. Competing accounts of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity are then 
evaluated simply in accord with how well they jibe with intuitions wrung 
from these c a s e s .25
One such case is that of fission, described in the previous section. The point 
of considering such a case is to help decide between “competing accounts of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity". Psychological 
reductionism gives an account of identity conditions in terms of psychological 
continuity, while physical reductionism claims the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for identity are to be found in bodily continuity. In the Brownson case, 
we are asked to consider who Brownson could best be said to be. The intuitive 
answer seems to be Brown. Given that he does not have Brown's body, this is 
used to support the psychological criteria and damage the physical criteria 
account. Of course, this is not the end of the debate. The supporter of the 
physical criteria view will try to come up with a counter example, or modify his 
position to, for example, the claim that it is not all the body which determines 
identity, but only key parts of it, namely, the brain.
This argument seems paradigmatic of Johnston’s method of cases. There is 
the real or imaginary case, and the evaluation of competing criteria through how
25 Johnston [1987], p59
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they “jibe with intuitions”. But Johnston has at least three criticisms of this 
procedure. Firstly, he claims that it actually presupposes that reductionism is 
true. Secondly, he criticises the method’s reliance on intuitions. And thirdly, he 
claims it makes ordinary re-identification of persons problematic. These points 
form part of an ongoing argument in Johnston’s paper, but each criticism stands 
independently of the others. Let us consider each of these criticisms in turn.
For the first criticism, Johnston states that the method of cases can only be 
viable if we presuppose the reductionist requirement. This is:
Our grasp of the concept of being the same person should be able to 
be correctly represented as a grasp of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of the predicate “is the same person,” 
conditions that could be cast in terms of statements about continuity and 
dependence, statements not themselves to be explained in terms of 
statements about personal identity.26
Johnston says that if we choose to give up the reductionist requirement, that 
means we would have adopted what Parfit calls the “further-fact view”. 27 On this 
view, personal identity is not constituted purely by facts concerning mental and 
physical continuity. Certainly, it is the case that such facts constitute evidence 
for personal identity, but they are not that in which personal identity consists. If 
we adopt this view, then the method of cases loses all validity. In the Brownson 
case, for example, we are presented with a bizarre situation where two factors 
which normally constitute good evidence for personal identity -  psychological 
and bodily continuity -  are separated. But then there is nothing in the cases that 
could make us decide whether personal identity holds or not, as the cases do 
not describe what happens to that in which personal identity does consist. We 
may feel the evidence points more towards one way or the other, but it would 
seem bizarre to reach any conclusions about personal identity from such 
inconclusive evidence. So for any holder of the further-fact view, puzzle cases
26 ibid, p60
27 ibid, p62
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offer no hope of deciding the issue.
Johnston is right in that such cases as the Brownson example would hold no 
interest for the further-fact theorist. Anyone who believes that personal identity is 
a matter of the continued existence of an immaterial soul, for example, would 
simply find the descriptions incomplete. However, this is not in itself an 
argument against the method of cases. Firstly, if we could have already 
eliminated the further-fact view by some other form of argument, there would be 
nothing wrong in deciding between competing reductionist views by the method 
of cases. It is only if the method of cases is the only method available for the 
reductionist that any inadequacy could be attributed to it. But secondly, there 
seems to me to be no good reason why the method cannot have a place in the 
assessment of further fact views. Indeed, one of the great criticisms of further- 
fact views was given by John Locke, using a version of the method of cases:
Let anyone reflect upon himself and conclude that he has in himself 
an immaterial spirit, which is that which thinks in him and in the constant 
change of his body keeps him the same, and is that which he calls 
himself, let him also suppose it to be the same soul that was in Nester or 
Theorists at the siege of Troy. [...] But he now having no consciousness 
of any of the actions either of Nester or Thersites, does he or can he 
conceive himself the same person with either of them? 28 
Locke had already defined ‘person’ as a “thinking intelligent being that has 
reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different 
times and places”29 . But the thought experiment with Nester and Theorists is 
not there simply to show how the person with the same soul cannot be the same 
person given Locke’s definition. It is rather that this example provides evidence 
in favour of Locke’s view over that of the soul view. What it suggests is that, 
whether or not there is some further fact concerning ourselves, it is wrong to 
place our identity in this further fact. In this way, it is a perfect example of the
28 Locke [1694], Chapter XXVII, Para. 13
29 ibid, Para. 9
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method of cases at work; an imaginary case is produced and the two competing 
accounts of personal identity are judged as to how well they fit our intuitions 
about the story. And there seems no way in which the further-fact theorist can 
simply claim that this argument does not apply to him.
So, not only is it possible for the method of cases to be of relevance to the 
further-fact theorist, even when this is not so, this cannot be a criticism of it 
unless the reductionist uses it as his only tool. So much for the claim that the 
method of cases presupposes reductionism. What about Johnston’s second 
claim, that the method relies too much on intuitions? Before discussing this 
further, it is worth making the general point that we must not overstate the role of 
intuitions in this methodology. Consider Parfit, whose work is the subject of 
much of Johnston's attack. Two facts should set off a few warning bells for 
Johnston. Firstly, Parfit claims his view is a revisionary oneso, which surely must 
entail overturning some intuitions we at present have. Secondly, many of 
Parfit’s conclusions even Parfit claims to be counter-intuitive. 3i These two facts 
sit uncomfortably with a view that the ultimate arbiter for Parfit is intuition. The 
point is that Parfit is also looking for overall coherence and consistency. Where 
intuitions are in conflict with consistency, it is the intuitions that go, not the 
consistency. Although these comments should make us wary about Johnston’s 
caricature of Parfit and general critique of intuition, Johnston is also making a 
specific criticism about the results the use of intuitions yield in one particular 
case.
With these warnings, let us turn to the problem case at the heart of 
Johnston’s critique. He takes up Bernard Williams’ conundrum. We are to 
imagine a machine which is able to record brain states in two different people 
and then re-programme the brains so that the original brain states of A are now 
in B and vice-versa. On the assumption that brain states are nomically
30 Parfit, Introduction, x
31 “We are naturally inclined to believe that that our identity is always determinate... this natural 
belief cannot be true.” ibid, p217
Chapter Three 79
connected with mental states, the result would be that A and B had swapped 
psychologies. The effect of this swapping would be the same as that of a brain 
swap, without the messy surgery. A supporter of the psychological view of 
personal identity would use this to support the claim that A was now B and vice- 
versa. This is because, if we were to imagine ourselves as either A or B before 
the operation, and we were asked to choose which person would be given a lot 
of money as opposed to being tortured after the operation, we would choose the 
person who would wake up with our psychologies. To show that this is right, we 
can imagine that the person who wakes up in B’s body would think to 
themselves “I am A”, and would be relieved if he remembered requesting riches 
for B’s body and sorry if he had chosen torture.
But what now if we imagine something slightly different. We are to imagine 
that we require very painful surgery that cannot be performed under 
anaesthetic. But what the doctors suggest is that, before our operation, our brain 
states are read into a computer and the brain states of another person are read 
into the brain. Then, after the operation, our original brain states will be read 
back into our brains. Johnston says that:
A might reasonably retort that he is being asked to undergo a double 
assault. First, his brain is to be fiddled with in a fairly drastic way so as to 
produce radical psychological discontinuity, and then he is to be caused 
to feel severe pain. And this reaction is in accord with the intuition most 
of us would have about the case.32
But, of course, this situation should provoke the same intuition as the original 
case. For in both of them, according to the psychological criteria theorist, there 
is no psychological continuity between the original person and the person who, 
in the same body, is to suffer severe pain. But in fact, the second story wrings 
out the intuition that our bodily continuity does matter.
What Johnston claims this shows is that, if it is so easy to show how
32 Johnston [1987], p66
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ostensibly the same case can wring out totally different intuitions, then how can 
intuitions be of any use here? As he puts is:
How can intuitions be reliable if we can be got to react so differently
to the very same case?33
The cases are not literally “the very same", but in both cases brain states are 
copied and wiped from the brain of the human being before that human being is 
tortured. At this point we should disentangle two different points in Johnston’s 
critique. Firstly, there is the local objection that in these cases of exchanges of 
psychology, intuitions are of little use because, depending on how we tell the 
story, we can wring out conflicting intuitions. Secondly, this specific case should 
cast doubt on the general validity of trusting our intuitions. To corrupt Descartes: 
Johnston has found that intuitions deceive, and it is prudent never to trust 
completely those who have deceived us even once. It may well appear that 
Johnston only needs to establish his first, specific point to make his objection 
stick. But this is not the case. The fact that intuitions can conflict in a puzzle case 
leaves us with three possibilities. Firstly, it could be that the puzzle case itself is 
unsuitable and should be set aside. But unless we reject the use of thought 
experiments in general, it cannot be right to declare any particular thought 
experiment unsuitable just because our initial intuitions about it conflict. Given 
that Johnston does not critique thought experiments in general and given our 
considerations in section 1 of this chapter, we can set this possibility aside. That 
leaves two possible courses of action. Either we find some way of deciding 
which of our intuitive reactions is correct by probing them further, or we attempt 
to solve the problem without the use of our intuitions at all.
It is clear from Parfit’s comments about the very counter intuitiveness of his 
position that he would go for the first of these courses of action. That intuitions 
conflict is not the end of the story as there is more to the method of cases than 
brute intuitions. Nobody who uses the method of cases would want to claim that
33 ibid. p67
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intuitions were infallible. In a case where intuitions were in conflict, the task 
would then be to see which of the intuitions has to be eliminated. There are 
various ways of doing this. If it is the case that the view supported by either of 
the intuitions is incoherent or contradictory in some way, then that would 
provide an excellent reason for claiming that one story succeeds in eliciting a 
misconceived intuition. We could also place the particular thought experiment 
within the context of other thought experiments and arguments. If it is the case 
that other thought experiments support one intuition rather than the other, then 
this would suggest which of the intuitions is more suspect. We could then try to 
see if either of the intuitions rests on a mistaken belief or a trick of the mind in 
much the same way as Hume tried to explain how we get the idea of causation.
How could we explain away the intuition that we would have something to 
fear if our brains were wiped and then that body were to be tortured? Imagine 
that instead of brain-wiping, the operation will be performed with a general 
anaesthetic, but at a time before anaesthetic was generally known about. If we 
explained what was going to happen to A, he may well have a lot of 
apprehension about what will happen to him. The state of being anaesthetised 
is simply so alien to him that he cannot imagine being operated on and not 
being conscious of it. It is hard for us to imagine, being so used to the concept of 
anaesthesia, just how possible it would be for someone unfamiliar with it to 
have the terrible intuition that they will not be able to operated on without feeling 
pain. They too may feel as if they were gong to be subjected to a “double 
assault”34 of anaesthesia and being cut open. It is open for the supporter of the 
psychological criteria of personal identity to explain our intuitions about the 
second case in a similar way, and to argue that, if we were familiar with brain- 
wiping technology, we would not react to an impending operation undertaken in 
this way as a “double-assault”. Familiarity would make it as innocuous as an 
operation under anaesthetic.
34 ibid, p66
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Another way of explaining away the intuition would be to appeal to Nozick’s 
idea of the closest continuerss . Nozick has put forward a theory of personal 
identity that claims that I am identical with whatever future person is the closest 
continuer of me who is not a closer continuer of someone else. The 
inadequacies of this as an account of personal identity have been pointed out 
many times.36 But the view does suggest a psychological point that we will tend 
to view such a closest continuer as myself unless we have good reasons not to. 
Hence in the absence of any fully-formed beliefs about personal identity that 
conflict with the intuition, we will view the mind-wiped future person as 
ourselves. A Parfitian view may well provide the fully-formed beliefs that will 
explain why we actually have nothing to fear from such a process.
I need to stress that these explanations of how we come to have a wrong 
intuition play no part in deciding which of the intuitions is correct. We do this by 
examining them for consistency, both internal and in relation with other cases 
we consider and other intuitions we have. Only then do we do the necessary 
work of explaining how it is that our intuitions came up with conflicting views. 
This is how the reductionist should deal with cases where intuitions conflict. 
What Johnston needs to show is that this strategy is defective. If he doesn't, then 
the fact that intuitions conflict in itself cannot be an objection to the reductionist 
programme.
But Johnston does not deal with this head on. Instead, he offers an 
alternative strategy which he claims is better because it depends on intuitions 
less. His method has two stages, the first of which concentrates on ordinary 
reidentification, by which he means the way in which we identify people in 
actual everyday life. He then adds:
Of course it may be that a number of competing theories survive this 
first stage. The surviving competitors may then be evaluated in terms of 
their compatibility with our reactions to those puzzle cases which
35 Nozick [1981], Chapter One.
36 Notably, by Noonan [1985] and Parfit, Appendix E, pp477-479.
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provide situations in which the competing theories diverge in their 
pronouncements. But these intuitive reactions are defeasible judgments, 
which we can defeat by showing they are over generalisations from the 
ordinary run of cases or are produced by some distorting influence or 
are outweighed by other judgments that we have reason to respect.37 
I have argued already that no supporter of the method of cases would 
dispute that judgments wrought from intuitions are defeasible. In which case, 
the difference between Johnston’s position and the one he is attacking seems 
to be dissolving. For the only difference that now remains is that Johnston 
considers that other avenues should be explored before adopting the method of 
cases. But even here. I’m not sure that Johnston is accurately representing his 
opponents. After all, considered historically, it could be argued that the method 
of cases only has the priority it has now precisely because previous attempts to 
trace personal identity through more commonplace routes proved inconclusive. 
Seen in this way, Parfit et al are working in Johnston’s second stage, because 
the first stage is taken to have been thoroughly worked by their predecessors.
Johnston’s second criticism does not therefore convince. He admits that 
intuitions have a role in the debate, and so the only real criticism that remains is 
that they are overused. I would argue that there is little evidence that they have 
been overused. What Johnston’s argument does highlight is that we must be 
very careful to make sure that this really is not the case in the specific 
arguments we formulate. But Johnston has not shown that the use of intuitions 
should be at all eliminated from our methodology. In the particular case he 
highlights, he has given us no reasons why it should be abandoned. Certainly, 
if psychological reductionism depended entirely on this one case, then there 
would be a problem. But as it is only one argument amongst many, the fact that 
different intuitions can be elicited from it is not reason enough for us to abandon 
the use of intuitions altogether. And Johnston has not shown that psychological
37 Johnston [1987], pp63-64
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reductionism does depend on intuitions wrought from this one case. But what is 
more important for this thesis, Johnston has failed to establish that the method 
of cases is fundamentally flawed, even if doubts still remain as to the best way 
to interpret the brain wiping case.
Now we must look at Johnston's final objection, that the method of cases 
yields criteria of personal identity that makes ordinary reidentification 
problematic. This objection seems to me the most puzzling of the three. The 
argument is that, taken to its logical conclusion, the method of cases yields the 
result that we are 'bare loci' of mental life. Given that he reaches this conclusion 
based upon misreadings of the method of cases which I outlined above, I will 
not concern myself with that argument here. But once this conclusion is 
reached, he states;
The crucial point is that our ordinary claims to know that our friends 
and familiars were continuously where their bodies were when they 
were unconscious or in deep sleep rests on nothing like the employment 
of ...a theory to rule out the possibility that any number of bare loci came 
to be associated with their bodies during such periods.38 
In other words, the bare loci view allows for the possibility of a succession of 
bare loci inhabiting the same body, and yet as normal re-identification makes 
no allowances for this and yet still works, the bare loci view must be suspect. 
Firstly, this seems no more than an appeal to the principle of ordinary re­
identification anyway. We have not yet seen why this principle is so important. 
Secondly, as Snowdon points out, sleep poses no particular problem at all:
His example of sleep can be given the obvious answer that there is 
very good evidence that people do not quit their normal body links 
during sleep, namely, that, however random the timing of reawakening 
they are always there when reawakened. 39
It can thus be seen that it is not at all clear that the method of cases does
38 ibid, p74
39 Snowdon [1991], p i 24
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yield a result that conflicts with principles of ordinary re-identification, and that 
Johnston seems to have no argument for holding to this principle at all. Indeed, 
he introduces the principle of ordinary re-identification with the line, "Here's a 
suggestion”40 . But is there anything to be said for the principle? Certainly, any 
philosophical view that results in a radical scepticism over something we 
believe to be unproblematic is sure to raise suspicion, although that in itself is 
not an argument against it. But it seems odd that Johnston requires the theory of 
personal identity to allow reidentification “in just the way in which we reliably 
and unproblematically reidentify ourselves and each other over time”.4i Take a 
mundane substance like gold, for example. We have our own reliable and 
unproblematic way of identifying gold, even though the true test of goldness 
requires chemical analysis most of us don’t even understand. But this scientific 
principle does not cast doubt on our ordinary ability to do the job. Certainly, we 
make mistakes with our everyday method, but we also do so when re-identifying 
people. Similarly, there seems no reason why the principles of personal identity 
over time cannot be based on factors quite different from those of our ordinary 
methods without casting doubt upon them. So if, for example we choose a 
psychological criterion of personal identity, because, as a matter of fact, we 
neither perform brain transplants nor teletransportation, our ordinary methods of 
reidentification do not come into doubt. And in actual puzzle cases, such as 
senility or global amnesia, our ordinary methods of reidentification do not yield 
any clear results anyway, so there is no unproblematic standard to measure our 
account against.
In conclusion, then, I would argue that Johnston’s critique of the method of 
cases fails, for the following reasons: Firstly, the method does have a place in 
arguments against further-fact views. But even where it does not, it can be used 
to help decide between reductionist views where we have already eliminated 
further-fact views by other methods. Secondly, it is not a method that relies
40 Johnston [1987], p63
41 ibid
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solely on intuitions, and therefore has a better foundation than Johnston 
believes. Consistency and explanatory value are two further requirements that 
our intuitive judgments must meet if they are to be acceptable. Thirdly, there is 
no reason to believe that the method yields results that would oblige us to give 
up our ordinary, unproblematic methods of reidentification over time.
It is as a result of all of these considerations that Johnston concludes that:
[..] it is plausible to take our pure concept of a person, understood as 
whatever it is that our reactions to these puzzle cases manifest, as being 
too unspecific to be of much interest, and as unspecific in a way that will 
typically lead us wrong in many puzzle cases.42
In which ways does ’person’ mislead for Johnston? It leads us (arguably) to 
accept a bare locus view of the self that makes ordinary reidentification 
problematic. And it leads to imaginings or thought experiments which are "idle” 
because they rest upon the employment of untrustworthy intuitions. I have 
answered both these accusations. But, nonetheless, Johnston’s suggestion that 
the term person is “too unspecific" does raise the important issue of just how 
wise we are to employ this term.
4. Persons, Animals and Humans.
Locke made a very compelling distinction in his Essay which greatly 
influenced subsequent discussions:
It being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, 
and a third the same person, if person, man and substance are three 
names standing for different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to 
that name, such must be the identity.43
To dissect precisely what Locke meant here would require us to look at what 
ideas’ meant for Locke. Fortunately, we do not need to do so, because what I 
am chiefly concerned with here is how Locke’s basic distinction between man
42 ibid, p71
43 Locke [1694], Chapter 27, para.7
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and person has been used by philosophers rather than with Locke’s particular 
theory. As such, I am not at this stage interested in Locke’s particular 
conception, but with how we can make sense of the supposed person/man 
distinction.44 The basis of this distinction is a principle that applies to far more 
than men and persons. It is the idea that there are many things which fall under 
more than one sortal concept, and as the identity conditions for each sortal it 
falls under differs, so an object can cease to exist qua one sortal but continue to 
exist qua another. For example, something can be both a statue and a lump of 
bronze. But if this is melted down, although it ceases to exist qua statue, it 
continues to exist qua lump of bronze.
Applied to ourselves, the idea is that we are persons’ and ‘men’. A person is 
a “thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider 
itself as itself’’4S whereas a man is simply a member of the species homo 
sapiens. What has provided the whole possibility of a debate over personal 
identity is the idea that the lives of a ‘person’ and a man’ can come apart. This 
can be imagined in cases of a person changing bodies, or a human being 
losing all faculties deemed necessary for it to be a person, but for that human 
still to be alive. Furthermore, there is the possibility of non-human persons. If we 
deny the possibility of person and human being having different identity 
conditions then there seems to be little to distinguish the philosophical problem 
of personal identity from that of the identity of any other animal.
There are two types of objection to the idea that our existence qua person 
may differ in extension to our existence qua human being. One is to deny the 
general possibility that one thing can fall under different sortais to which 
different identity conditions apply. The other is to object to the more specific 
distinction between ‘man’ and person’. To do the first type of objection any 
justice would require a study beyond the scope of this thesis.46 Therefore in
4 4 1 shall return to Locke’s particular view in §7.1
45 Locke [1694], Chapter 27, para.9.
46 My final position does not require an answer to this general problem.
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what follows, I shall be considering only the second kind of objection. These will 
of course imply more general points, but I must leave the development of these 
to others. What I shall be doing here is looking at some arguments which at first 
glance could seem extremely important for personal survival, but in fact, still 
leave questions begging. In what follows, I shall stick to the two examples 
already given of human/person and statue/bronze.
One counter argument is to claim that rather than there being one object 
which falls under two sortais in cases such as those of the statue and the lump 
of bronze, there are in fact various different objects present all along. For 
example, it has been argued that the only way to make sense of the bronze and 
statue case is to propose that, contrary to common sense, there is not one thing 
there which is both a statue and a lump of bronze, but rather two separate 
things which happen to be co-extensive.47 The evidence for this is that they do 
in fact cease to be co-extensive when the statue is melted, which is precisely 
the same evidence cited as a reason for saying there is one thing which falls 
under two sortais! Similarly, we are wrong to think that we are one thing which 
is both a man and a person, but rather there are two distinct but coexistent 
things, a human being and a person. The problem now becomes; which of 
these two objects is the true referent of T? This way of explaining how one 
object can apparently fall under different sortais can be attacked on many fronts, 
not least on the grounds of its ontological extravagance. There is, however, no 
need for us to take issue with this viewpoint, because it reinforces rather than 
challenges the view that person' and 'human being’ can come apart. As long 
as this remains a possibility, we are free to continue our investigation.
A second possible line of objection that has a prima facie relevance is based 
on the work of Saul Kripke on necessity. Kripke has argued that if X and Y are 
rigid designators, that is to say, terms that designate “the same object in all
47 If we consider the four-dimensional ontology favoured by Lewis, as outlined in §2.2 , we can 
see quite easily how two different perdurers or four dimensional-worms’ can share a common set 
of stages, just as two roads can have a stretch in common.
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possible worlds”48 then "for any objects x and y, if x is y, then it is necessary that 
X is y."49 Kripke mainly discusses necessary identity relations, but Kripke uses 
the same principle where ‘is’ refers to constitution, so For example, he would 
argue that "water is H2O” is necessarily true as both “water” and "H2O” are rigid 
designators.51 It appears that this issue is very important for personal identity. 
For if, as many reductionists claim, persons are not “separately existing entities, 
apart from our brains and bodies”52, and it can be shown that persons are 
necessarily their brains and bodies i.e. human beings, then it is hard to see how 
a person can survive the destruction of their body.
Does Kripke’s view entail that persons are necessarily human beings? It 
would seem not. For anyone who accepts Locke’s definition of a person, or 
something similar, person’ is not a rigid designator. This is because anything 
which matches the definition of person, or any similar definition, would be a 
person. In other possible worlds, ‘person’ may designate something other than 
the actual persons in our world. Compare this with water. One could hold up a 
glass of water and pointing at it say, “water is whatever natural kind this stuff 
turns out to be”. It turns out to be H2O, and so water cannot be anything else. But 
one does not turn to a person and say, “a person is whatever natural kind this 
being turns out to be”. It is part of the concept ‘person’ that a being can be a 
person regardless of the natural kind to which they belong. We cannot conclude 
that because the persons around here are human beings, a person must be a 
human being. Wiggins denies this, and I shall return to this denial shortly.
Although Kripke’s view does not entail that all persons are human beings, it 
could be argued that for any particular human person, the fact that that person is
48 Kripke [1971], p172
49 ibid, p i 63
50 In the sentence ‘a person is a human being’, is the ‘is’ one of identity or constitution? I take it to 
be the ‘is’ of constitution, but as the same Kripkean necessities apply for constitution and identity 
relations, one could read it as an ‘is’ of identity without affecting my arguments.
51 The actual example Kripke give is of heat’ and ‘The motion of molecules’.
52 Parfit p216
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that human being is a necessary truth. Consider Kripke’s discussion of a 
wooden lectern. Of course, there is no general necessity for lecterns to be made 
of wood. But the more interesting question is, “could this very lectern have been 
made from the very beginning of its existence from ice?”53 He concludes, rightly 
I believe, no. But as he acknowledges, “the question of whether it could 
afterward, say in a minute from now, turn into ice is something else". These 
considerations help to reduce the relevance of essentialism in our debate on 
persons. The essentialist holds that, if this lectern is made of wood then had it 
not been made of wood then it could not be this lectern. Similarly, if I (this 
person) am constituted by this body and brain, i.e., this animal, then had I not 
been this animal I would not have been this person. This says nothing about 
whether I could, in the future, cease to be this animal.
On their own then, there is nothing in Kripke’s arguments concerning the 
necessity of identity and constitution that makes a distinction and possible 
separation between persons and human beings impossible. I am not saying 
that Kripke’s ideas have no place in the personal identity debate. All I am saying 
is that there is large gap between the state of the debate now and it having 
anything conclusive to say about personal survival.
Wiggins has followed the second line I outlined above, which I believe 
causes more difficulties for the reductionist. This strategy focuses not on the 
general issue of sortais and objects but on the particular case of human beings 
and persons. There seems to me to be two distinct lines of argument that 
characterise Wiggins’ work in this area. Firstly, there is the argument that 
although we are persons, to understand what we essentially are we have to 
consider ourselves as human beings. Secondly, there is the argument that 
‘human being’ and ‘person’ are co-extensive terms. I shall start with the first of 
these arguments.
As I discussed in §2.2, Wiggins makes use of Locke’s distinction between
53 Kripke [1971], p179
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natural and nominal essences. While real essences are out there in the world 
whether we discover them or not, nominal essences are constructs which we fit 
the world into. Hence a cardboard box has a real essence which is its molecular 
structure and so on, while it’s nominal essence depends on what it is used for, 
storing objects or as a table, for example. A nominal essence is definitional, that 
is to say, a table is whatever is used as a surface for writing, eating off or placing 
drinks and so on. ‘Person’ seems to be a nominal term, because whatever fits 
the definition of a person, be that definition Lockean or a variant, is a person. 
Locke, Dennett et al, in their attempts to formulate conditions of personhood are 
trying to get at the best definition of the term, not conducting an empirical 
investigation as to what persons are in the way that metallurgists discovered 
what gold really is. ‘Human being’ is quite different. We can discover what a 
human being is only by scientific investigation. It is our assumption that there 
just is a natural kind, homo sapiens, of which it is our job to discover the 
essence.
When we consider what we are, we discover that we are persons and we 
are human beings. Which of these terms captures best what we essentially are? 
Wiggins’ view is that if we really want to know what we are then it makes more 
sense to consider our natural essence rather than our nominal essence. As 
natural essences are concerned with the way the world is carved up, rather than 
with the way we carve up the world, our natural essence should give a more 
accurate picture of what we really are. So to discover what we really are, we 
should consider ourselves human beings. Our conditions of identity are then 
determined in the same way as any other animal’s conditions of identity, in a 
way which fits the natural continuation of a living organism.
This is certainly a strong objection against any form of psychological 
reductionism that defines personal identity in non-physical terms. But it runs up 
against the same problems I discussed in chapter two. Whether or not ‘person’ 
is a nominal or natural term, the first person question of survival remains open. It
î—!)
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may be that our Identity conditions should be determined in the same way as 
any animals, but if this only answers the third person question of identity and not 
the first person question of survival, then the relevance requirement has not 
been met. We would only have answered one of the puzzles of personal identity 
and this is not, I have argued, the question most pertinent to our interests in 
persons, as persons ourselves. Wiggins’ argument is, however, still important, 
because if we were to conclude that the answer to the first-person question of 
survival involves identity, then it would rule out psychological reductionism.
Wiggins’ point may actually strengthen the case that identity is not part of the 
answer to the first person question of survival. Consider myself and a bodily 
continuous future person who has fallen into madness, recalls nothing of my life 
up until this descent into madness and has a totally different character to me. 
How should I think of this person? Should I make provision for him? These are 
important questions. Now, I am told that this person will be me, because identity 
is determined by the identity of the human animal. This doesn’t seem to answer 
my worries. It may well influence my decisions in some way, but it leaves other 
questions like, “Should I consider my relation to that future person as being as 
important to me as the normal relations I have with myself at other times?" And 
these questions seem to be the important ones.
Wiggins’ second line of argument has been to argue that the concepts of a 
particular person and a particular animal cannot be disentangled. 54 if we are 
careful enough in our analysis of the term ‘person’, then prima facie cases 
where there are persons without human beings, or human beings without 
persons will be discredited. I have already suggested why, if we accept a 
Lockean definition of a person, (and I see no reason why we should not), then 
the sortal “person" is not constricted to the natural kind actual persons happen 
to be. Snowdon also rejects Wiggins’ view, claiming that it ultimately depends 
upon the claim that animals are “of necessity the unique possessors of mental
54 Wiggins [1987]
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states,” and that “neither Wiggins nor anyone else has given persuasive 
grounds for this claim."55 But he concludes his discussion of Wiggins with an 
interesting suggestion;
‘Person’ in its psychological use should be thought of as a term 
which can apply to entities of different types, which does not pick out 
what we fundamentally are, and does not pick out a sort sharing criteria 
of identity.
This is only a suggestion and Snowdon as yet has no argument to back it 
up, but it does seem to me to express quite succinctly the essence of the doubt 
people have about this term ‘person’. What follows is my attempt to unpack this 
suggestion and may or may not represent Snowdon’s own thoughts.
Let us return to Locke’s original definition of a person. What we have here 
can be read as a list of attributes. A person is a thing which can reason and 
think. But as to what sort of thing it is which has these attributes, the definition is 
neutral. Locke’s definition allows for carbon, silicone or spiritual persons. In that 
sense, Snowdon is right to say that person’ “can apply to entities of different 
types”. One can think of many other terms which apply across types. 
Scavengers can be many different sorts of animals, ‘fast things’ can be 
mechanical, organic or chemical. But in these cases, the thing which qualifies 
as a person, scavenger or fast thing is not usually individuated by that attribute. 
The formula one car that breaks down or the scavenger that turns vegetarian 
ceases to be a fast thing or a scavenger, but does not cease to exist. Similarly, if 
a human being ceases to think and reason, it may cease to be a person but 
does not cease to exist. Furthermore, transference of an attribute need not take 
identity with it. Let us say that scientists remove the scavenger gene (which 
almost certainly does not exist, but let us imagine it does) and transfers it into a 
sheep and that engineers remove the formula one car’s engine and put it in a 
Lada. We do not say that the Lada now is the formula one car or that the sheep
55 Snowdon [1994]. MS
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is the very same animal as the now ex-scavenger. Similarly, so an argument 
may run, if we transfer the attributes of reason, memory and so on from one 
organism to another, surely this does not take identity with it. This kind of 
reasoning must be what motivates the sort of objection Snowdon offers. Person 
is a term that covers anything with a certain set of attributes, but it is unable to 
pinpoint what anything which falls under this term fundamentally is. So it is in 
vain that we look for identity conditions in the continuation of these attributes. 
Instead, identity conditions can only be obtained by looking at the natural kind 
which supports these attributes, in our case, human beings.
Wiggins says something very similar in Sameness and Substance. He 
entertains the possibility that person is a “concept whose defining marks are to 
be given in terms of a natural kind determinable, say animal, plus what may be 
called a functional or systematic component". 56 This would make person' rather 
like ‘vegetable’. Vegetables are any number of natural kinds whose root, fruit or 
leaf is savoury and edible. So although they are defined functionally, their 
identity conditions are given by their natural kind. He dubs this view ‘animal 
attribute view’. He goes on to say that ‘person’ differs from ‘vegetable’ because 
“the definition of ‘person’ is not something we conceive for ourselves in the way 
in which we have conceived for ourselves the nominal essences for ‘hoe’ or 
‘house’.”57 The attributes of persons are therefore discovered by finding out the 
attributes of human beings, for Wiggins, the only real persons there are.
These considerations of natural kind and attribute put the issues before us 
sharply in focus. I agree that for token identity, we would be foolish to trace a 
continuation of attributes. But I have already rejected the idea of identity as 
being unproblematically a crucial part of the answer to the first-person question 
of survival. This allows for the possibility that in cases where there is 
continuation of attributes there is also what is necessary for personal survival. I 
have argued that what matters may not be identity but continuation of some
56 Wiggins [1988], p i 71
57 ibid, p i73
Chapter Three 95
kind. If then all the attributes that make me, now, a person, continue, and what is 
important is that I am a person and not this animal, then can I not view this as 
survival? It is certainly not survival of me as I am now, but it may well be survival 
of all that matters about me now. I would be in a similar position to the British 
person facing Euro-integration that I described in §2.1. The thing which I care 
about will not continue to exist but what I care about in that thing will continue to 
exist. Nostalgia may induce a touch of sadness but I have no real reason to feel 
that the future is any worse from my point of view than it is now.
I should stress once more that this possible view of personal survival is not 
one which I have presented strong arguments for. What it rather does is open 
the door for a way of understanding personal survival in a different way. The 
crucial point is simply that unless token identity is shown to be crucial to 
answering the first person question of survival, then there is no reason to 
suppose that we cannot talk about survival of the person as distinct from the 
survival of a numerically identical human being.
If this is correct, then the animalist could be right without threatening my 
position. All the following can be true:
(1) Persons are humans.
(2) Personal identity is identity of the human animal.
(3) We can find out more about persons by studying actual persons i.e. 
Human beings.
(4) Personal survivaiss does not imply personal identity but the 
continuation of those aspects of the person which are most 
valuable, namely those aspects to do with consciousness, character 
and memory.
This justifies looking at the issue of persons. If instead we looked solely at 
human beings, then we would be rejecting the possibility of (4) being true out of 
hand.
58 As defined In chapter two
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In this chapter I have considered the twin bases of our enquiry -  its key 
concepts and methodology. The criticisms that have been directed at these two 
bases all have something important to say and our review of them has revealed 
important things about our enterprise. We have found that person is unlikely to 
be a suitable concept to gather identity conditions under, but that nonetheless, 
persons, not human beings, can still be our primary concern. We have got 
clearer on why and how thought experiments work and we have also seen 
some of the traps the ‘Method of Cases’ must avoid. Now, we can begin.
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Introduction
Having set out certain requirements for a philosophy of persons and 
defended the use of certain methodologies and concepts, I will now turn to 
consider one particular position on the issue, namely Parfit’s version of 
psychological reductionism.1 I shall not be arguing for this view from first 
principles. The pedigree of psychological reductionism in general has been 
established historically, and developed ingeniously by Parfit, and so there is 
nothing I could add in support of the basic principles of Parfit’s conception. 
However, I do believe that there are significant flaws in Parfit’s position and my 
aim is to remove these flaws whilst retaining the essential elements of the 
Parfitian conception.
I argue that there are features of Parfit’s psychological reductionism which 
appear essential to it, even though they can and should be removed. In part 
two, I distinguish the essential elements of Parfitian psychological reductionism 
from certain unfortunate features which have come to characterise the account 
and then come up with a revised view of what psychological reductionism is 
which I hope leaves out those features of it which are unacceptable.
Before beginning, it would be worthwhile giving an overview of what is to 
come, even though there may be a certain opacity in this summary that I hope 
will be removed over the remainder of this thesis. Parfit’s position will Parfit’s 
position has three characteristic features, all of which I believe can be retained 
after my revisions. The first of these features is the explanation of what is 
required for a unified mental life in terms of psychological connectedness and 
continuity. I will argue that Parfit’s account of this. Relation R, is flawed, but that 
we can replace it with a better explanation which fulfils the same basic function 
as Relation R. A unified mental life can be explained in terms of psychological
1 All referencees hitherto to Parfit will be to Reasons and Persons unless otherwise indicated.
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connectedness and continuity, but not in the way Parfit attempts to do so. The 
second feature is that there can be a unified mental life without personal 
identity. The third feature is that it is the unified mental life, not personal identity, 
which matters in survival. The question of what is meant by “what matters” will 
be dealt with in chapter six.
It is clear that the main one of these claims is the first, namely that what is 
required for a unified mental life can be explained in terms of psychological 
connectedness and continuity. Such an explanation has two parts: there are the 
relata of such an account, namely thoughts and experiences, and the 
connections between these relata. Chapters four and five deal with important 
problems in the Parfitian conception of persons concerning these two elements. 
In chapter four, I consider whether psychological reductionism requires its relata 
-  thoughts and other mental events -  to be independent of the subjects who 
have them. I argue that there is more to be said on this account than Parfit 
considers, but that a proper appreciation of the issue need not threaten the 
Parfitian conception. Equipped with this better understanding, I turn to the 
relations between thoughts and experiences in chapter five, where I argue that 
Relation R fails to perform the function required of it, but that there is room for an 
alternative which still retains the distinctive Parfitian features. In chapter six I 
take the lessons learned form the largely negative arguments of chapters four 
and five and offer a positive account of how psychological reductionism should 
be described. It will then be the job of part three to assess this revised 
conception and test it against the requirements of part one.
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Parfit and “I”
At the risk of over generalising, it could be said that historically, 
psychological reductionism’s strength has been in its general principles, but it 
has often proved weaker when it comes down to fleshing out its accounts with 
detail. For example, Locke famously located personal identity in the continuity of 
the same consciousness and offered several convincing arguments for this.i 
But on closer examination, his criteria for personal identity were shown to be 
inadequate. Hume’s claim that we cannot locate the self through introspection 
was persuasive, but that left him totally unable to account for the unity of a 
person’s life 2 Parfit makes the opposite type of error. He does try to fill in the 
detail of his position, but in doing so, he loads his thesis with unwelcome and 
unnecessary baggage. In this chapter, I try to unload some of that baggage. 
Parfit claims that reductionism can account for the unity of consciousness over 
time solely in terms of the mental events and the relations between them which 
constitute that life. What is wrong with this and how his errors can be corrected 
is the subject of this chapter.
The key question that is being asked in this chapter is, “Does the nature of 
thoughts in general, and first-person thoughts in particular, entail any facts 
about the subjects of those thoughts?” In other words, can we learn anything 
about persons by considering the nature of the thoughts which constitute a 
person’s mental life? The relationship between thoughts and the subjects of 
those thoughts is a matter of great disagreement. Parfit claims that we can 
describe thoughts and mental events independently of the persons who have 
them.3 What precisely this means, whether or not it us true and the importance 
of this issue for Parfit’s conception of persons are three issues which I consider
1 Locke [1694], Book 2, Chapter 27.
2 Hume [1739], Appendix.
3 Parfit, §81
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In this chapter.
I begin by explaining what a theory’s being reductionist requires and how 
Parfit’s claim that thoughts can be described independently of thinkers fits into 
this reductionism. I then consider two arguments that apparently conflict with the 
claim that thoughts and thinkers can be separated, that recently put fon/vard by 
Quassim Cassam and its archetype, that of Immanuel Kant. I then examine the 
consequences of these claims for the Parfitian approach to personal survival. I 
argue that a Parfitian position can be made compatible with both Kant and 
Cassam’s accounts, though in reconciling these differing positions, revisions 
will have to made to Parfit’s account.
1 .What is Reductionism?
Reductionism means different things in different disciplines and even 
different areas of philosophy. I will not attempt to give a general definition of 
reductionism but will stick to reductionism about persons. Parfit says that all 
reductionists claim;
A person’s existence just consists in the existence of a body, and 
the occurrence of a series of thoughts, experiences, and other mental 
and physical events.4
Prima facie, this is a pretty anodyne definition, and would seem to make 
reductionists of everyone bar those who hold that a person is essentially a soul 
or indivisible Cartesian ego. But this definition does contain a few assumptions 
which when made explicit make it more interesting. Firstly, what characterises 
the reductionist position is not just that reductionism makes it possible to make a 
list of what a person consists in, as above, but that those items on the list are 
taken to be the constituent parts out of which a person is constructed. Parfit’s 
definition suggests that we have a set of ingredients which, when blended 
together, produce a person. The way Parfit explains his reductionism implies
4 Parfit. p216
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the possibility that these ingredients could all have an independent existence, 
without there being any persons. Not everyone who at first glance would accept 
what Parfit’s definition says about persons would accept this. Many would claim 
that although a person is just a body and a series of mental and physical 
events, there is no way any of these events could exist without the existence of 
a person. I shall consider precisely what these claims concerning the 
independence of thoughts amount to shortly.
Secondly, the reductionist account should go at least some of the way 
towards explaining the unity of a person’s life. It is not just that all the elements 
listed together constitute a person, but that the way they come together explains 
how and why persons are what they are and how they are. If the reductionist 
position is true, then it will be possible to explain what makes thoughts and 
events part of the life of a particular person in terms of the constitutive elements 
listed in the definition. Again, I think Parfit fails to explain how this is so, and I 
attempt to show why in the next chapter.
There is more than one reductionist position however, although all would 
agree with the general definition. Parfit describes three positions: Identifying 
Reductionists (IR), Constitutive Reductionists (OR) and Eliminative Reductionists 
(ER). Their differing claims are:
IR: Persons just are bodies.
OR: A person is an entity that has a body, and has thoughts and other 
experiences. Though persons are distinct from their bodies, and 
from any series of mental events, they are not independent or 
separately existing entities.
ER: There really aren’t such things as persons; there are only brains 
and bodies, and thoughts and other experiences.5 
Parfit claims that he is a constitutive reductionist. Although he claims that we 
could describe the experiences and relations between them which go up to
5 Parfit’s notes on the 1993 Jacobson Lecture, University of London.
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make a person "without claiming that these experiences are had by a person”6, 
this does not make him an eliminative reductionist. This no more follows than it 
does to say that, because we can describe all the parts of a car and the 
relations between them without claiming they are parts of a car, then cars do not 
really exist. The claim that we can describe the constitutive elements of persons 
without mention of persons can be expressed as the claim that there can be a 
personless description of what constitutes persons. The possibility of a 
personless description is a distinctive feature of Parfitian reductionism. 
However, it is not clear what precisely is meant by a personless description and 
how important it is to Parfit’s argument. I conclude in this chapter that in order to 
strengthen the Parfitian view, we will have to rule out the possibility of a 
personless description.
A constitutive reductionist could be a physical or psychological reductionist. 
Both would agree that a person simply is their body, thoughts, events and so on. 
A physical reductionist would claim that it is virtue of continuity of body and or 
brain that these elements are part of the life of a single person, whereas a 
psychological reductionist would claim that it is in virtue of the mental features 
that these elements are part of the life of a single person. For the psychological 
reductionist, a person is defined and individuated by the series of psychological 
events which go up to make the life of that person and not by any facts 
concerning their bodies or brains. In this way, although actual persons are living 
organisms, it is in virtue of their psychological attributes that they are persons, 
and the conditions of identity over time for persons are psychological ones.
Let us consider in more detail what this position entails. It appears to me that 
to be a psychological reductionist entails undertaking two different reductions. 
The first is the “whole to parts” reduction, which is described by Parfit’s general 
definition of reductionism. A person is simply those physical and mental 
elements that together constitute the life of a person. Here, the complex whole -
6 Parfit, p217
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the person -  is reduced to the sum of its simpler parts. But in order to be a 
psychological reductionist, a further, different form of reduction is required. Of all 
the elements which make up a person, one type of element -  the mental -  is 
bracketed off. It is in virtue only of these elements that a person is the particular 
person that he is. For example, it is held that if all the physical matter from which 
a person is made up is changed, as long as there is a continuity of mental life, 
the person will remain the same. This kind of reduction I call a “total to 
essentials" reduction. In this type of reduction, we take any object or 
phenomenon which is constituted by several aspects and reduce it to those 
aspects of the object which are crucial in individuating it. For example, the 
British Labour Party is constituted by its members, organisation, policies and so 
on. But some would argue that what makes the Labour Party what it is is, for 
example, clause four of its constitution. Everything else about the party could 
change, but as long as clause four persisted, it would still be the Labour Party. 
As is clear in this example, the total to essentials reduction is an attempt to 
capture two things. Firstly, it captures the defining features of a thing. A person, 
for the psychological reductionist, is a person precisely because it has a mental 
life. It may require a body to have this mental life, but it is not in virtue of the 
body that the organism is a person. Therefore, despite the fact that a human 
person is a complex organism, its psychological features are what define it as a 
person. As a consequence of this, secondly, it attempts to capture what is 
required for something to remain that thing over time, i.e. it pinpoints those 
elements which must form part of its conditions of identity, or survival, over time.
Although we have seen that there is a two-part reduction here, in Parfit’s 
view the reduction has not yet gone far enough. The problem is this; if persons 
are to be individuated by their mental lives, then how in turn are these to be 
individuated? It is not enough to explain the unity of a person's life in terms of 
the unity of a mental life, we must also explain the unity of the mental life. It is in 
answering this question that Parfit’s reductionism gets more specific and more
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reductive still. Parfit, having already reduced the unity of a person’s life to the 
unity of mental life, now attempts to reduce the unity of mental life to the 
thoughts and experiences that make up this mental life. The claim is that mental 
events belong to the life of a single person because they are interrelated in 
certain ways and not because they are intrinsically owned by one person or 
another. As Cassam describes this position:
It is because the thoughts and experiences themselves and the 
relations between them can be described in impersonal terms that facts 
about the ownership of mental states or events by a subject can be said 
to have received a reductive explanation.^
Parfitian reductionism, according to Cassam, is thus the attempt to reduce 
the personal to the impersonal. In other words, thoughts which are thoughts of a 
person can be described without reference to that person. Furthermore, it is this 
feature which Cassam claims makes the account reductive. On this point, I 
disagree. As I have explained, the reduction of the personal to the impersonal is 
a further reduction that comes after the initial two-stage reduction. So an 
account that didn’t have this last reduction would still be a reductive account. 
There would still be, of course, a need to explain the unity of a mental life, but 
this explanation would not need to be reductive for it to be part of a wider 
reductive account s Nonetheless, Parfit does offer a reduction of the personal to 
the impersonal, although there is an ambiguity in what this could mean, which 
Cassam again notes:
Shoemaker has pressed the question whether Parfit’s impersonal 
description is simply one in which there is no actual reference to 
persons, or whether the entities referred to in impersonal descriptions 
are thought of as capable of existing without there being persons.9 
Cassam thinks Parfit holds the latter, stronger view, but Cassam’s
7 Cassam [1992], p363
8 1 offer such an account of mental unity over time in chapter six. 
9 Cassam [1992], p361
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interpretation of Parfit is not unequivocal. The question for Parfit is then, do the 
thoughts and events which make up a person’s life require the existence of a 
person for their own existence or could they exist if there were no persons at 
all? The weak version of Parfitian reductionism would claim that there is no 
need for thoughts to be capable of independent existence. All that is required is 
that we do not need to refer to persons in our account of what persons are. The 
strong version of Parfitian reductionism says we can imagine being able to 
describe the mental events which could go to make up a person's life without 
there actually being a person at all. What explains the existence of thinking, 
conscious subjects is the existence of thoughts, desires, memories and so on 
which just so happen to be interrelated in the relevant ways. But persons only 
exist because of these interactions and there Is no contradiction in holding that 
any one of the mental events which go towards constituting the life of a person 
could exist without there being any persons at all. Cassam calls this Strong 
Reductionism. This strong view is prime facie far more implausible than the 
weak version. And Cassam argues that strong reductionism is a position that is 
not ultimately tenable because “it is distinctive of a life of a person or subject to 
be self-conscious, and hence to include the thinking of first-person or l-thoughts. 
[...] and the content of a particular l-thought cannot adequately be characterised 
without ascribing it to a particular person or subject."io
Deciding which view Parfit holds is no easy task, as Parfit is far from explicit 
on this point. However, I am not so much concerned with the interpretation of 
Parfit as with the consequences of denying the independence of thoughts. 
There are at least two ways in which this independence can be denied. The first 
is Cassam’s claim that l-thoughts depend ontologically on persons or subjects. 
The second is Kant’s claim that thoughts formally entail a subject. In the 
remainder of this chapter I shall consider and explain both these views and 
examine their consequences for the Parfitian conception. I shall argue that
10 Cassam [1992], p362
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neither claim is fatal to the Parfitian conception, but that both require changes to 
it. I shall begin with Kant’s arguments.
2. Kant: No Thoughts Without a Subject.
Kant’s views on the relations between a thought and its subject are famously 
difficult and I obviously cannot undertake a full account of them here. What I will 
do is simply to try to state key aspects of his position and sketch some of the 
reasons he has for holding them. The account I am focussing on comes in his 
Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant argues that for it to be possible for there to be experience of the world, 
there has to be a fundamental unity within the subject of experience which 
allows the world to be perceived. Kant calls this the transcendental unity of 
apperception; the unity of inner experience necessary for any particular 
experience of the world to be apperceived as part of a wider, unified whole. 
Closely related to this idea is Kant’s claim that there is an "I think” which can 
necessarily accompany all thought. It is this “I think” which allows the manifold 
of experiences to be grasped as a coherent whole in conscious experience. 
Without it, consciousness could only be of a psychedelic series of dissociated 
experiences.
The fact that any thought can be accompanied by an “I think” entails the 
formal requirement that every thought must have a subject. But Kant argued that 
we cannot make any inferences from the fact that thoughts must have a subject 
to the nature of that subject. The transcendental unity of apperception is not an 
object of experience, but that which makes experience possible. Therefore 
knowledge of either what the subject of consciousness is or of the phenomenon 
of consciousness in general cannot be obtained from the unity of apperception. 
This can only come through “intuition”, i.e. experience of objects in the world. 
So there is a distinction between the a priori knowledge of the unity of 
apperception and the empirical knowledge of subjects of consciousness.
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Problems arise when the two are confused.
So Kant actually agrees with Descartes’ starting point, that the cogito, the “I 
think”, is necessary for all thought. It is simply that one cannot move from that to 
any conclusions as to the nature of this cogito. Kant writes of the cogito:
As is easily seen, this is the vehicle of all concepts, and therefore 
also of transcendental concepts, and so is always included in the 
conceiving of these later, and is itself transcendental. But it can have no 
special designation, because it only serves to introduce all our thought, 
as belonging to consciousness.
The fact that I think makes all judgments possible. This form of knowledge, 
knowledge of myself as a subject of thought, is what Kant calls transcendental, 
meaning it is not concerned with objects of intuitions, but the form of 
understanding. All our judgments have the possibility of self-ascription; they can 
all be described in the form “I think X”. So “I think" is simply the wrong sort of 
thing to be an object of the understanding. It is rather the form in which 
understanding is held.
But Kant continues:
However,... it [the cogito?] yet enables us to distinguish, through the 
nature of our faculty of representation, two kinds of objects. T, as 
thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called ‘soul’. That which 
is an object of outer sense is called body . 12 
So although nothing can be inferred from the ‘I think’, there is still the soul, 
the T  of inner sense to deal with. This is where Kant goes on to explain the 
‘rationalist error’ of Descartes, in what Kant calls ‘transcendental paralogisms’. 
A logical paralogism is simply a fallacious syllogism. But "a transcendental 
paralogism is one in which there is a transcendental ground, constraining us to 
draw a formally invalid conclusion”. 13 in other words, because of the way we
11 Kant [1781], A 342
12 ibid
13 Ibid.
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necessarily see the world, we are seduced into making an invalid deduction. 
This is demonstrated in the first paralogism:
That, the representation of which is the absolute subject of our 
judgments and cannot therefore be employed as determination of 
another thing, is substance.
I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible 
judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be employed as 
predicate of any other thing. 14
Therefore I, as thinking being (soul), am substance.
In the second edition, the same argument is put differently:
That which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not 
exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.
A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought 
otherwise than as subject.
Therefore it exists only as subject, that is, as substance. 15
The T  of the first edition becomes the ‘thinking being’ of the second. But in 
both cases, what seems to be the source of the confusion is a mix-up between 
substantial and formal subjects of thought. The first premise seems to concern 
thinking subjects as objects of thought. Both the ‘thats’ of “That, the 
representation of which... " and “that which cannot be thought... " seem clearly to 
be objects which are being thought of and being represented. It follows from 
Kant’s empirical realism that objects that are represented exist and as such are 
substance. The subject here is thus substantial: its existence is empirically 
given. The second premise uses a different employment of T or ‘thinking being’.
14 ibid, A348  
15ibid, B411
Chapter Four 109
In this case, there is no object of intuition, rather, we are talking about the way in 
which a subject of thought must be considered. In Strawson’s words, in this 
case “I” is used as “criterionless self-ascription”. 16 That ‘I’ am subject is analytic; 
it tells us nothing about that to which T refers. The subject here is thus formal, 
i.e. its existence is given, but not empirically, thus there is nothing that can be 
said concerning its substantiality. Now we can see why the conjunction of the 
two premises is a necessary paralogism. The second premise is that we cannot 
be thought of other than as subjects. Though this cannot actually tell us of 
anything beyond the formal requirement for a subject, because in the first 
premise subject’ is substantial, when we conjoin the two premises, which use 
subject’ in different ways, we get a synthetic conclusion apparently proving the 
substantiality of the soul. We must remind ourselves that ‘subject’ is ambiguous, 
in that it can be formal or substantial, and that no conclusion from premises 
which conflate these two meanings can be sound.
This is very important for the argument in the third paralogism concerning 
personal identity;
That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different 
times is in so far a person.
Now the soul is conscious, etc.
Therefore it is a person. 17 
In this case we again need to consider the distinction between "the whole 
time in which I am conscious of myself” and the “outer observer who represents 
me in time”.i8 In the former case we again have an a priori statement which 
reveals nothing of the real existence of myself.
The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is 
therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their coherence.
16 Strawson, [1966], p i 64-5
17 Kant [1781], A361
18 ibid, A362.
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and in no way proves the numerical identity of my subjects9 
There is neither an inference nor an intuition that goes along with this self- 
identity. To be conscious of oneself and conscious of oneself as the same self is 
one and the same thing. The latter is entailed in the former. As Strawson puts it; 
When a man ascribes a current or directly remembered state of 
consciousness to himself, no use whatever of any criteria of personal 
identity is required to justify his use of the pronoun 'T to refer to the 
subject of that experience....It would make no sense to think or say: I 
distinctly remember that inner experience occurring, but did it occur to 
me? There is nothing that one can encounter or recall in the field of 
inner experience such that there can be any question of one’s applying 
criteria of subject identity to determine whether the encountered or 
recalled experience belongs to oneself - or to someone e ls e .20 
Consider how this differs from ascribing identity to an external object. Kant’s 
incomplete description is:
If I want to know through experience, the numerical identity of an 
external object, I shall pay heed to that permanent element in the 
appearance to which as subject everything else is related as 
determination, and note its identity throughout the time in which the 
determinations change.21 
In this case, there is something substantial in identity statements. As it does 
concern objects of intuition, there is a substantive referent for the identity 
statement. “Same person" is meaningful because “different person” is 
conceivable. But “different I” makes no sense, and so “same I ” doesn’t inform us 
of anything.
But there is something even worse about using T as an identity fixer. In this 
case, Kant is unusually clear:
19 ibid, A363.
20 Strawson [1966], p i 65
21 Kant [1781], A 362
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Despite the logical Identity of the 'I', such a change may have 
occurred In It as does not allow of the retention of Its identity, and yet we 
may ascribe to It the same-sounding 'I', which In every different state, 
even In one Involving change of the [thinking] subject, might still retain 
the thought of the preceding subject and so hand It over to the 
subsequent subject. 22 
Here, "subject" Is used In the substantial sense. So what this quote means Is 
that the use of 'I' Is compatible with there In fact being a series of materially 
different subjects. Consciousness could pass baton-llke from one substantial 
subject to the next, and the assertion of Identity would be empty. An Important 
phrase here is the “same sounding T \  The T In thought Is same sounding 
because when I think of what I did or thought yesterday. It seems to me that the 
T which did those things Is the same T that is now thinking of them. From my 
point of view, It appears that there Is an Identity between T  today and T  
yesterday. Kant’s point is that I am not entitled to conclude from this that It Is the 
same substantial T  yesterday as today, as Its appearance as the same T  Is 
compatible with there being various different substantial subjects. In this way, 
the T only appears, or “sounds”, the same -  It may not be the same.
We can sum up the core of Kant’s arguments about the “I think" by 
considering a short quote from the Critique;
I do not know an object merely In that I think, but only In so far as I 
determine a given intuition with respect to the unity of consciousness In 
which all thought consists. 23 
We have knowledge about the way thinking things are solely In virtue of the 
fact that we are able to perceive them as objects of our consideration. But the 
way we do this cannot Itself be the object of knowledge. We cannot, as It were, 
turn the camera of mind back onto Itself.
In conclusion, there are two key points we need to take from Kant’s work.
22 ibid, A 363
23 ibid, B407
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Firstly, all thoughts have the possibility of having the "I think” attached. In other 
words, even when there is no occurrent belief “I think", the thought is in such a 
form that the “I think" could be appended to it. But secondly, we cannot use this 
fact to reach any conclusions about what subjects of thought really are. The 
“same sounding I” can be found across thoughts which are not part of one 
materially single subject. I have not offered any arguments for these 
conclusions and have only broadly outlined Kant’s. The fact that these are 
Kant’s conclusions does give them some weight. The least I have done is 
shown how a position which holds both of the above conclusions is not only 
possible, but has a notable historical precedent.
I shall consider the implications for Parfit of accepting Kant’s argument 
shortly, but first I need to consider another view of how thoughts require 
subjects.
3. Cassam; No l-thoughts Without a Subject.
Cassam offers a short, simple argument in favour of his view that l-thoughts 
always require subjects and then takes much more time discrediting various 
arguments against this view. He starts with the general claim that the content of 
a thought cannot be fully specified unless the truth conditions of that thought 
have been determined. Hence, to specify the content of the thought “that tree is 
burning," we need to know which tree is burning. Similarly, the content of the 
thought “I am in pain” cannot be fully specified unless we know who the thinker 
of the thought is. This entails that the content of l-thoughts cannot be specified 
unless there is a thinker of that thought. As Cassam puts it:
In order to know what the thought is one must know who the thinker
is.24
A corollary of this is that to know there is a thought you must know there is a 
thinker. We must be clear precisely what this argument requires for first-
24 Cassam [1992], p365
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personal thoughts. On certain definitions, it is not a person. Cassam gives as an 
example Dennett’s conditions of personhood. On Dennett’s formulation, 
persons are rational, subjects of intentional ascriptions, language users, self- 
conscious, require a certain attitude to be taken towards them and are capable 
of reciprocity. 25 These last two conditions are required for persons to be moral 
agents. Cassam notes that even if the last two conditions are lacking, a being 
would still be capable of first-person thoughts. Cassam then makes it clear that 
his thesis is that “l-thoughts are only properly ascribable to subjects” 26 Cassam 
simply assumes subjects are "like persons except that they do not necessarily 
meet the ethical conditions of personhood.”27 Whether or not Cassam is right, 
for the moment I shall accept the possibility of his conception of what it could 
mean to be a subject, but not a person.
This point is important, as it opens up a gap between what can be called a 
subject of thought and a fully-fledged person. This invites investigating whether 
ciiuiuuyii IIly ihuuyiil w iiii a buujyui ucirinul by reduced lo Ihe subjectless 
thought, the personal can still be reduced to the impersonal, by which I do not 
mean third-personal but more specifically, whether reference to persons is 
eliminable.
Whereas Kant argued that a subject was a formal requirement for thoughts 
to be had at all, Cassam’s conclusion is rather that a substantial subject is 
required. There needs lo be a subjycl in uider lor an i-lhouyhl lo be a genuine 
"self-ascriptive, subject-predicate thought.”28 The “I” needs to refer to 
something, namely, a person or subject. Cassam has notable predecessors, 
such as Evans, who were also prepared to argue that T  entails a substantive 
subject.29 So although Kant and Cassam agree that thoughts entail subjects, 
they differ considerably in their reasons for why this is so and in what sense a
25 Dennett [1992], p177-78
26 Cassam [1992], p370
27 ibid
28 ibid, p365
29 Evans [1982], chapter 7.
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subject is required. Given these differences, we should consider the 
consequences of Kant’s and Cassam’s arguments for Parfit separately.
4. Parfit and Cassam.
If Cassam is right, how can Parfit retain his claim that it is possible to specify 
the thinker of an ‘I’ thought without reference to persons? The key is that 
Cassam’s requirement to specify the thinker of a thought can be met solely by 
subjects-at-a-time, without the need to specify persons. This can be shown by 
reconsidering some of Parfit’s thought experiments. Imagine someone is in the 
duplicating teletransporter, which has developed further faults. It not only does 
not destroy the original person, it also sends two copies on to outer space. Just 
before losing consciousness in the booth, X thinks "I am cold”. On waking up, 
she and her two copies, Y and Z all think, “so I’ll put on a jumper”. Cassam’s key 
claim was that “in order to know what the thought is one must know who the 
thinker is’’.3o in this case, it is true that we know the thinker of “I am cold” is X, 
and X, Y and Z are all thinkers of the type-identical thoughts, “So I’ll put on a 
jumper”. Here, we have specified the substantial subjects-at-a-time of the 
thoughts in question. The problem here is that we still don’t necessarily know 
which persons are the subjects of these thoughts, as it is precisely the point of 
such thought experiments to show that there is a problem of personal identity in 
such cases. This would be especially true if X had been destroyed and only the 
replicas remained. There is no such problem of the identity of the substantial 
subjects-at-a-time of each thought. The fact that there is a mystery concerning 
which persons are present doesn’t prevent us from being able to locate and 
pick out the substantial subjects-at-a-time involved.
The force of Cassam’s point that "in order to know what the thought is one 
must know who the thinker is" can in this way be somewhat weakened. 
Certainly, in order to know what the thought is we need to know that it has a
30 Cassam [1992], p365.
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subject. But the subject of thought can be located, and thus the content of the 
thought known, without knowledge of which person is having the thought. For 
example, in the teletransportation case, we need to decide which, if any, of the 
pre- and post teletransportation subjects-at-a-time are stages in the life of a 
single person in order to attribute the thought to a particular person. But before 
we do this we are able to know the content of the thought, as we are able to 
pinpoint the substantial subject at the time of the thinking of the thought. We can 
thus fully specify the content of each occurrence of the thought “So I’ll put on a 
jumper” without reference to persons. As long as we know the subject of each 
thought, X,Y or Z, we know enough.
In this way, the sense of "subject” which Cassam’s argument requires is 
something less than that of a fully-fledged person. A subject is here simply the 
substantial being which has the thought at a particular time. But the concept of a 
person involves the way in which a being’s existence extends over time. This 
opens up room for the impersonal description of persons Parfit requires. A 
person can be described as a certain series of substantial subjects-at-a-time. 
So l-thoughts do not entail anything about the substantive persons we are.
The case of fission makes the point even more clearly. Strawson discusses 
this case and labels the person who splits P and the two resulting persons p i 
and P2. From the inside, both pi and p2 will be forced to see themselves as the 
same person as P. But we know that they cannot both be the same person as 
P.31 If we are to attempt, as the rationalist does, to make substantive judgments 
about our identity over time merely because of the form of our thoughts, we will 
conclude that because we think we are the same as the original person, we are 
the same as that person. Strawson neatly highlights this error by imagining P1 
and P2 both saying in unison;
The rational psychologist is right! On the inside one does detect the
31 See §2.3 for the reasons why both fission products cannot be identical with the pre-fission 
person.
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asymmetry, for I know that I am P and my opposite number is not. 32
In this case too, even if we know the substantive subjects-at-a-time of the 
various thoughts are P, P1 and P2, we don't yet know whether these three 
subjects are one, two or three separate persons. In this way, the concept of a 
subject-at-a-time is more basic than that of a person, and the knowledge of 
oneself as subject does not provide any further knowledge of oneself as a 
person. This is shown by the fact that P, P1 and pz all know which thoughts they 
are the subjects of, but they can still be mistaken over which person they are. 
So to say “P is subject of thought T' is an impersonal description in the sense 
that P need only be described as a subject of thought and not as a person. This 
makes it impersonal in the strict sense of “without reference to persons”, rather 
than third-personal.
This response requires giving up the idea of thoughts as ontologically 
independent, but it still allows for an impersonal description of persons. The key 
features of Parfitianism can survive this revision. It would still be possible to 
account for a unified mental life over time in terms of psychological 
connectedness and continuity, but it would now be in terms of connections 
between subjects-at-a-time rather than individual thoughts and events. 
Furthermore, this psychological relation between subjects-at-a-time is different 
from the identity relation, as is shown by the fact that it would hold in the fission 
example above. Nothing of importance is lost by talking about psychological 
connectedness and continuity between subjects-at-a-time rather than individual 
thoughts, but rather more credibility is gained.
Although I believe this is a tenable response to Cassam, why not go further 
with Cassam? To respond in terms of subjects-at-a-time entails a view of 
persons as being some kind of aggregate or product of strings of subjects-at-a- 
time. But as these subjects do not lack Dennett’s ethical conditions of 
personhood, what is there to distinguish these subjects-at-a-time from persons-
32 Strawson [1966], p87
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at-a-time? Why insist on talking about subjects-at-a-time, when the subjects in 
questions are clearly persons? Certainly, we would lose the “personless 
description” but this seems neither an important nor well-defined feature of the 
Parfitian conception.
I need not decide between these two options. What I believe to be more 
important is to assess the relevance of Cassam’s point to the Parfitian 
enterprise. As I argued in part one, I believe the first-person question of survival 
to be different from the third-person question of identity. Further, the 
psychological reductionist tradition has seen first-person survival as a matter of 
a unified mental life continuing over time. This position is not threatened by 
Cassam’s argument. What is threatened is Parfit’s view that a unified mental life 
is a product of thoughts and other mental events, interrelated in certain ways. 
Now, if we follow Cassam and do not allow these thoughts to have an 
independent existence, then we are lead to the conclusion that thoughts are 
always of a person-at-a-time, or a subject-at-a-time. This means mental unity 
over time can no longer be seen as a matter of connections between 
independent mental events, but it can be seen as a matter of the relation 
between persons-at-a-time.
This is a change to the Parfitian conception I favour adopting. In chapter six, 
where I offer my positive account, I will try to show how this change can be 
incorporated. But first, we must see how Kant’s arguments effect the Parfitian 
conception.
5. Parfit and Kant.
Cassam argues that for l-thoughts to have any content, it must be possible to 
state the truth conditions for that l-thought, and to do this, one must know who 
the thinker of that thought is. Cassam made it clear that what is actually required 
for l-thoughts is a subject. For Kant, thoughts formally entail a subject, but 
nothing concerning the substantiality of the subject can be deduced from this.
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Putting Cassam’s arguments to one side, what would accepting the Kantian 
conception entail for the Parfitian view?
Parfit argues that mental unity over time is a product of connectedness and 
continuity between individual thoughts. Kant’s view is not necessarily opposed 
to the atomism of this position. But what makes each thought formally the 
thought of a single subject is that the “same sounding ‘I’" can accompany each 
thought. It is in virtue of this formally identical M’ that there is a unity of thought, 
and indeed the same sounding T is a precondition for the unity of thought over 
time.
The way in which this is opposed to the Parfitian view can be seen through 
the words of Patricia Kitcher:
His [Kant’s] reflections on the nature of mental states show that we 
can acknowledge something to be a mental state only if we can 
acknowledge the existence of, not a mere bundle, but a synthetically 
connected set of mental states.33
In order for something to be a mental state, it all ready has to be part of a set 
of mental states connected by the same sounding T. If this is correct. Parfit 
cannot be right to say that thoughts can exist somehow unowned, and only 
become the thoughts of a subject once they are suitably connected. An 
unconnected thought is, on Kant’s view, not a thought at all. A Parfitian account 
of the unity of consciousness over time, therefore, would seem to require to take 
account of this feature of thought. It is simply not enough to say that it Is only 
because of the relations between thoughts that the thoughts are connected. 
There is also something about the form in which thoughts are had which 
contributes to continuity of consciousness.
But, again, I do not see why this should threaten the core tenets of 
Parfitianism. If psychological connectedness and continuity is a result of the 
form in which thoughts are had, then so be it. The important fact is that the
33 Kitcher [1984], p118
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unified mental life over time can connect persons-at-a-time who are not 
identical. The formal identity of the "I-think" is distinct from the substantial 
identity of the person. The gap is still there to answer the first-person question of 
survival in terms different to that of the third person question of identity. In fact, 
Kant’s conception can facilitate this distinction, as Kant places a wedge 
between the inner unity given by the “l-think” and the notion of substantial 
identity, which is concerned with objects of intuition. What we would have to 
change is the explanation of what a unified mental life consists in, not the views 
about the importance of a unified mental life and its distinctness from substantial 
identity, and it is the latter views, not the former, which I believe are more crucial 
to the Parfitian conception.
In my positive account, given in chapter six, I shall try to show that it is 
possible for a revised Parfitian account to incorporate Kant’s ideas concerning 
the necessary unity of thought.
5. Conclusion.
When Parfit claimed that thoughts are independent, he could have meant 
one of two things. He could have meant that they are ontologically independent, 
literally capable of independent existence. Cassam’s arguments cast 
considerable doubt on this claim. Cassam argued that at least one sort of 
thought, l-thoughts, entail a substantial subject of thought. This argument is not 
quite as strong as may appear. All we need are substantial subjects-at-a-time. 
Alternatively, he could have meant that they are conceptually independent, that 
they can be thought of without thinkers. Kant argued differently. Thoughts 
formally require a thinker both at a time and over time. But again, this is not 
quite as strong a claim as may first appear. Nothing whatsoever about the 
substantiality of this subject is entailed by the existence of thoughts.
There is nothing to prevent both Cassam and Kant from being right. My 
concern has been to show how a Parfitian conception is still possible if both
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Cassam and Kant are largely correct, as I believe they are. Some radical 
restructuring of the Parfitian conception is therefore necessary. The idea that 
mental unity at a time and over time is simply to do with relations between 
individual thoughts must go. At a time, we need to accept that thoughts are had 
by a substantial person. Over time, there is something about the way in which 
thoughts are had that explains the unity of thought over time. If we accept both 
these claims, the key Parfitian claims can still be retained. A unified mental life 
occurs where there Is psychological connectedness and continuity between 
persons-at-a-time. This continuity is explained at least partly by the form in 
which thoughts are had. This unity does not presuppose identity, and it is this 
unity, not identity, which is important for the first person question of survival. For 
now, I have merely made room for this account. In chapter six, I shall show how 
it is possible. But first, we must turn to Parfit’s conception of psychological 
connectedness and continuity and see how that is flawed.
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Chapter Five 
Parfit’s Relation R.
Can the reductionist account for the unity of a person’s life solely in terms of 
the thoughts, events and actions which constitute that person’s life, in spite of 
the problems for the psychological reductionist outlined in chapter four? To 
answer this question I must first look at Parfit’s own account of what is required 
for the unity of a person’s life; what he calls Relation R -  psychological 
connectedness and continuity. Firstly, as I discussed in the previous chapter, 
the thoughts and mental events which form the relata of this account are 
supposed to be in some sense independent of the subject who has these 
thoughts. I have already argued that this conception is flawed. However, in this 
chapter I shall set aside this criticism so that my further criticisms do not 
themselves rest upon these earlier criticisms. I shall be considering the 
concepts of mental connectedness and continuity and arguing that they are ill- 
defined and inadequate to fulfil the task required of them. I thus argue that 
Relation R fails to perform the function it needs to perform, namely, to account 
for the unity of a mental life. It is because I believe Relation R fails on its own 
terms that I want to keep apart the criticism of the relata of relation R from my 
criticisms of relation R itself. I contend, however,that there is room for an 
alternative Parfitian account which can do the work Relation R cannot. The 
lessons learned from this critical account will then be used to positive effect in 
chapter six.
1. Psychological Reductionism and Diachronic Unity
Traditionally, psychological reductionists have held that the identity over 
time of a person is determined by the existence of strong psychological 
connections of memory, personality and intentions and so on holding over time. 
Various different accounts have been offered as to what these relations consist
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in, but the fundamental point was agreed. However, it came to be believed that 
the sorts of relations considered vital for personal identity could possibly exist in 
cases where identity did not hold. For example, in the fission case, it is claimed 
that two persons at a later time can have memories, personalities and intentions 
continuous with only one earlier person.1 This seemed to threaten 
psychological reductionism, as it suggested that identity could not solely be 
accounted for in terms of psychological relations. But Parfit countered by 
arguing that where the psychological relations which usually determine identity 
branch, although we do not have identity, we still have "what matters in 
survival”.2 By doing so, he makes more explicit the psychological reductionist’s 
intuition that it is our mental life which really counts.
On Parfit’s view, the unity of a person's life is determined by diachronic unity 
of consciousness. Although a brain and body are required to sustain this unity 
of consciousness, it is in virtue of the unity of the mental life that a person's life is 
a coherent whole and the unity of consciousness over time doesn't require the 
same body over time. To give an account of what is required for the unity of a 
person's life therefore it appears the psychological reductionist need only give 
an account of what is required for the diachronic unity of consciousness. To 
avoid any confusion between unity of consciousness at a time and diachronic 
unity of consciousness, I will from now on talk of the latter as a unified mental 
life. The concept of a unified mental life is intended to be a minimal one, and so 
fairly unproblematic, even though the way in which it is filled out will result in 
various different positions. A unified mental life is a temporally continuous, 
though not necessarily uninterrupted, series of mental events which are related 
to each other in the same important ways as are our normal mental lives. I need 
to make three clarificatory remarks concerning this definition. Firstly, by using
1 Because the concepts of memory, and to a lesser degree intention, seem to presuppose the 
continued existence of one particular person, the terms quasi-memory and quasi-intention were 
introduced to cover those cases where there is an apparent memory or intention without personal 
identity. See p13ff and chapter six. The concept of quasi mental states is however far from being 
uncontroversial. See Wiggins [1992] and Hughes [1975] for critiques of q-memory.
2 See §6.5 for a detailed explanation of what is meant by ‘what matters’.
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the term ‘mental events' I am remaining neutral as to whether or not mental 
events can exist independently or not. The term neither assumes nor precludes 
the possibility of mental events being discreet and/or capable or independent 
existence, although following the previous chapter it will be clear that I do not 
think them so capable of independent existence. I also follow Parfit in defining 
mental events broadly so that the term covers “even such boring events as the 
continued existence of a belief, or a desire,”3 as well as occurrent thoughts and 
memories. The second point to note is the lack of a requirement for 
uninterruptedness. This is, of course, to allow for periods of sleep and other 
times when we lose consciousness. I assume that the idea of continued 
consciousness with such gaps is not problematic.4
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, is the requirement for mental events 
to be related in the same important ways as our normal mental lives. The 
paradigm for a unified mental life is the mental life of actual persons. The 
relations that connect different temporal parts of these lives can be described 
functionally or materially. What relates a memory with an earlier event is both 
that there is a chain of neural causes internal to the same brain stretching back 
from the memory to the event, which is the material relation; and that the 
memory provides an unmediated source of information (accurate or otherwise) 
of the person's past experiences, which is the functional relation. For there to be 
a unified mental life, do the mental events in that life need to be related in the 
same functional and material way as the mental events in our lives are in fact 
related, or is only the functional or the material relation important? The answer 
to that question is clearly problematic and lies close to the heart of the debate 
concerning reductionism. For that reason, my definition of a unified mental life 
does not presuppose any one answer. But it does presuppose that the question 
has an answer, s
3 Parfit, p211
4 Locke [1694] makes this point clearly in Bk 2, Chapter 27.
5 I partly answer this question in Chapter six.
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Parfit claims that what matters, and what usually determines personal 
identity in a world without fission, teletransportation or other forms of 
duplication, is what he calls Relation R. Relation R is defined as "psychological 
connectedness and/or continuity, with the right kind of cause."6 Where Relation 
R holds there will be a unified mental life and therefore the life of a person. 
Given its importance in Reasons and Persons it is perhaps surprising that Parfit 
neither gives a thorough explanation of just what this entails nor explains why 
he introduces it. Rather in the manner of a character in Plato’s dialogues he 
simply offers it as a candidate for the criterion of personal identity over time, 
expands upon it ad hoc as and when the argument demands and allows it to 
emerge as the best candidate among rival theories. In order to examine 
Relation R in detail, we need to get much clearer about what it is.
As I have said, I contend that essentially. Relation R is a description of what 
is required for a unified mental life. The building blocks of Parfit’s account are 
particular mental events, be they thoughts, feelings or memories. In Chapter 
four we saw that Parfit claimed such experiences can be described 
independently of their subjects. Therefore to understand what Parfit means by 
Relation R we must take all the connected mental events to be discreet 
elements which come together only in virtue of their interrelations. This is one 
area where Parfit’s explanation of a unified mental life diverges from my general 
definition. Whereas my definition was neutral as to the independence of mental 
events, Parfit claims that they are at least conceptually independent.
Relation R requires three distinct elements: Connectedness, continuity and 
the right kind of cause. I shall briefly discuss what Parfit means by each one of 
these terms. All of the remainder of this section is exegetical and thus accords 
with Parfit’s views, except in one very important respect. Where I talk about a 
unified mental life. Parfit talks about persons. Parfit can do this because, as I 
have argued, for the psychological reductionist, all we need to do to account for
6 Partit, p216
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the diachronic unity of a person’s life is to account for the diachronic unity of 
mental life. For Parfit, connectedness and continuity with the right cause are the 
only things that matter in survival. In effect this means a unified mental life is 
alone what matters. The fact that nothing in the account is lost when I substitute 
‘unified mental life’ for ‘person’ itself demonstrates the virtual synonymity Parfit 
accords the terms. I however would prefer not to use ‘person’ interchangeably 
with ‘unified mental life’ so as not to beg the question as to whether there is 
more to the unity of a person’s life than mental unity. While Relation R describes 
nicely what on the Parfitian view is required for a unified mental life, I would like 
to keep it clear in my exegesis of Parfit that we cannot assume that it also shows 
what is required for unity of a person’s life.7
The first element in Relation R is psychological connectedness. Parfit 
describes three kinds of psychological connections; those of memory, intention 
and ‘psychological features’:
Between X today and Y twenty years ago, there are direct memory 
connections if X can now remember having some of the experiences 
that Y had twenty years ago. [...] There are several other kinds of direct 
psychological connection. One such connection is that which holds 
between an intention and the later act in which this intention is carried 
out. Other such direct connections are those which hold when a belief, 
or a desire, or any other psychological feature, continues to be had.8 
Note that these connections are described functionally, without reference to 
their material basis. However, there must be a material basis, as connectedness 
implies a cause, and so psychological connection is a type of causal 
connection. But the material basis is covered separately when Parfit considers 
what is the right kind of cause for Relation R. But that there must be a cause is 
not at issue.
7 1 shall examine more closely the Issue of what matters in survival in Chapter six and will consider 
some of the other factors which unify a person’s life in chapter seven.
8 ibid, p205
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It is clear that Parfit’s explication of connectedness is somewhat minimalistic. 
A memory connection, for example, just is that causal connection, whatever it 
may be, which holds between a memory and the earlier experience of which it 
is the memory. However, although more could be said, these brief definitions 
are sufficient for us to get a hold of what is meant by connectedness. I discuss 
problems with this idea in the next section.
The second element of Relation R is continuity. To get from connectedness 
to continuity. Parfit introduces the idea of overlapping chains of connectedness. 
We can understand this by considering this schematic diagram:
E l------------- M M \B ---------------------------------1 B-----------------------------...
B---------------------------------------1 E3--------------------- M-------------M-
! A £2----------------- M-----------M\ /-------------------A E---------
Here, the horizontal scale is time, and the lines represent psychological 
connection. A vertical line indicates that connectedness has ceased. For 
example, E  represents an experience and M  the memory of that experience. 
The last time any experience is remembered, 9 it can be said that there is no 
longer psychological connectedness with the original experience, and so the 
chain comes to an end. B represents a belief, and the vertical line shows when 
that belief is no longer held. I represents an intention and A the later action 
which is the fulfilment of that intention. In the diagram, a small fraction of our 
mental lives is represented, and in a crude, simplified form. However, what it 
does illustrate is how, although most connections may only hold over a fraction 
of the time scale, they can overlap with one another to form a continuous chain 
of connections. In this portion of the chain, there are no connections that hold 
over the whole time period. But there is still continuity. At the end of this period, 
the person no longer remembers or £2, but the chains of connection that still 
hold at the end of the period overlap with other chains, which overlap with still
9 It is perhaps more accurate to say that the chain of connection ends the last time a person has
the capacity to remember £, in which case the diagram would read “E  M-— I”, but nothing
hinges upon which of these two ways we interpret what a chain’s ending means.
Chapter Five 127
others that stretch back to and £2. To adapt a more concrete, famous 
example, there was a boy who stole an apple, who grew up to be an officer who 
did a brave deed, who went on to become an old general. io The old general 
may not remember stealing the apple, but he remembers carrying out the brave 
deed, and the person who did the brave deed remembered stealing the apple. 
So even though there is no direct memory connection between the general and 
the boy, as there are such connections between the general and the officer, and 
the officer and the boy, so there is continuity of memory between the general 
and the boy.
Parfit claims that both connectedness and continuity are required for a 
unified mental life. We can explain this in a schematised and simplified form by 
returning to the psychological spectrum. Imagine the case where Smith’s 
psychology is replaced by Napoleon’s, but let’s imagine this occurs in 100 
phases, 1% per day for 100 days. We can represent this diagrammatically using 
the same symbols as above, with the difference that the horizontal lines 
represent not single connections but chains of related connections:
1 2 3 4 5 . . .
A  1---------------------------------------------------------...
B --------------------1-------------------------------------------- ...
C ---------------------------------1 -------------------------------- ...
D --------------------------------------------- 1------------------- ...
E ----------------------------------------------------------- 1— ... And so on.
Chain A, for example, could refer to memories of childhood, which we carry 
throughout our lives. Although there is almost certainly no distinct set of memory 
traces in the brain that corresponds to this group, we know that there is a fairly 
distinct set of memories that corresponds to it. As we are concerned with the 
psychology rather than neurology of consciousness, this lack of analogue in the
10 The original example came from Reid [1941], reprinted in Perry [1975] p i 14.
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brain doesn’t matter.11 Chain B could be fears and phobias, 0  aesthetic 
preferences, D political beliefs and so on. On day 1 Smith’s childhood 
memories are replaced with those of Napoleon. After day 1 it is those memories 
that continue into the future, although, of course, they will gradually fade, as all 
memories do. On day 2 Smith loses his fear of spiders and gains one of heights. 
Again it is the vertigo that will persist in the future, continuing that chain of 
connection. And so on. It is clear that by day 100, no chain of connection will 
stretch back earlier than day 1. The resulting person, call him Smith-Bonaparte 
will then have no psychological connection with Smith prior to day 1. This 
means Smith-Bonaparte will have no memories, residual traits or beliefs from 
the period of time before the experiment. Given this total transformation, it could 
then be said that the original unified mental life has ended and has been 
replaced by another. But Smith-Bonaparte will be psychologically continuous 
with Smith, because the chains of connection all overlap. There is no sudden 
rupture with the past. Compare this with the case below, where the machine in 
the psychological spectrum case changes Smith’s psychological features all at 
once:
A ---------------------------------------------------------1 ------------------------------------------...
B------------------------------------------- 1--------------------------------...
0 ------------------------------------------- 1-------------------------------- ...
D------------------------------------------- 1-------------------------------- ...
In this example there is neither connectedness nor continuity. At a certain 
point all psychological connections terminate and are replaced by a new set. 
Because in our first example the chains overlap there is continuity. On each day 
of the experiment the subject will be continuous with the person of the day
1 1 1t could matter to the practical possibility of ever wiping away a distinct set of memories only, but 
my discussion in §3.2 about the importance of possibility should make it clear that this is not an 
important problem here. Mental holists would claim there is a more fundamental conceptual 
problem in thinking of thoughts as discreet in the way in which the thought experiment requires. 
However, my aim in this chapter is to defeat relation R on its own terms, and the way in which I 
subsequently revise relation R is not inconsistent with mental holism.
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before. Only one aspect of their psychology will change. But we would still 
consider that at the end of the 100 days, the thoughts, memories and other 
psychological features of Smith were part of a different unified mental life than 
the one now lived by Smith-Bonaparte. One unified mental life will have been 
superseded by another. They would, however overlap: one extends from birth to 
day 99 of the experiment and the other from day 1 to death, the overlap thus 
occurring during the period of the experiment. In the second case, we again 
have two unified mental lives, but no overlap. There is neither connectedness 
nor continuity. In order for there to be one single unified mental life throughout 
all the subject’s life, there would have to be both connectedness and
continuity. 12
We have seen what connectedness and continuity are and seen why both 
are required for a unified mental life. There is still the third element to consider: 
the right kind of cause. Without knowledge of the causes our account is 
incomplete. It would be a good idea to start by considering various different 
types of cause that could produce Relation R. The normal cause is the 
continued survival of the animal, and especially the brain, which is the bearer of 
the mental states. Of course, the explanation is not complete until we have a 
good explanation of how the brain does manage to produce memories and 
retain personality traits and so on. But this is a project for neurology, not 
philosophy. If reincarnation were possible, then transmigration of souls might 
sometimes be a cause of Relation R. If King Arthur were indeed to be 
reincarnated in the body of a twentieth century taxi driver, along with his heroic 
character and memories, then Relation R would hold between King Arthur and 
that taxi driver. A science fiction case would be the reading of information from 
the brain and the re-writing of this information back into the same or a similar
12 Over a very long period of time, lack of connectedness between the two times may not 
threaten a unified mental life, as long as there is enough continuity. For example, a person of 
seventy-five may share no connections with their childhood self. Whether this means that the 
child and the elderly person do not share in the same unified mental life is a matter of conjecture. 
See Lewis [1976].
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brain, as described in the spectra thought experiments.
Before deciding which of these are ‘the right kind of causes', I should stress 
that causation is a necessary part of Relation R. Relation R is connectedness 
and continuity of mental states and events and as such requires a causal 
relation between those states and events. It is not just a similarity relation. For 
example, let’s say that I have a doppelganger in a parallel universe. If I were to 
be run over and killed and just seconds later my doppelganger stumbled upon 
a way into our universe at the exact spot where I had been killed, then there 
would be someone just as capable of carrying on with my life as I would have 
been, had I survived the accident. This is very interesting, if implausible, but 
what should be clear is that Relation R does not hold between myself and my 
doppelganger. There is no causal connectedness between my mental states 
and his, because my mental states have played no part in forming his. We do 
share type identical mental states, but Relation R is not just about type identical 
mental states but the relations between mental states.
Having established that causal connection is required for Relation R, we 
now need to ask whether any cause is acceptable or whether Relation R can 
only hold where there are certain particular causal relations. Parfit claims that 
Relation R with any cause is what matters. The problem for this view is best 
brought out by a thought experiment described by Douglas Ehring.i3 We are to 
imagine a device similar to the spectra machine, which is capable of recording 
the information about a person’s brain states and then transferring these brain 
states into another person’s brain. Ehring imagines this as a rather old- 
fashioned device where the brain state information is stored on tape. In the 
thought experiment, an extraordinary accident occurs:
After encoding information on a tape from A after A’s destruction, the 
tape is accidentally dropped onto another encoding machine. As a 
result the tape is damaged beyond repair. However, the tape’s hitting
13 Ehring, p52
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the machine causes the machine to malfunction with the highly 
improbable outcome that this machine produces another tape exactly 
similar to the original.
If this tape is used to "programme" the brain of B, thus making B type 
identical to A, should we now say that Relation R holds between person A 
before and person B after?
The problem here is that although there is a causal chain between the 
original person and the person who has the taped information copied into their 
brain, this is a chance event, as is the person from a parallel universe 
appearing in the same spot you are knocked down dead on. The link between 
the knocked-down dead me and my doppelganger is as weak, it seems, as the 
link between the original person and the person created by the transfer of taped 
information. In both cases, the nature of the later person is not determined by 
the nature of the previous person. Their qualitative identity is just a matter of 
chance.
Certainly it is a chance event, indeed almost a miraculous one. Obviously it 
is also so preposterously improbable that it would surely never happen. It 
seems, though, that there is no reason in this case to suppose that Relation R 
does not hold between the two persons before and after the tape. The chance 
element in the story doesn’t destroy the connection between the two. Think of 
other chance events. Imagine a surgeon attempting a tricky operation, slipping, 
and thus making an incision in just the right place. Or a painter after a particular 
aesthetic effect who falls onto his painting, smudges the paint and thus 
achieves serendipitously the effect he was after. In both these cases, a chance, 
unplanned, possibly unrepeatable event is the cause of a particular sought after 
effect. We might say such events are almost miraculous. But in both cases an 
earlier cause (the doctor, the painter) are linked to a later effect (the success of 
the operation, the creation of a great painting) via a chance happening. As Parfit
14 ibid
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points out, the reliability of a cause is irrelevant if the cause has the desired 
effect;
Suppose that there is an unreliable treatment for some disease. In 
most cases the treatment achieves nothing. But in a few cases it 
completely cures this disease. In these few cases, only the effect 
matters. The effect is just as good, even though its cause was
unreliable.15
In Ehring’s case we have a cause which is extremely unreliable: it only 
works once in a universe’s lifetime. But that one time it does work, the effect is 
the same as that when there is a normal reliable cause.
It certainly doesn’t seem that the reliability of any cause gives grounds for 
distinguishing the right kinds of causes. But there is another point to Ehring’s 
story, aside from the issue of chance. What seems to be the problem is that the 
person who results from the accident with the tapes could have come into 
existence whatever the nature of the original person. Just as the colour of an 
axe is irrelevant to the cut it produces, the data on the tape is irrelevant to the 
effect it has in the other tape. The nature of the resulting person is thus totally 
independent of the original person’s, and so it seems ridiculous to suppose that 
those two people have the same kind of connection as holds between a normal 
person over time.
The problem with this objection is that if we accept that the nature of the two 
persons are quite independent of one another then it undermines the central 
premise of the argument: that the original person’s brain-states caused the latter 
person’s brain states. If it is irrelevant to the causal story that the tape which fell 
contained person X’s brain state information, then on any account of causation, 
X’s brain states are not a cause of Y’s. But if, on the other hand, it is important to 
the story, then it is no longer true that the nature of X’s and Y’s brain states are 
independent. Then we are back to the situation whereby we simply have a very
15 Parfit, p287
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unreliable cause.
Parfit thus seems right not to place any restrictions on which material causes 
are the right ones for Relation R. As long as the cause performs the right 
function, the material basis for it is irrelevant. This then leads to another problem 
which is, what is meant by the right function? What Parfit says in the quotation 
above is that what is important is the effect. Not that this takes us very far. What 
that cashes out as is the need for the cause to produce psychological 
connectedness and continuity. As long as memories are causally connected to 
earlier events, actions to intentions and beliefs and other psychological features 
persist, and that these connections overlap into continuous chains, then 
whatever the cause, that cause is of the right kind. So to answer the question of 
what is the right function, we need to examine more closely what is meant by 
connectedness, which I turn to in the next section.
For Parfit then, Relation R will hold with any material cause, provided that the 
material cause is between mental states. However, although Relation R holds 
whatever the cause, it still remains to be seen whether or not Relation R can 
matter whatever the cause. As I shall be rejecting Relation R in its current form, I 
do not need to answer this question. However,it will need to be asked of my 
replacement for Relation R.
2. Problems With Relation R.
If we were to ask the question, 'How are the experiences that form an R- 
related sequence connected?' we wouldn’t find much of an answer in Parfit. 
The ‘how’ is presumably a question for neuroscience, if we believe that it is due 
to brain processes that we think, remember and so on. There is still another 
question though that does need to be answered, which is ‘what does it mean to 
talk about mental experiences being connected?’ As we saw in the last section. 
Parfit offers examples of mental connectedness -  between an event and a later 
memory; intention and action; persistence of mental feature -  but doesn’t say
Chapter Five 134
what it is that makes these connected. We have already seen how they must 
stand in a certain causal relation to each other. But without more detail this will 
not do. A Jehovah’s Witness’ belief that they know the meaning in life stands in 
a causal relation to many people’s beliefs that Jehovah’s Witnesses are pests, 
but these are inter-personal relations and are thus not part of the same unified 
consciousness. The answer we may instinctively want to give is that the mental 
events are connected if they are part of the same unified consciousness. But 
this answer cannot be given, as Parfit is trying to explain why we have a unified 
consciousness solely in terms of the relation between the mental events. 
Having claimed that our mental lives are reducible to the mental events that 
compose them, to then say that mental events are connected because they are 
part of the same consciousness would be viciously circular.
Parfit’s ideas on what R-relatedness entails actually takes us far closer to the 
Jehovah’s Witness scenario than perhaps we’d think. Parfit seems to think that 
R-relatedness is simply a matter of thoughts causing other thoughts, memories 
of earlier experiences, fulfilling of intentions and so on. That this entails the 
possibility, even reality, of R-relations holding inter-personally, rather like in the 
case of the Jehovah’s Witness, is something Parfit seems more than willing to 
accept. Consider this quote:
My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving 
faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I 
changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live 
in the open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives 
of other people. But the difference is less. 16 
The image of the glass tunnel is certainly an effective metaphor for the the 
way in which our lives have a sense of being essentially separate from the lives 
of others. Despite the philosophical attack on the reality of an ‘inner’ private life 
that stretches from Wittgenstein and Ryle to contemporary eliminative
16 Parfit, p281
Chapter Five 135
materialism, most people still have a sense of their mental lives as something to 
which only they have direct access. Conrad’s line in Heart of Darkness, “We 
live, as we dream, alone,” still strikes a chord. If we consider death as The End, 
within these invisible walls that separate us from others, life does indeed seem 
to be a one-way ticket to darkness on an ever accelerating express train.
But Parfit suggests that, if his view of what people are is correct, this glass 
wall can be lifted. We will no longer feel as essentially separate from others as 
we may otherwise do. This is because for Parfit the relations that hold for 
himself over time may not just hold between moments of his own life, but 
between himself and others as well. We need to see how this is possible to 
properly appreciate how Parfit’s position is flawed.
j
First off, we must remember what a person consists of, on the Parfitian view. 
A human person consists of a body, a brain and a set of experiences which are 
R-related to one another. But it is in virtue of Relation R, not the body or the 
brain, that various different experiences are united in the life of a single person. 
Indeed, a body and a brain without Relation R cannot be a person, as there 
would not be a conscious being with a sense of its own past and future. That I 
am R-related to a past and a future person is then the most important thing 
about my existence as a particular person. Thoughts, beliefs and other mental 
states and events are R-related if they are connected and continuous, and have 
the right kind of cause. Mental events and their connections are thus the 
fundamentals from which Relation R is built. Intrapersonally, such a connection 
could be, for example, an experience causing a memory, the memory persisting 
and going on to effect decisions, beliefs and feelings. This is one chain of 
psychological connections. But there is no prima facie reason why such 
relations cannot hold interpersonally. And that there are in fact such relations is 
vital for Parfit to lift the ‘glass tunnel’. Consider how Parfit follows up his 
discussion of the glass tunnel;
When I believed the non-reductionist view, I also cared more about
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my inevitable death. After my death, there will be no one living who will 
be me. I can now redescribe this fact. Though there will later be many 
experiences, none of these experiences will be connected to my 
present experiences by chains of such direct connections as those 
involved in experience-memory, or in the carrying out of an earlier 
intention. Some of these future experiences may be related to my 
present experiences in less direct ways. There will later be some 
memories about my life. And there may later be thoughts that are 
influenced by mine, or things done as a result of my advice. My death 
will break the more direct relations between my present experiences 
and future experiences, but it will not break various other relations. 17 
This is a very telling passage. It reveals just how broad the idea of mental 
connection and relatedness is for Parfit and how he explicitly does believe that 
some such relations hold interpersonally. Unless the relations that hold across 
his own life are of the same kind as those that hold between himself and other 
people, how can the glass tunnel be lifted? The relations which bind together 
experiences into a unified mental life differ from such interpersonal ones only in 
that they are more direct than those that hold interpersonally. Once more. Parfit 
is vague with his terminology. Although we can get a feeling for what is meant 
by saying that experience memory is a more direct relation than, for example, 
the relation between an idea and its influence on other people. Parfit offers no 
definition or criteria of directness. Are the connections that hold between the 
person who steps into and the person that steps out of the teletransporter 
direct? As Parfit claims Relation R holds in this case, we must assume that the 
answer is yes. But there is certainly nothing direct about the causal route such 
connections would take: from brain to scanner to radio wave to scanner and to 
brain again. Parfit seems to be helping himself to a question begging concept. 
Direct seems to mean something like ‘intrapersonal’, even though this cannot
17 ibid
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be an adequate definition, as Parfit is supposed to be explaining the personal 
solely in terms of mental events and their relations. If these relations were 
defined in terms of the personal, this would defeat the project. This illustrates 
the same point made about the right kind of cause. ‘Directness’ rather like ‘the 
right kind of cause’ must be unrestricted materially if Parfit’s position is to hold. 
The medium of causation or connection is irrelevant to their rightness or 
directness respectively. Nor are there any functional criteria offered for 
directness, and the only implied criterion, that directness means something like 
intrapersonal, would undermine the claim that relation R explains what it means 
for mental events to be of one person. The concept of directness is therefore 
rather empty. This is not so say that an alternative Parfitian position could not 
give substance to the notion of directness. Indeed, this is part of what I attempt 
to do in the next chapter. But suffice it to say for now that Parfit’s own account, 
which is the one currently under scrutiny, fails to breath life into this concept.
Psychological connections are distinguished solely in virtue of their being 
direct or indirect, strong or weak, where ‘strong’ means “there are enough direct 
connections,” i.e. “at least half the number of direct connections that hold, over 
every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.” 18 On such an account, it is 
clear that there is nothing to make intrapersonal relations intrinsically different to 
interpersonal relations, save in directness and quantity. And Parfit welcomes 
this, as it enables him to see his death as the end only of some of the mental 
connections he values. What I shall now do is offer some examples of what on 
Parfit’s view must be seen as interpersonal R Relations, real and imaginary, and 
explain why Parfit’s view entails them. Then we shall be able to see how Parfit’s 
position is flawed.
One case can be taken directly from Parfit, from his discussion of quasi­
memory (or ‘q-memory’). The concept of q-memoryi9 was employed as a 
response to the objection that as “it is part of our concept of memory that we can
18 Parfit, p206
19 This concept was first formulated by Shoemaker [1970].
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remember only our own experiences,”20 memory cannot be part of a criteria of 
personal identity;
I have an accurate quasi-memory of a past experience if:
(1) I seem to remember having an experience.
(2) Someone did have this experience.
(3) My apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of 
way, on that past experience.21
What was said earlier about the right kind of cause for Relation R also 
applies to ‘the right kind of way’ in (3). Let us consider a case of q-memory. In 
§3.1 we looked at the case where the normal neural cause of psychological 
connectedness and continuity was interrupted by a machine that recorded the 
neural states of the brain and then re-wrote these states back into the brain later 
on. Let us imagine that the tapes got accidentally spliced and, whilst sticking the 
tapes back together, a short section of one tape was mistakenly inserted into the 
wrong tape. After the brain had been ‘reprogrammed’, a person thus wakes up 
to find that, although largely the same, he seems to remember going to Kew 
Gardens, even though he had never been there. He checks this out and finds 
that the person with whose tape his got confused has forgotten his visit to Kew. 
He should conclude that, by accident, he has a q-memory of another person’s 
experience and is thus psychologically connected with this other person to a 
very small degree, but in exactly the same way as he is psychologically 
connected to himself at an earlier time. That is to say, the q-memories were 
continued first by normal neural means, then briefly by tape and then by neural 
means again. This story could be told with any other of the connections which 
form Relation R. The person could acquire a belief, and intention or a 
personality trait. Thus, on Parfit’s own account, the connections which form 
Relation R can hold interpersonally.
This is a piece of science fiction. But there are good reasons for saying that if
20 Parfit, p220
21 Ibid
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Parfit is right, some of these connections hold interpersonally as a matter of fact. 
When people have a conversation, watch people performing, listen to them 
talking or even read their words then what is going on in the mind of one is 
affecting what is going on in the mind of the other. When I talk about what I 
believe, through the faculty of hearing, you are affected by these beliefs which 
will in turn alter your own beliefs, even if it is only to give you the new belief that 
I believe X. The cause of the connection here is not just neural firing but speech 
and sense perception. But it is still true that a psychological event is connected 
with another, only now the two psychological events are in different people. And 
on Parfit’s view, any cause will do. If two or more people live very close lives, 
these connections will form overlapping chains. Parfit wants to say that, 
although this is the case, we are not R-related to other people. This is because, 
firstly, these are not direct connections, and secondly, there would not be strong 
connectedness. However, it should be clear that these are not important 
qualitative differences, but matters of quantity and directness, whatever that is 
supposed to mean. The relations that hold interpersonally are of the same kind 
as those that hold for Relation R.
So far, we have seen how the connections which form Relation R can hold 
interpersonally. But if Parfit is right there is at least one possible case where we 
can have full-blown Relation R interpersonally. Shoemaker considers the 
fission case and notes that here "there are two later persons who are 
psychologically continuous with the owner of the original brain."22 But as we 
saw in chapter 3, and Shoemaker agrees, neither of these resultant persons 
can be considered the same as the original person. Parfit too acknowledges 
that “the best description [of the fission case] is that neither of the resulting 
people will be me.”23 Therefore we straightforwardly have a case of 
psychological connectedness and continuity -  Relation R -  interpersonally, 
because the pre-fission person is R-related to two future, but different, persons.
22 Shoemaker/Swinburne, p120
23 Partit, p260
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We are now in a position to formulate three claims that Parfit’s view rests on. 
They are:
(1) Mental events are independent. (See chapter four)
(2) There are no intrinsic differences between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal psychological connections. The differences are 
solely in directness and the strength of chains of 
connectedness, which is determined by number of direct 
connections.
(3) A unified mental life just consists of enough directly connected 
mental events forming overlapping chains.
It should be clear that Parfit’s idea of Relation R depends upon claim (1) 
being true. In chapter four, I argued that it was not. Let us suppose that there I 
was wrong. Parfit’s view still depends on claims (2) and (3). The weakness of
(2) is that there is no clear meaning to the word ‘direct’. Parfit clearly doesn’t 
mean by this that the connections should be neural, for example, as many of his 
thought experiments utilise non-neural connections. Nor is any functional 
definition offered, and it is hard to see how one could be offered without 
circularity and/or artificial distinctions being made. Furthermore, connectedness 
is something which on Parfit’s own account can hold interpersonally. There is 
nothing intrinsically intrapersonal about psychological connectedness. What we 
are left with is then essentially the claim that there are such things as 
psychological connections and that if enough overlap they will form continuous 
strong chains of connectedness. And by claim (3), we can see that this will 
result in a unified mental life. Does this claim stand up?
Certainly claim (3) doesn’t follow from claims (1) and (2). However, unless 
something important about the nature of mental events and/or the connections 
between them is missed out by claims (1) and (2), (3) looks like being the only 
claim compatible with them. If there are just mental events and connections 
between them, and there are unified mental lives, then these lives must just be
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a product of the events and their connections. The problem is that in (1) and (2) 
there is nothing in the mental events and their connections that makes them 
necessarily of a single unified mental life, or even, if we take Parfit’s claim about 
the independence of mental events seriously, of any subject. We are then to 
suppose that it is simply by their being bundled in sufficiently large numbers that 
a single subject emerges. There is such a gap here between what goes into the 
mix -  events and their connections -  and what comes out -  unified mental lives 
-  that it is hard to make the position seem plausible. We have mental events 
that can exist unowned and connections that can be interpersonal and simply 
by putting them together we are to believe that they become owned and 
intrapersonal. Relation R is supposed to explain what is required for a unified 
mental life. But as the connections which form Relation R can hold between 
patently different unified mental lives, and the only difference between these 
and intrapersonal ones is directness -  which is an obscure concept -  and 
quantity, Relation R fails to explain how a unified mental life does emerge. And 
that it should explain how this is possible is one of the requirements we can 
justly put on reductionism, as I explained in §4.1.
Unless we think this really is the best account we can give, claims (1 ) or (2) 
must be wrong. I have already argued that (1) is wrong. I could have made a 
mistake. But even if (1) is defensible, (2) is not. There must be a better account 
of connectedness if we are to get from unowned experiences to unified mental 
lives. Most importantly, we must put flesh on the ides of direct connectedness. 
Only then will we be able to explain how it is that some connections are 
interpersonal and others intrapersonal, and then there may be some hope of 
explaining how connectedness helps constitute a unified mental life.
The conclusions of this and the last chapter seem fatal for the Parfitian. 
However, although it does mean Parfit’s precise position cannot be accepted, I 
believe a broadly Parfitian account can still be salvaged. There are two reasons 
for saying this. Firstly, I have suggested already how it could be possible to offer
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a Parfitian (in the precise sense defined) account of personhood without 
undertaking Parfit’s final reduction of a mental life to the thoughts and feelings 
that comprise it. Secondly, as I pointed out earlier, it appears to me that the 
fundamental instinct of the psychological reductionist is that it is our mental life 
which really counts. If this instinct is a genuine insight, then it can clearly be 
preserved if the details of Parfit’s account need to be changed.
What then needs to be done to salvage the Parfitian position? We need an 
alternative to Relation R that is up to the job of explaining what is required for a 
unified mental life in terms of psychological connectedness and continuity. But 
the relata of such an account must not be independent thoughts and 
experiences and the notion of connectedness must be adequately explained. 
Such a relation must also retain the features of Parfitianism. It is to the task of 
describing such a relation that I now turn.
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Chapter Six 
The Parfitian Conception Revised
So far I have criticised Parfit’s account of psychological connectedness and 
continuity whilst maintaining that, once these errors have been rectified, a 
distinctly Parfitian account of personal survival can be retained. In this chapter I 
attempt to show how that can be done. To begin with, I will outline the Parfitian 
features I believe can be retained and the state of my argument so far, and then 
indicate how I intend to proceed.
Parfit’s position has three key features. The first of these is an explanation of 
what is required for a unified mental life over time in terms of psychological 
connectedness and continuity. Although I reject Parfit’s own version of what this 
explanation consists of -  Relation R -  as long as it can be replaced by another 
explanation which performs the same function, then this distinctly Parfitian 
feature will remain. Secondly, this relation is distinct from the identity relation. 
This means that the fact that there is a unified mental life that connects person X 
atTi  and person Y at T2 does not entail that person X is person Y. Thirdly, it is 
claimed that it is the relation which supports the unified mental life which 
matters in survival, not identity. I shall return to precisely what is meant by “what 
matters” in section five.
I claim that these three features of Parfit’s account can be retained, even 
though I have rejected the details of Parfit’s account of Relation R. I have 
outlined two key failings of Parfit’s position. Parfit argues that, in my terminology, 
a unified mental life is a function of mental connectedness and continuity, where 
the relata which are connected are individual mental events. The first problem is 
the account given of the relata. Thoughts and mental events are supposed to be 
independent of the person who has them. However, if Kant is right, then there is 
a formal requirement for all thoughts to have a subject. Furthermore, if Cassam 
is right, then at a time, l-thoughts actually entail a substantial subject. I believe
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these views to be more credible than Parfit’s. The second problem is the 
account of connectedness. This notion is simply not properly explained by 
Parfit. If connectedness is to be the force which binds together a unified mental 
life, it must be more thoroughly explained.
It is clear that neither of these two errors rule out a position which includes 
the three Parfitian features outlined above. The fact that psychological 
connectedness and continuity is not satisfactorily explained by Parfit’s account 
does not rule out the possibility that it can be satisfactorily explained and can be 
a relation distinct from the identity relation. My aim in this chapter is to offer such 
an explanation. The key to my account is the rejection in chapter four of the idea 
that we can account for a unified mental life over time in terms of the relations 
between thoughts. Rather, we must consider relations between persons-at-a- 
time. Consider a person X at T1 and a person Y at T2. There are many ways in 
which they may be related. Person X may be identical to person Y. Person X 
may be psychologically connected to person Y, but not identical to Y. The 
nature of this psychological connection can take many forms. The connection 
may simply be that the thoughts of X have influenced the thoughts of Y, via 
conversations between them, or by a book X has written, for example. A science 
fiction example is that Y may have had some of X’s memories transferred into 
her brain. Finally, Y may be psychologically connected and continuous with X. 
Parfit’s thought is that the latter is possible, even if Y is not identical with X, and 
that if this is the case, the lack of identity does not prevent it being true that Y is a 
survivor of X What I attempt to do in this chapter is argue for a way in which this 
can be true, without relying on the problematic account of psychological 
connectedness and continuity given by Parfit and hopefully without making 
Parfit’s mistakes. By making my account one concerning the relations between 
persons-at-a-time, rather than between thoughts and other mental events, I aim 
to avoid the unwanted mental atomism of Parfit’s account.
It is worth outlining now what I see this replacement relation to be. I propose
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a replacement of Relation R which I call the I* relation"! ;
The r  relation holds where there is (a) direct phenomenological 
connection over time between persons; (b) functional indexicality 
between persons over time; (c) such connections are held both forwardly 
and retrospectively, forming a coherent internal narrative.
In outline, direct phenomenological connectedness over time is a memory 
relation, whereby the person at a later time remembers the experiences of the 
person at the earlier time as if they were her own memories. By functional 
indexicality I mean that all thoughts of the I* related persons are causally 
efficacious with regards to future actions, in the right kind of way. Functional 
indexicality and direct phenomenological connectedness are forms of direct 
psychological connection over time. These connections can hold to a lesser or 
greater degree. We know if they hold to the correct degree if the third condition 
of the r  relation is met. i.e. if there is a coherent internal narrative, by which I 
mean that each I* related person can make sense of all the experiences of the I* 
related persons as being part of a single, continuing life.
Firstly, I will discuss each part of the I* relation in turn, explaining why they 
are necessary and how it avoids the problems of Parfit’s account. I will then 
consider how this account offers certain improvements over Relation R and will 
then turn to the question of whether the I* relation is “what matters in survival".
1. Direct Phenomenological Connectedness.
Direct phenomenological connectedness is concerned with the form in 
which we have memories of past experiences. On my definition, X is directly 
phenomenologically connected with Y iff X remembers Y’s experiences as her 
own.2 Although diachronically this is a memory relation, to make clear what is
1 This terminology is borrowed from Rovane [1990], who introduces the pronoun I* to “range over 
persons with whom I am psychologically connected...and would refer to them without implying 
they are identical with me." (p368) My account of the I* relation is in many ways an expansion of 
Rovane’s concept of r ,  which she herself leaves undeveloped.
2 This phrase is used by Braude [1991] who writes, “State x is autobiographical for S ’ =df S 
experiences x as its own." (pp87-88)
-
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meant by having an experience as one’s own, it is a good idea to first consider 
some synchronic examples. If I stub my toe, I experience pain. It seems to add 
nothing to the description if I say that I experience that pain as my own. But now 
consider if you stub your toe, and I experience that pain. There are many ways 
in which this could be true. I could have a kind of secondary, empathetic pain. 
This is often the case when someone suffers a heavy blow, and a witness says 
something like, “I really felt that.” It could mean that I mysteriously feel a pain in 
my toe at the same time as you feel pain in yours. But it could be the case that I 
actually experience the pain in your toe. We experience pain in our own bodies 
as pains coming from these parts of our bodies. But our own proprioceptive 
awareness can be altered. Amputees often feel pain in a part of their body 
which is no longer there. Conversely, people with artificial limbs can come to 
feel sensations in these limbs. So there is nothing logically impossible in my 
proprioceptive awareness encompassing, for a while at least, your toe. In such 
a case, however, even though the pain is in your toe, I would experience that 
pain as my own. It would be as if I had stubbed my own toe, but that my toe was 
for some reason, several feet away from the rest of my body. In such a case, I 
would be, momentarily, directly phenomenologically connected with you.
Consider next a case in which I see through your eyes. 3 I may be in London, 
while you are in Paris, looking at the Mona Lisa. Although it is not I who is 
looking at the painting, I will experience looking at the painting as my own 
experience. It will be as if I were looking at the painting myself. 4 Again, that 
would make me directly phenomenologically connected with you.
In these examples it is clear that there is direct phenomenological 
connection to a limited degree, as X does not experience all of Y’s experiences 
as her own. However, the examples are merely intended to show what is meant
3 Strawson [1959] discusses a similar thought experiment, pp90-91.
4 One difference will be that I would not be able to control the direction of my gaze. But this is 
unimportant. If I were strapped to a wheel chair, with my head constrained and eyes propped 
open, and then taken around the Louvre against my will, that would not prevent my visual 
experiences being experienced as my own, and in this case, actually being my own.
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by experiencing as one’s own and to illustrate how one could conceivably 
experience someone else’s experiences as one’s own. Now we must turn to the 
more important diachronic case of memory. The archetype of direct 
phenomenological connectedness over time is quasi-memory, or q-memory. 
Consider Parfit’s q-memory example:
Venetian memories. Jane has agreed to have copied in her brain 
some of Paul’s memory traces. After she recovers consciousness in 
the post-surgery room, she has a new set of vivid apparent memories.
[...] One apparent memory is very clear. She seems to remember 
looking across the water to an island, where a white Palladian church 
stood out brilliantly against a dark thundercloud.5 
In such a case, Jane is said to experience the memories as her own. This 
does not just mean that the experience of remembering is experienced as her 
own, but that she recalls the experience remembered, the sight of the Palladian 
church, as if it were her own experience. This is a purely phenomenological 
claim. Parfit, borrowing Peacocke’s expression, says that the quasi-memory 
comes in the "first-person mode of presentation”.6 That is to say, the quasi­
memory is had from “the seer’s point of view”7. Although the quasi-memory may 
not be of something the person themselves experienced, it is presented to them 
from the viewpoint of the person who did have those experiences. In the same 
passage. Parfit gives as another example the occurrence in dreams of seeing 
oneself from the outside. Here, one has a point of view which is not that of 
oneself, but is nonetheless first-personal in nature. In such dreams we see 
ourselves as if we were someone else looking at ourselves.
For Jane to q-remember the experience as her own does not require her to
5 Partit, p220. It has been argued, by Wiggins [1992] and Hughes [1975] for example, that such a 
story is incoherent. However, these criticisms are usually against the possibility of discreet 
memories being transferred, or of the subject being able to have memories not considered to be 
their own. Because my final position does not require the denial of either of these two criticisms, I 
need not respond to them.
6 Parfit, p221 ; Peacocke [1983].
7 Parfit, ibid
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believe it was her own. Jane could think, "I q-remember seeing Venice, but it 
was Paul, not I, who saw Venice". It is enough for her to remember seeing 
Venice as if it were her who actually did see Venice for her to be directly 
phenomenologically connected with Paul.
If q-memory were possible, then the person who q-remembers X and the 
person who experienced X would be directly phenomenologically connected. 
There is one respect in which q-memory differs from the synchronic examples 
given above. With q-memory, I could say, “I remember seeing X, but it was not I 
who saw X.” But with the Louvre and toe examples, it is not obvious that the 
experiences one has as one’s own are not also actually one’s own. There’s an 
oddness to saying, "My experience of seeing the Mona Lisa is as if I am in front 
of the Mona Lisa, but it is not I seeing the Mona Lisa,” which is absent from the 
q-memory case. But the difference is not important. The intention is to 
demonstrate what it means to experience something as one’s own experience, 
whether or not it is actually one’s own experience. The synchronic examples 
offered are at the very least problematic, in that it is debatable whether we 
should claim that I am seeing the Mona Lisa or that the pain in the toe is my 
pain.8 But these examples are only illustrative, and in the crucial diachronic 
case of q-memory, it is very clear that the experience Jane q-remembers is not 
her own experience.
This definition of direct phenomenological connectedness is incomplete as it 
stands, as it will run into familiar problems with the possibility of deviant causal 
chains. What if, for example, your verbal recollections of your holiday are so 
vivid that it comes to seem to me that I remember the holiday as if it were I who 
went there, and that my apparent recollections correspond to what you did 
actually do and see? Having seen your photos and heard your descriptions, I 
could have a memory-like experience qualitatively identical to that of yours.
8 Peacocke’s [1979] (p99ff) discussion of similar problems of perception, such as whether or not I 
see a car in my mirror, or a person on television, should make clear to those unconvinced that this 
is a problematic area.
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Would that mean we have become directly phenomenologically connected? 
The problems here are familiar. There is a need to make the memory 
dependent upon the original experience in such a way as to rule out such 
possibilities without making the definition circular or arbitrary. I cannot offer such 
a definition here. But however difficult formulating such an account may be, I do 
not think it unreasonable to suppose that a significant distinction can be made 
between a memory-type experience that is built up from third-party information 
and a memory-transfer. Specifying exactly what that difference is I must leave to 
others. 9
What should be clear at this stage is that direct phenomenological 
connectedness on its own is not nearly enough for a unified mental life. No 
matter how many experiences we q-remember as our own, if we don’t think of 
them as our own experiences then the connectedness between ourselves and 
the actual experiencer is going to be very limited. Furthermore, there is much 
more to a unified mental life than retrospective memory. There are beliefs, 
desires, intentions and so on. We must see how direct phenomenological 
connectedness fits in with the other elements of the I* relation before we can 
fully appreciate its role.
Parfit, in his account of psychological connectedness, considered memory 
and then tried to fit other thoughts and mental contents, such as intentions, into 
the same framework. It is a criticism of Parfit that memories and intentions are 
disanalogous.10 | believe memories to be in a category of their own, precisely 
because, diachronically, they have a phenomenological element lacking in 
other mental contents. I can remember something as if the original experience 
of that something were my own experience. But what could it mean, for
9 Peacocke has formulated conditions lor a causal chain to be non-deviant. The main condition is 
the requirement for the effect to be differentially explained by the cause, where " /s  being 0 
differentially explains y’s being ip i f f /s  being 0 is a non-redundant part of the explanation of y"s 
being tp, and according to the principles of explanation (laws) invoked in this explanation, there 
are functions... specified in these laws such that y’s being tp is fixed by these functions from Xs  
being 0 .” (Peacocke [1979], p66. The second main condition is for “stepwise recoverability” (Ibid 
p80). I believe that on this account, causal chains of psychological connection are non-deviant.
10 See Rovane [1990]
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example, to experience an earlier intention or belief as one’s own, unless that 
simply means that we remember them? Memory provides the only 
phenomenological access to our pasts. The way in which intentions and beliefs 
unify our mental lives over time is, I contend, quite different from the case of 
memory. But intentions and beliefs do form part of a unified mental life, 
nonetheless. The second element of the I* relation, which I now turn to, explains 
how this can be the case.
2. Functional indexicallty.
Consider once more the person who enters the teletransporter. The person 
who steps out on Mars will be directly phenomenologically connected with this 
person, because he will remember the experiences of that person as his own. 
This will be the case even if this person is convinced that teletransportation 
destroys people and creates new ones in their place. This belief cannot stop the 
way in which the memory experiences are had.
Intentions are not the same. If the person enters the teletransporter intending 
to watch a movie and the person steps out intending to watch the same movie, 
this person is not experiencing the intention simply as their own, it is their own. 
The cause of the intention may be the earlier person, but if the man on Mars 
intends to see a movie, that can only be his intention. In this respect, if the man 
on Mars believes that teletransportation kills people, he doesn’t have to watch 
his language so closely when ascribing intentions to himself as he does when 
he recalls past experiences. While he would have to be vigilant to stop himself 
thinking that what he remembers is what he did, (which will become 
increasingly difficult after time, when he will not be able to automatically know 
which memories are pre-teletransportation and post-teletransportation), he has 
no such problem with intentions. Whatever he intends to do, he intends to do.
However, there is clearly a link between the intentions of the reluctant 
teletransporter user on Earth and the man on Mars which is utterly unlike the
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link between the intentions of two different people and quite a lot like the the link 
between a single person’s intentions over time. To understand this link, let us 
return to Earth again. Our reluctant "traveller”, let us call him Bob, has arrived to 
find his shuttle trip cancelled, and has been offered teletransportation instead. 
He is on a business trip, and his boss decides to take up the offer, but our man 
still refuses, believing that the machine will kill him. The boss begins to make 
threats. Bob thinks to himself, “If he makes me use that machine. I’ll prosecute 
him for murder.” In his temper. Bob fails to see the lack of logic in this thought.n 
Bob’s beliefs entails that if he is teletransported, he will be killed, and so won’t 
be able to prosecute anyone. Perhaps at some level Bob does believe what is 
going to happen is going to very much like survival. His boss then punches him 
in the head, drags him into the teletransporter and the machine is turned on.
A little later on Mars, Bob (a different Bob?) walks out of the booth fuming. 
“Right, that's it,” he screams, “I’m charging you with murder.” There are many 
reasons why he may change his mind. Why should he be concerned with the 
murder of someone else? Furthermore, if his prosecution is successful, that 
would establish that he isn’t Bob, which may leave him without any of Bob’s 
possessions, or maybe even the wife he loves, as much as Earth-Bob did. But 
the point of the thought experiment is much simpler. No matter what we believe 
about the identity of the person on Earth and the person on Mars, the intentional 
link is as if they were one person. Normally, if I want to do something, that I 
intend to do it, continue to intend to do it, and the circumstances arise when I 
can do it is enough to ensure that I do that something. My intentions are 
casually efficacious with regards to future actions. That is to say, ceteris parabis 
nothing other than my forming an intention to do something is required for me to 
actually go on and do that something. In this example, the same is true for Bob
11 This lack of logic isn’t necessary to the thought experiment. He could equally think, “It he 
makes me use that machine, my replica will prosecute " However, the logically Inconsistent 
version makes the point rather nicely that no matter what we believe about this machine, we know 
that what comes out at the other end is psychologically continuous with us, in the same ways in 
which the person who wakes up each morning Is with the person who went to sleep the night 
before.
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on Earth and Bob on Mars. Earth-Bob’s intention to prosecute is enough to lead 
Mars-Bob to prosecute, so long as no change of mind occurs, such as often 
happens with normal intentions.
Here then, the earlier intention is the cause of a later intention or action just 
as if the earlier and later intentions and actions were the same person’s. This is 
not because of the phenomenology, as is the case with memory, but because of 
the way intentions function. If they function as if they were the intentions and 
actions of a single person, then we have what I call functional indexicallty. This 
is why Earth-Bob’s logical error is unimportant. He thought, “I will prosecute,” 
and later Mars-Bob thought, “I will prosecute." The logic of identity requires that 
Earth Bob’s “I” and Mars-Bob’s “I” refer to different persons. But the “l”s here 
function just as though they do refer to the same person. There is the formal 
identity of the “I” explained by Kant.
Continuity of other psychological features can also be explained in terms of 
functional indexicallty. Beliefs, dispositions, phobias and so on all lead one to 
behave and react in certain ways to certain situations. For example, if Earth-Bob 
believes Cliff Richard to be the greatest rock star in the world, and Mars-Bob 
meets Cliff Richard, barring any radical reappraisal of his view. Bob will be 
awed and amazed by this meeting. Beliefs form and develop over time. Mars- 
Bob’s reaction will be just as Earth Bob’s would have been, had his belief been 
allowed to develop and his life had not been cut off by the teletransporter. 
Again, because the belief functions in the same way, I say that there is 
functional indexicallty between Earth-Bob and Mars-Bob.
Functional indexicallty adds to direct psychological connectedness the other 
mental features of intention, belief, desire and so on which direct 
phenomenological connectedness leave out. What is now needed is an 
account of how these different factors must blend together, in order for there to 
be a unified mental life. This is explained in the third element of the I* relation.
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3. The Internal Narrative.
Parfit’s account included psychological connectedness and continuity. The 
first two elements of my own account have described two types of psychological 
connectedness. For Parfit, continuity was a product of enough overlapping 
chains of psychological connections. To a certain extent, this is true of the 
account being offered here. Consider again the Venetian memories case. 
Although Jane is directly phenomenologically connected with Paul, this 
connection is a small one. It only consists of a small set of memories. There is 
no way in which there is a unified mental life that connects Jane and Paul. 12 
Even if Jane shared all Paul’s memories, this would not be so. We would still 
require functional indexicallty. If the relations of direct phenomenological 
connectedness and functional indexicallty held between Jane and Paul to the 
same, or very nearly the same, degree, as is normally the case in a single 
person, then we could say there is a unified mental life. Jane would remember 
what Paul did as if she herself had done the things she remembers. Paul’s 
intentions would be as causally efficacious to Jane’s actions as they would 
have been for his own actions. What Paul’s beliefs disposed him to do, they 
dispose Jane to do. Under such circumstances, we would have continuity as 
well as connectedness, and thus a unified mental life. But we must consider 
more carefully just what this continuity requires.
I want to claim that continuity is the existence of a coherent internal narrative. 
Although this is a product of direct phenomenological connectedness and 
functional indexicallty, we need the concept of the internal narrative to decide 
whether these psychological connections hold to the correct degree. Consider 
first how it is a product of direct psychological connectedness. Where there is a 
high degree of direct phenomenological connectedness and functional 
indexicallty, it seems there cannot but be a coherent internal narrative. It would
12 I defined a unified mental life in §5.1 as “a temporally continuous, though not necessarily 
uninterrupted, series of mental events which are related to each other in the same important ways 
as are our normal mental lives.” See §5.1 for a full explanation of this.
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help to consider what a normal Internal narrative is like. I remember being born 
and being brought up on the Kent coast. I know that my choice of A level exam 
subjects was partly a result of my experiences in my O level exams, and that I 
went to a University which I choose for various reasons, and so on. All fairly 
humdrum stuff. But the notion of an internal narrative is a hum drum notion. It is 
the sense we make of our lives from the inside, and unless we lead exceptional 
lives, this is often, for better or for worse, a very hum drum affair. Now if all my 
memories fit together in this smooth way and my actions reflect a consistent, if 
evolving, set of intentions and beliefs, it is very probable that I will have such an 
internal narrative.
But sometimes we need to invoke the concept of the internal narrative to 
judge if there is the right amount of direct psychological connectedness. I have 
already pointed out how if Jane is only directly phenomenologically connected 
to Paul by a few memories, she will not be I* related to him. We need more or 
less as much connectedness as we normally have between a single person at 
different times. The requirement for an internal narrative is one way of helping 
us to understand just how much is enough. If Jane is directly 
phenomenologically connected and functionally indexical with Paul such that 
Jane has a coherent internal narrative that stretches back for the present back 
through Paul’s life, the we will know that there are enough of these relations for 
us to say that there is a unified mental life that links Jane now and Paul in the 
past.
On the other hand, too much can also cause problems. If Jane does not lose 
her connections with her earlier self, then her internal narrative will go askew. 
She will remember, for example, not only visiting Venice in June, but visiting 
New York at the same time. She will in effect have two sets of conflicting 
memories. She will also have conflicting desires and beliefs. So as well as 
requiring enough of the right connections with the person to whom the latter 
person is to be I* related, there also has to be very little or no such connections
Chapter Six 155
with any other earlier person. Specifying a quantity of connectedness is very 
difficult. What we can do is use the requirement for a coherent internal narrative 
as a kind of requirement for there being the right amount of connectedness 
between each directly psychologically connected person.
Given the circumstances of their story, whether Jane and Paul could ever be 
fully r  related is a difficult question. There are several obstacles to there being a 
coherent internal narrative that links their lives. Most obviously, she will 
remember being a man. She will remember living in a different house. How is it, 
she may ask herself, that I have been planning to be a rock star for all these 
years, and yet there isn’t a single musical instrument in the house? Of course, 
what it will feel like for her is that she is Paul, waking up in the body of a woman 
in a strange place. The reason why this could threaten one’s sense of identity Is 
precisely, I claim, because it undermines the internal narrative we have of our 
own lives. Much will depend upon what Paul knew before the operation. If he 
knew his brain would be wiped and the states transferred into a woman, then 
maybe it wouldn’t be such a problem. Whatever would happen in this case, it is 
clear that without the internal narrative, our mental lives cannot have the unity 
which they normally do.i3
Briefly, a word about “coherent”. Just how coherent does the internal 
narrative need to be? This is a question I feel unable to answer. What is clear to 
me is that without an internal narrative, there cannot be a unified mental life. But 
our narratives can be more or less structured and coherent. It is also probable 
that the amount of structure required varies from person to person. Enough is 
simply enough for the person involved to make sense of that narrative. Just as 
some people can make sense of the narrative of Leopold Bloom’s life in Joyce’s
13 The importance of a narrative to a subject’s life history has been stressed most notably by 
Alisdair McIntyre [1985]: “The concepts of narrative, intelligibility and accountability presuppose 
the applicability of the concept of personal identity [...] The relationship is one of mutual 
presupposition. It does follow of course that all attempts to elucidate the notion of personal 
identity independently of and in isolation from the notions of narrative, intelligibility and 
accountability are doomed to fail. All such attempts have.”(p218) See also Ricoeur [1975] and 
Glover [1988].
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Ulysses, whilst others require the straightforward certainties of David 
Copperfield, so our abilities to make sense of our own internal narratives may 
depend upon our own capacities for self-interpretation. Ricoeur talked of life as 
“a story in search of a narrator". How we “narrate” the stories of our own lives 
is almost certainly not the same from person to person.
Direct phenomenological connectedness, functional indexicallty and a 
coherent internal narrative together seem enough to provide for a unified 
mental life. If X remembers Y’s experiences as her own; Y’s desires, intentions 
and beliefs develop and function as if they were X’s; and X can make sense of 
the life which stretches back and connects with Y’s life as a single life, then 
surely there is a unified mental life that links X and Y. In this chapter I have 
constantly used variations of the expression, “as if it were one’s own”. This 
expression is the essence of the I* relation, and the three parts of the I* relation 
are attempts to enumerate the factors that together give the impression of a 
unified mental life which appears as one’s own. In teletransportation we have a 
clear example of how two numerically distinct persons, one on Mars and one on 
Earth, who can look backwards and forwards respectively to a numerically 
distinct person and yet see that person’s life as their own. In such a case there 
cannot but be a unified mental life.
Now I would like to turn to how this account of a unified mental life improves 
on the Parfitian conception.
4. The r  Relation v. Relation R.
As I have explained, the need to formulate the I* relation as a replacement 
for Relation R was primarily motivated by the inadequacy of Relation R’s 
account of connectedness, continuity and the relata of Relation R. These could 
be described as technical problems, in that they are not problems with the three 
basic features of Parfitian account I outlined, but with the details of how a
14 From the title of Ricoeur [1991].
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diachronic mental life should actually be described. However, having made 
these alterations, we can see several other advantages the I* relation has over 
Relation R. In general, the I* relation explains better why it is that certain 
hypothetical cases are importantly different from cases of normal survival. In this 
section I explain why it is that the I* relation is a less liberal principle than 
Relation R, and why that illiberality should be welcomed.
Firstly, we should consider fission. Rovane 15 has pointed out how fission 
undermines some of the most basic features of our lives. Consider intentions. 
Though it seems possible for someone who knows that they are going to split to 
formulate intentions for each of the two fission products to fulfil, these intentions 
could not function like our normal ones. Firstly, our intentions assume that we 
will not split as they assume only one person will be there to carry them out. In 
certain cases, such as intending to be the first person to do something, it 
requires that only one person be there. Secondly, and more seriously, the way 
in which we fulfil our intentions in a fission situation would differ quite 
fundamentally from the way we fulfil normal intentions. For example, normally, if 
I intend to write a novel, in order to fulfil that intention it is enough that the 
intention continue and I act upon it. But if I know I am going to split, I may decide 
to form the quasi-intention that only one of my fission products write that novel 
and that the other travel the world. In this case, acting upon the continued 
intention is not enough to fulfil it. This is because both fission products will wake 
up with exactly the same desires and wishes as the pre-fission person. It will 
then be necessary for them to work out, or decide, which of them should fulfil 
which part of the intention. It may be that the decision made was that the person 
who woke up on the left hand side of the other would write the novel and the 
person on the other side travel the Earth. Maybe a coin was to be tossed. But 
whatever the decision, the fission products will not know what was quasi­
intended for them until they either toss the coin or see which side they are on.
15 Rovane [1990]
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But no such procedure is required with normal intentions. The fact that the 
intention is remembered and continued is enough.
Parfit’s Relation R does not account for this difference, as it doesn’t explain 
what sort of connection must hold between an intention and a later action. 
However, the I* relation does. I maintain that the intention must be causally 
efficacious, in the same way as ordinary intentions are causally efficacious, if 
two persons are to be fully I* related and thus be part of a fully unified mental 
life. In the fission case, this condition is not met, as Rovane explains. What this 
means is that in the case of fission, there is rather less mental continuity than 
there is in normal cases, because there is rather less functional indexicallty. 
This is one reason to suppose that fission is not like ordinary survival. Now, the 
importance of this difference is another matter. Even in ordinary survival, there 
can less continuity than is normal. An amnesiac, for example, may need to 
make notes for themselves to carry out their own intentions, for example. This 
does not mean that the amnesiac cannot enjoy a unified mental life, but it does 
mean that it is not as unified a mental life as is normally the case. In my opinion, 
the same is true in fission. We have rather less mental continuity than is normal, 
but enough for us to say that there is a unified mental life connecting the pre 
and post fission persons. One reason for holding this is that there would still be 
a very clear internal narrative for both fission products. But however important 
we decide the difference is, there is a difference, and my account acknowledges 
this difference in a way in which Parfit’s does not.
These considerations also bring out the point that all parts of the I* relation 
can hold to a lesser or greater degree. Neither functional indexicallty nor direct 
psychological connectedness is an all or nothing relation. Consequently, the 
degree to which the internal narrative of our lives coheres can vary.
A second reason for favouring an account of the kind I have suggested is 
that, taking as it does its standards from normal cases of survival, it corresponds
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more closely with what we believe about real people. 16 The kinds of relations 
required for there to be an unified mental life that links two numerically distinct 
persons are the same as those required for a unified mental life in a single 
person. And the borderline cases in such cross-person cases are just like 
borderline single-person ones. For example, as discussed above, we may 
doubt that a severe amnesiac has a unified mental life, just as we can doubt if 
two people who are not completely I* related have a unified mental life. But the 
tests which we apply to try to answer those questions are the same. Does the 
amnesiac/later person remember earlier experiences as their own? Are the 
intentions of the amnesiac/earlier person causally efficacious as regards the 
actions of the amnesiac/later person? Is there a coherent internal narrative that 
allows the amnesiac/ later person to make sense of the past? Of course, 
sometimes these questions will have indeterminate or uncertain answers. But 
the uncertainty is the same in both cases. The borderline cases in our imagined 
examples are just like the borderline cases in ordinary, pathological cases.
A third aspect of mental continuity which Parfit’s account neglects is the 
need for both backward and forward looking connections. 17 Consider q-memory 
once more. If Jane q-remembers John's experiences. Parfit says Jane is 
phenomenologically connected to him. Relation R is simply a product of enough 
of these kinds of connections. I would not deny that under such circumstances 
Jane is psychologically connected with John, but no number of such similar 
connections could ever lead to the kind of psychological continuity Relation R 
should demand. The reason for this is that Jane will only be retrospectively 
connected with John. Her memories look back at John’s experiences. But John 
never looks forward to Jane’s future. He doesn’t plan what Jane will do, nor 
does he anticipate having Jane’s experiences. His plans, beliefs and desires 
will not effect Jane. This is different to the teletransportation case. Here, there is
16 Wilkes [1993] has made the strongest case for the view that our accounts of persons must 
correspond to what actually is the case.
17 Mclnerney [1985 & 1991] first drew my attention to this failure in Parfit.
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a pattern of planning, intention and memory. The beliefs, intentions and desires 
of the person on Earth will effect the person on Mars and the person on Mars 
can recall life back on Earth. In the Venetian memories case, Jane cannot look 
forward to the holiday in Venice. She can look forward to receiving Paul’s 
memories on his return, but her desires, plans and wishes cannot effect what 
Paul does in Venice, just as Paul’s desires, plans and wishes cannot effect what 
Jane does later.
Parfit does talk about other kinds of psychological connection, even though I 
have found his account wanting. My account, I hope, makes it clearer. The idea 
of the internal narrative is crucial to this. The internal narrative is not just a 
backward looking retrospective autobiography. The internal narrative is lived, 
day by day, and so is permanently being created by its author, the person. 
Sense cannot be made of this narrative unless one can look both forwards and 
backwards at whatever moment of the story one finds oneself.
There are thus three respects in which I believe the I* relation is more 
precise than Relation R. Firstly, it accounts for the differences to psychological 
continuity pathological cases such as fission makes, because it does not 
explain direct psychological connectedness simply in terms of connections 
between particular thoughts and events, as if different kinds of thoughts all 
worked in the same way. Secondly, the \* relation corresponds more closely to 
what normally is involved in psychological continuity. And thirdly, the backward 
and forward elements in psychological continuity are more fully brought out by 
the r  relation.
One more point remains to be discussed. Parfit claimed that Relation R was 
what mattered in survival. Just what does this mean, and can the same claim be 
made of the I* relation?
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5. “What Matters in Survival”.
To ask what matters in survival is a nebulous question. Interpreted one way, 
the question is very general. In the fission case, for example, what could matter 
to me is that after the split there will be two people instead of one whose lives 
are dedicated to the pursuit of an ideal I hold dear. In this case, what matters to 
me is served well by fission, even if one views fission as death. On this reading, 
“what matters” simply means “what is important for the particular person”. But 
this cannot be what Parfit means and it is not the conception I intend to use. 
There is clearly no way of explaining what is of value to persons in the future in 
the general terms required by a philosophical theory. Furthermore this question 
is clearly far removed from that of specifying the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for personal survival, which was the starting point, if not the end, of 
the present discussion.
We could interpret “what matters” in another way. We could say that what 
matters in survival is simply what is required if X is to be a survivor of Y. But this 
too is unsatisfactory, as it makes the question of what matters indistinguishable 
from the question of what is essential for personal survival. To talk of mattering 
would simply be to misleadingly add the suggestion of value to a 
straightforward enquiry into the necessary conditions of survival.
Neither of these two interpretations captures the sense of “what matters” in 
Parfit. What matters in survival is not just a question of what survival entails but 
nor is it a question purely of what we value. It is rather a question about what it 
is about survival which we value. It is a question about what is important to us, 
but it is specifically a question about what is important in survival itself. It seems 
to me that this is as far as Parfit really gets with the notion. His use of the 
expression clearly combines the idea of value with that of the requirements of 
survival, without actually explaining what this combination entails. In clarifying 
what is meant by “what matters”, therefore, it is possible that I will be moving on 
from Parfit’s own view. This is inevitable as there simply isn’t a sharp conception
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of this term in Parfit. However, I think an explanation is possible which is both 
sharp and which captures something essential to the Parfitian view which Parfit 
himself overlooks. I believe that the correct interpretation of the phrase “what 
matters in survival” is “what is required for survival from the first person point of 
view”. If this is the correct interpretation, it should be clear that in answering the 
question “what matters in survival” we would meet the relevance requirement, 
i.e. we would have addressed the first personal question of survival. I shall 
now explain what my interpretation of “what matters” means and why I think it is 
the correct interpretation.
What is it that makes the question of personal survival different from that of, 
say, rabbit survival? Many of the puzzle cases used in the personal identity 
debate, such as those of fission and teletransportation, could be equally applied 
to rabbits. And even the thought experiments where the mind is effected could 
probably apply to dogs and ‘higher’ mammals. One factor which could make a 
difference is that persons, and perhaps certain other ‘higher’ animals, have a 
first-person perspective on the world. This perspective need not prevent us from 
approaching the question of survival in a completely third personal way. Even 
when talking about dolphins or pigs, the fact that these animals do have some 
sort of first-personal perspective is not in itself a reason to stop us approaching 
the issue in a third personal way. One can simply treat the organism as one 
other object in the world and attempt to specify the conditions of survival or 
identity. The same can be, and has been, done for persons. The result has been 
the search for the necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity, what I 
have called the factual question of identity. 19 But as I explained in chapter two, 
there are questions about our survival for which an account of the factual 
question of identity cannot provide answers. One of these is whether we should 
have any special concern for the person who steps out of the teletransporter on 
Mars who is a replica of, but clearly not numerically identical to, me.
18 See chapter two tor a more detailed account of the Relevance Requirement.
19 See §2.1
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For this reason, I argued that there is a second question: the first-person 
question of survival. In cases such as teletransportation, are there reasons why I 
should consider the person who walks out of the booth on Mars as my survivor, 
who I should care about just as much as if he were me, even though we are not 
numerically identical? Here, the first-personal perspective I and my replica have 
seem to be in tension with the third-personal facts. There appears to be a clash 
between the way we view our survival from the first personal viewpoint and the 
way in which it is viewed from a third personal viewpoint. This is the most 
puzzling feature of teletransportation. Whilst we know that, from the first 
personal point of view, teletransportation would seem like a means of transport, 
from the third personal point of view it is destruction and replication of a person. 
Of course, our first personal judgments can be effected by our third personal 
ones and vice versa, but the gap between the two nonetheless remains.
On my view, however, the factual question of personal identity over time 
should be taken as quite distinct from the first person question of survival. The 
two questions are not in conflict, they are simply different. The possible area of 
disagreement is over the importance we give to each question, and even here, 
how important the questions are depends on what our interests are. If we are 
concerned with the issue of personal identity, period, then the first person 
question of survival is irrelevant. But if we are concerned with the importance of 
personal survival, then neither question can simply be ignored.
On this point, I fundamentally disagree with Parfit. Parfit believes that 
teletransportation is a problem for identity theorists. We can see this by the use 
he makes of the concept of an “empty question” . 20 An empty question is a 
question where the answer (i) is not required to understand fully the situation 
referred to and (ii) cannot be said to be right or wrong. Parfit argues that some 
questions of identity are empty. For example, in the case of teletransportation 
we can know all the facts concerning the situation. He claims there is no further
20 Partit 213-214
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fact of identity to be discovered. There is no correct answer to the question, “Is 
the person on Mars identical with the person on Earth?” We thus have simply to 
choose between two descriptions of the events. We could say the person 
survives teletransportation or we could say a person is destroyed and 
replicated. These two descriptions do not describe two different states of affairs, 
for each of which only one of the descriptions can be right. Rather, they both 
describe the same situation and we need not decide which description is right. 
In order to decide which is the better description, we have to consider “what 
matters in survival”.
On my view Parfit is wrong. There is a fact of identity is this case. The replica 
is not identical with me. The question of identity is therefore not empty at all. But 
there is another set of considerations in this case. That is, the person who steps 
out of the teletransporter will be related in a certain way to the person who 
walks in. Namely, they will be I* related. On my view, this is enough for the Mars 
person to be a survivor of the Earth-person. Even though he is not identical with 
me, I have reason to care about my survivor as much as if he were me. In fact, I 
have more reason to care about him than I do about myself in the future, if I 
were not I* related to my future self, because of severe brain damage, for 
example. This is because the I* relation states what is important to the first- 
person question of survival, whereas identity conditions only satisfy the factual 
question of identity.
Notice that I have not distinguished the factual question of identity and the 
first personal question of survival in terms of objectivity and subjectivity. The I* 
relation is, I believe, best described as an objective account of the first-personal 
conditions for survival. It is not ‘subjective’ because it is a set of criteria over 
which we can agree and which we can apply to persons other than ourselves. It 
is also not ‘subjective’ because we can use it to overrule the subjective 
judgments of persons concerning their identity. We can say that someone who 
claims to be the survivor of a dead person is deluded because there is no
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evidence to believe the two are I* related. We recognise that others too have 
this first personal perspective. We also acknowledge that any creature, or 
indeed automaton, that fulfils something like Locke’s criteria of personhood2i 
also has this viewpoint. This means that when considering the conditions of 
survival for beings other than ourselves, we can use this understanding to allow 
for the special nature of the first personal viewpoint.
So the question of what matters in survival becomes for us now a choice: For 
a person to consider a future person as her survivor, someone she should plan 
for, save for, and whose interests she should have a special concern for, should 
that future person be numerically identical with her or is it enough that she be I* 
related to her? In short, is it identity or psychological connectedness and 
continuity of a certain sort which is the basis of our concern for future selves? 
The answer, I claim, is the latter one, and I shall defend this claim in the final 
chapter. Indeed, it is the very existence of this view which makes the question of 
personal survival distinct from animal, vegetable or mineral survival. The 
existence of the first personal perspective and the fact that we occupy this 
perspective makes the question of our survival crucially different to the question 
of an animal's survival.
6. Conclusion.
As I have already stated, because my position is a development of Parfit’s, it 
is not an argument from scratch. I have not offered strong arguments as to why it 
is psychological connectedness and continuity which matter in survival. What I 
have done is tried to improve on the account of what psychological 
connectedness and continuity is and explained what is meant by “what matters’’. 
What I hope to have done is to have improved on the Parfitian account which 
we had many reasons to accept, but with which we also had severe problems. 
In the final chapter I shall turn to an appraisal of the view proposed, in which I 
hope the attractions of the view become more apparent.
21 See section 1 ot this chapter
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Chapter Seven 
Appraisal
Parfit argued that what matters in survival is Relation R -  psychological 
connectedness and continuity. I have argued that his Relation R is inadequate 
and have replaced it with what I have called the r  Relation. The I* Relation 
performs the same basic function as Relation R and it retains the distinctive 
features of the Parfitian account, whilst avoiding what I have argued are the 
main errors of Parfit. This revision forms the main part of my critical development 
of psychological reductionism. The I* relation will, of course, need to come 
under scrutiny itself, but it does seem to indicate a promising direction in which 
to develop Parfitianism. In this chapter, I shall begin this scrutiny. In particular, 
we need to ask if the I* relation is what is required to answer the first-person 
question of survival. There are also the requirements of chapters one and two to 
be considered. Firstly, does my account meet the relevance requirement, i.e. 
does it address the first personal question of survival? What we will find is that 
the questions, “Does the r  relation capture what matters in survival?" and “Does 
this revised Parfitian view meet the relevance requirement?” are very closely 
related.
In chapter one, as part of my examination of the raison d ’être of 
philosophical anthropology, I formulated the Kierkegaardian requirement, i.e. 
the requirement to explain how it is we can view ourselves both as beings 
trapped in the here and now, and as beings whose existence extends 
backwards and forwards over time. We need to ask whether this requirement 
has been met. I consider this at the end of this chapter.
This thesis is an investigation into persons. It cannot be ended without an 
account of what persons are. This account has had to come at the end, and not 
at the start of the thesis, because my conception of what persons are follows 
from what has been argued concerning their survival over time. Now that the
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account of survival has been completed, what this entails for a conception of 
what persons are needs to be considered. This is done in the first section of this 
chapter.
Considering these questions is a means of appraising the view I have 
argued for. I have already tried to show how my view avoids the main errors of 
Parfit, but this in itself is not a demonstration of its worth. We also have to 
consider if the theory achieves what it is required to achieve. The aim of Part 
One was to make clear just what we can expect a philosophy of persons to 
achieve. I now need to show how the conception outlined here meets these 
expectations.
However, there are limitations on how thorough this appraisal can be. This 
thesis is a critical development of psychological reductionism and does not 
argue for such a position from first principles. Psychological reductionists such 
as Parfit have already discussed in great detail many arguments in favour of the 
view that psychological connectedness and continuity is the basis for personal 
survival. I see little value in going over these arguments again.
The chapter is divided up as follows. Firstly I consider the question, “What is 
a person?” and describe the answer I believe my position entails. In sections 
two and three, I defend the view that the I relation is what is required to answer 
the first-person question of survival against some apparent counter-examples. 
Sections four and five then turn to the relevance and Kierkegaardian 
requirements respectively and show how they been met by my account. 
Establishing these requirements and showing their importance is actually a 
lengthier task than seeing if they are met. By the time we see if they are met, my 
conception of persons Should be sufficiently clear for the task to be quite 
straightforward. The importance of meeting these requirements is, however, 
great, as I hope the first two chapters have shown.
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1. What is a Person?
The psychological reductionist view I have been developing entails a 
revision of what we mean by the term ‘person’. My preliminary definition was 
Locke’s: “A thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places”.i 
The problem with this definition is the use of terms such as "being” and "thing”. 
How can it be that a person is a thing if the conditions of the survival of a person 
do not include the survival of any substantial thing? Locke himself seems to 
recognise this difficulty and later adds a second definition:
So that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, 
which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness. Person, 
as I take it, is the name for this self.^
Here Locke tries to separate the identity of the person from the identity of a 
substantial being, locating the former in the identity of consciousness. What 
Locke calls "identity of consciousness” I would prefer to call "continuity of 
consciousness”, for I have argued that the relation which sustains a continuity of 
conscious is not necessarily an identity relation. The problem for Locke is, how 
can we individuate a consciousness over time if it is not any substance or 
entity? And if a consciousness is not a thing, then what is it? Can we even talk 
of a consciousness?
To raise such questions requires us to start thinking in terms of individuable 
consciousnesses. But what we should not be tempted to do to resolve this 
dilemma is to attempt to reify consciousness in some way. One of Locke’s 
central points, reaffirmed by his successors and in this thesis, is that personal 
survival does not depend upon the survival of any thing at all. Hence to try and 
make a thing out of consciousness would simply be to fall back into the error 
Locke revealed. Also we do not want to talk of persons as ephemeral 
"consciousnesses” as this would be to erect a new mystery as puzzling as any
1 Bk II, Chapter XXVII, Para.9
2 Bk II, Chapter XXVII, Para. 25/26
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of the dilemmas surrounding persons which we may have dissolved thus far.
Psychological reductionists wanted to be able to claim that personal survival 
does not require the survival of a substantial thing but that is not to say that 
persons are nothings or ephemeral somethings. One way of making these two 
claims compatible is to hold that persons are particular beings but personal 
survival does not require survival of that particular being. At first sight, this may 
seem an absurd proposition. It seems to ignore the principle that if any F is an X, 
then for F to survive it must remain an X. For example, if the Mona Lisa is a 
painting, for it to survive it must remain a painting. However, if one is to accept 
that a person is a particular living being, but that the person’s survival does not 
require this living being’s survival, something along these lines would have to 
be accepted.
However, I believe there is a better solution. This relies upon the specific 
notion of survival described in chapter two. Survival may not require a token- 
identical continuer. A type identical whole or part continuer may be enough. 
There are at least two reasons why this conception of survival offers a better 
solution.
Firstly, in chapter two, I considered a possible counter-argument against 
psychological reductionism;
(1) Persons are of type X. (e.g. human beings)
(2) Relation R can survive transformation of type X to type Y
(3) Relation R can survive transformations which human beings
cannot.
(4) Personal identity cannot consist in Relation R.3
But, I argued, to say a person survives a certain transformation may simply 
mean that there is a type identity of certain vital parts or features of that person 
before and after the transformation, rather than that there is strictly survival of 
the whole person. This is enough to neutralise the counter-argument. Although
3 §2.1
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a person can be a human being, it is not the identity of the human being which 
is required for personal survival. This is because it is the consciousness of the 
human being which is of relevance to the first-person question of survival. It is 
argued by psychological reductionists that consciousness can continue across 
different token individuals, as would be the case in teletransportation. In other 
words, type-identical parts or features of persons are enough to sustain 
continuity of consciousness and hence facilitate personal survival.4
In this way we can see how it is possible that, although persons are beings, 
survival of the person does not require survival of that being. In my view, what 
Locke did was to demonstrate that this was true, without showing how it could 
be true. In this thesis, I hope to have offered some reasons as to how it is true. A 
second reason comes from the Kantian considerations of this thesis. To sum 
these up, a unified mental life requires the formal identity of the first-personal 
subject, not the actual identity of a physical subject. Because when we consider 
our survival from the first-person point of view it is this unified mental life that we 
are concerned with, it is this formal identity which determines personal survival. 
If this is the case, it is quite clear that personal survival does not require survival 
of the particular being. But that is not to deny that a person is at any one time a 
particular being.
Interestingly, although Parfit calls himself a constitutive reductionist, he still 
prefers to say that a person has a body and a brain rather than is a body and a 
brain.5 Personally, as long as “is” is understood in the constitutive sense, I can’t 
see how Parfit’s description can be better, particularly as the verb ‘to have’ 
implies there is something which is doing the having, which simply begs the 
question once more as to what these persons are which have bodies.
The advantage of this conception of survival is that it accepts what many 
animalists insist upon, namely that if a person’s body is destroyed, that person 
is also destroyed. But as I have explained, the I* relation is a relation that holds
4 This possibility was argued tor in more detail in §2.1
5 Parfit reaffirmed this point in his notes to the 1993 Jacobsen lecture
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between persons-at-a-time. If I am teletransported then I, this particular person, 
ceases to exist. A replica is built in my place. But there is a conception of 
survival on which the person on Mars is my survivor. The first-person question 
of survival is, “Should I, now, consider person X at a later time to be my survivor, 
who I have reason to care about just as much if he were me, regardless of 
whether we are numerically identical?” If I am I* related to that person, then the 
answer is yes. And that entitles me to call that person my survivor.
Locke's first definition of a person is therefore still quite acceptable. What we 
have done is understood a little more about how a person can be a “thinking 
being” without the survival of the person consisting in identity of this being. This 
is certainly a significant change to the traditional psychological reductionist 
position. But what it does is enable us to admit that after teletransportation, for 
example, there is no longer the same person, whilst retaining the fundamental 
psychological reductionist claim that psychological continuity and 
connectedness is what is important to my survival.
2. Why Is The First Person Point of View Important?
I have claimed that the first personal point of view is the important one when 
we consider personal survival. Over the next few sections, I shall subject this 
view to scrutiny by considering potential counter evidence. I start by looking at 
William James' work on the self. James' work on personal identity in the 
Principles of Psychology is usually divided by critics into his interesting 
discussion on Hume and Kant, and his more extraordinary ideas such as those 
about the importance of clothes for personal identity and the role of the glottis in 
assenting and negating. But it is within the more unusual sections that I think we 
find some of the most interesting ideas. We know James holds to an 
idiosyncratic view the moment he describes not one, but four different selves: 
the material, social and spiritual selves plus the pure ego. Although all these
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“selves” are interesting, I am only concerned with one; the social self.6
For James, the social self is itself a multifarious thing. Many, if not most, 
people behave, appear talk and even feel differently depending on whom they 
are talking to and where they are. It would seem wrong to attribute all of these 
differences to putting on an act and to say that only one of these represents the 
‘real self. What would be more accurate would be to say that we display 
different facets of ourselves on different occasions. Think of the stereotypical 
mafia man, who is all love and kindness to his family and a cold killer at work. It 
seems an over-simplification to say that this man’s true self is only manifest in 
one half of this double life.
In his discussion of the social self in particular, James gets us thinking about 
the importance of factors other than a unified mental life, even though he, rightly 
it seems, does not believe the social self determines personal identity. We may 
concede that our social and material selves are important factors in what makes 
us who we are, but we would not immediately consider discontinuity of these 
selves to threaten our identity over time.
I would now like to bring this together with my argument that Parfifs claim 
about what matters in survival is best interpreted as meaning what is required 
for survival from the first person point of view. The question suggested by 
considerations such as those of James is, why should it be the first person point 
of view which settles the question of survival? Considerations of James can 
help us to push this question harder, imagine that all the social interactions you 
currently engage in come to an end, and that these are very important to you. 
Your family no longer treat you like a family member, you no longer enjoy the 
position you have at work, if you are famous, you are no longer sought after or 
recognised. This is the death of what James calls the social self. Loss of the 
social self is in effect society treating you as if you have died and that someone 
else now occupies your body. Given that we are social animals, and despite the
6 James [1890], pp293-296.
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continuity of consciousness, I would say that for many people, such a fate would 
be seen, maybe not immediately, as death, in as strong a sense as global 
amnesia may be for many other people. Thus being treated as a different 
person could make the person feel that they were a different person from their 
first personal point of view too. This raises two questions. Firstly, in such a case, 
is it not the case that it is the third personal, and not the first personal view of 
survival which is important? Secondly, is not the first personal judgment 
informed by third personal judgments, so that to analyse personal survival 
purely in the first personal terms as I have done is mistaken?
In this case, the I* relation is still very important. To be able to think that one 
is not a survivor in such a case actually requires the I* relation. In order to feel 
the break with the past one actually has to have a fundamental awareness of 
the continuity with the past, or the break would not be apparent. The I* relation 
therefore provides the fundamental unity against which a judgment of disunity 
can take place. In our actual society, such a person would not be considered as 
having died. Legally, socially and morally, we would consider that the person 
has survived the trauma altered rather than has altered so as not to have 
survived. But it is possible to imagine a society which places more importance 
on social position. In this case it is possible that both the subject and the society 
in general could view the person as having died.7 Once again, it is important 
that the r  relation must be underpinning all these changes, because it is only 
because there is a unified mental life linking the person before and after the 
loss of the social self that one can conceive of a change in social position being 
equivalent to a change of person. My first point is therefore that the crucial factor 
in survival is the I* relation, even in those societies which decide to view other 
changes as resulting in a change of person. Such societies can only form these 
conventions if the more basic personal unity provided by the I* relation is 
already in place, at least for the vast majority of its members.
7 1 understand this Is the case In certain Melanesian societies where one’s Identity Is taken to 
change when one’s role in society changes.
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But this is not yet enough. It could be objected that in such a society, the I* 
relation would simply be one necessary condition of personal survival, but not a 
sufficient one. The reason for this is quite simple. In such a society the criteria 
for personal survival are third personal, not first personal. Anyone who grew up 
in such a society would therefore apply the third personal criteria to themselves 
and would not take the continuity of their own mental life as evidence for 
personal survival. What this means is that the claim that it is survival from the 
first person point of view which is important could be a culturally relative one. 
And yet, it is supposed to be a claim about persons in all possible worlds. The I* 
relation would thus seem to fall short of its goal.
However, I believe this failure in the I* relation is only an apparent one. We 
need to answer the question, “In a society where the social self determines 
personal survival, are there persons, no persons, or are persons something 
different?” Consider the first possibility, that there are persons in that society, 
beings who fulfil Locke’s criteria of personhood, just as there are persons in our 
society. That there are such persons in such a society seems to me to be 
indubitable. The day before someone takes on a new role, for example, there is 
nothing to stop that person looking forward to that new role and making plans 
for it. Similarly, when in that new role, memories of and connections to life 
before are not lost. In this sense, there is still the unity of personal life that we 
have in our society. Consider also people who join cults and gain a new 
identity. Just because that community treats its members, and its members treat 
themselves, as new persons, doesn’t mean that there is not, before and after the 
conversion, what we would call one person.
So, despite the differences, there seems no reason to conclude that there 
are not persons, in our sense of the word, in that society. The third possibility is 
that there are persons, but that this means something different. In some sense, 
this must be true. But just so long as there are persons in our sense of the word 
-  i.e. beings who meet something like Locke’s conditions of personhood -
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whether or not there are also persons in some other sense is irrelevant. What I 
have said about personal survival applies in all cases to what we call persons. It 
can hardly be a counter argument to this to claim that in some cultures this 
concept of a person doesn’t operate. A person is a person whether they 
recognise that description of themselves or not.
There is a dilemma facing any claim that a concept is culturally relative. To 
establish that a concept is culturally relative, it is not enough to show that the 
concept is applied differently or has a different meaning, as this really boils 
down to the claim that it is just not the same concept. The claim must be a 
stronger one, that the concept has no application in that society. If it could be 
shown that what I have called a person is not a concept with any application in 
some other societies, then it would be a genuinely culturally relative term. But I 
can’t see how such a claim could be made. I shall further argue for this view in 
the next section.
Adapting Parfit, I have claimed that it is the first personal point of view which 
is the important one. I still believe this is true. Without the I* relation, there 
cannot be persons such as the persons we are. As I have argued, without the I* 
relation, alternative conceptions of personal identity that preserve a 
recognisable sense of “person” are not possible. We need the underlying unity 
of the I* relation. It is in this sense that the first-personal view of survival is the 
important one. Without it, we could not even think of plausible alternatives. 
Expressed in another way, this means that we must have persons, in the sense 
of the word I described in section 1, before we can have other, culturally 
relative, variants on the concept of personhood.8
So it is not true that the possible importance the social self could have in 
other societies supports third-personal rather than first-personal views of 
personal survival. What of my second worry, that it suggests third-personal
8 We even have variants on the term person In our own society, such as the legal concept of a 
person. However, nobody would believe that these variants threaten our core conception of what 
a person is.
Chapter Seven 176
views influence our first personal judgments more than my account allows? It is 
a truism that beliefs we have about our culture and about the attitudes of others 
effect the way we think about ourselves. The beliefs we have about ourselves 
can clearly be influenced very strongly by the societies we live in. But my 
account is not about the beliefs we have about ourselves, but the way we are, 
as persons. My point in this section has been to show that we are persons, in 
the sense I have described, whatever other beliefs we may come to form about 
ourselves. Therefore, the effect of these beliefs is not central to the enterprise of 
this thesis.
To strengthen this argument, in the next section, I consider some of the 
views about persons held in various cultures that, prims facie, most clearly 
conflict with my views. I will then show how these differences do not in fact 
threaten my own position.
3. The Self and Society.
I have argued that the fundamental unity provided by the I* relation can 
underlie different views of what persons are, but that in each such case, 
persons, in the sense I have defined, must exist in order for persons' in some 
other sense to exist. If this is a case, we should expect to find societies 
somewhere in the world where there are significant variations on the concept of 
a person, but where nonetheless we can still apply the conception I have 
described. Anthropology shows us that this is in fact true. I am cautious about 
using anthropological examples as I am cautious about using data from any 
discipline of which I am largely ignorant. But I do not believe that any of the 
examples I use rely on anything other than accurate ethnographies and data. 
Indeed, in one case, the example is familiar to us all. Also, I am more interested 
in the alternative possibilities suggested by these examples than I am with the 
actual societies themselves. I shall argue that the cases I discuss which may 
seem to undermine my claims about persons are actually entirely compatible
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with them. I consider three such views, which I have called the functional self, 
the manifold self and the human self.
(i) The Functional Self.
Rom Harré considers cultures where different linguistic use of personal 
pronouns points to a different conception of the self. I will look at two of these. 
The first is the culture of traditional Eskimos. In their language, Inuit, “personal 
reference is accomplished with only two suffixes, '-ik' and ‘-tok’, the former 
indexical of the speaker, the latter referring to any other person or group of 
persons”.9 Harré argues that this suggests the Eskimo sense of self is weaker 
than it is for us, who have many ways of self-reference. Ethnographic evidence 
supports this view:
Eskimo emotional states appear to be much more socially dependent 
than ours. Isolated Eskimos, in so far as they can be observed, seem to 
be stolid, neither cheerful nor depressed. But once they become part of 
a community (a family, say) they quickly take on the emotional tone of 
the community, whether they are intimately bound up with its concerns 
or not. [...] It is said that all moral issues are referable only to 
relationships of the individual within a family group. The active, decision­
making unit is not the individual human being, but the family.10 
It is clear that this is not just a matter of different conceptions. The individual, 
it is supposed, feels differently about his or herself than a European does. Self 
consideration becomes a very much rarer thing. A person is therefore defined 
much more by their social situation than their sphere of consciousness. It could 
be argued that in such a society, a lack of a unified mental life would not present 
a problem for personal identity. As long as the individual continued to fill their 
space in the family and community, there could be no problem of personal 
identity. If this is how Eskimos view each other, it would be hard to imagine why 
they would view themselves any differently. In the various puzzle cases
9 Harré, p107
10 ibid
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discussed by philosophers, so the argument would run, for the Eskimo to be 
able to answer they would have to know if the resulting person continued to fulfil 
their social role, not whether they psychologically connected and/or continuous 
with the earlier person.
I dub this conception the “Functional Self” because it is the view that a is the 
same person as b iff a performs the same social function as b. This conception 
is worth considering whether or not it is the correct interpretation of the Eskimo 
view of the self.
I believe this conception is not tenable. What reasons are there for 
supposing that in such a society, someone who was purely functionally 
continuous with an earlier person would be considered to be the same as that 
person? Perhaps it is because, as long as this were the case, everyone would 
consider it to be the same person. But we need to push this further. There are 
two possibilities. Either everyone knows that this is not a numerically identical 
human being or they don’t. If they don’t, then we can infer little from their beliefs. 
Consider Searle’s Chinese room argument'•T Here, someone in a room passes 
out correct Chinese responses to Chinese questions, but without knowing a 
word of Chinese, thanks to a very helpful manual. Despite this making her 
indistinguishable from a Chinese speaker, Searle argues that anyone who 
knew what is going on would not think that the person in the room could speak 
Chinese. In our case, as long as the later human being responded in the correct 
way, they would be indistinguishable from the earlier human being whose life 
they were ostensibly continuing. But this does not show either that the later 
human actually is a continuer of the original person or that her contemporaries 
would recognise her as so, if they were in possession of all the facts.
What, then, if everyone knew that this human being was not numerically 
identical with the earlier one? Again, there are two possibilities. It could be the 
case that nobody minds because the important thing for this society is that
11 Searle [1980]
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social roles are performed. But this would only show that what is important is not 
the survival of the individual rather than that the \* relation is not what is 
required for the survival of the individual. There would be no conflict between 
this and my view. The remaining possibility is the one which seems truly to 
exemplify the functional self: everyone is aware that the later human is not 
numerically identical with the first but nobody minds because survival of the 
individual just is continuation of someone who performs the same social role. 
Here, conditions of personal survival would be third personal, not first personal, 
and functional, rather than a matter of psychological connectedness and 
continuity. Could such a conception ever be applied?
When we consider what such a society would be like, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to make sense of it as being a society of persons at all. 
There is a further fork in the thought experiment to consider. On the one hand, 
this could be a society without r  related persons at all. There are no beings who 
have a forward and backward looking relationship with themselves in the way 
described earlier. 12 This would be a society, not only where there was a 
different view of personal survival, but with a different sort of inhabitant 
altogether. If we try to think ourselves into such a society, we find that doing so 
is virtually impossible. Beings without the first personal sense of their past and 
futures are simply too alien for us to be considered persons at all. In order for 
the thought experiment to have any bite, therefore, we need to imagine that, 
though these beings are I* related to the future and the past, they simply don’t 
use this as their criterion for survival, but use functional considerations instead. 
This seems to me to be deeply implausible. How could beings with a sense of 
their own pasts and futures, with the powers of memory and intention, divorce 
all these factors from their conception of personal survival and replace it with a 
functional view which is entirely third-personal? For example, they would seem 
at least to need two different personal pronouns: one “I” which is the I of a
12 Chapter six, especially §6.5
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unified mental life, and one functional “I”. It would thus be possible for someone, 
in the functional sense, to do things which, in the other sense, they would have 
no possibility of remembering. Users would certainly have to be aware of the 
differences. And this would mean that, in effect, they were employing two 
parallel conceptions of personal continuity over time. This, once more, would 
collapse into the view that we had a society where personal survival is 
determined by I* relatedness, but that importance is placed on something other 
than personal survival, which is based on functionality.
The dilemma is this. If we don’t allow the beings in this thought experiment to 
have r  relations, then they become so alien that they cannot be considered as 
persons at all, and thus it ceases to become a counter-example to my 
conception of persons. But if we do allow them these relations, the idea that 
they could take a purely functional view of personal identity just becomes 
implausible. What happens is that if we try to imagine what it would be like to be 
in such a society, we find that we already presuppose the conception of persons 
I have argued for. In order to be able to think of identity in functional terms, one 
already requires the characteristics of persons I have described. At best, they 
have two different views of personal survival, which still means my account is 
applicable to that society. 13 The characterisation of the Eskimo view of personal 
identity being functional must then be false, and the idea that the functional self 
can exist without the r  related self is unconvincing. The Eskimo view of the self 
is therefore a variant which operates within the limits laid down by the I* 
relation. Certainly, the group may be more important for them and may be 
crucial in making a person what they are. But if we are to suppose that this 
entails a breakdown of the sense of a person being a thinking being with a 
sense of its own future and past, we are surely mistaken. In short, when we 
really consider what the functional self would entail, it only becomes plausible 
in beings rather different to persons.
13 As, I have argued, we too have two views; one based on the third person conception of 
identity, the other on the first person conception of survival.
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(ii) The Manifold Self.
Harré’s other example comes from Japan, in Japanese, the way one refers 
to oneself and others always depends upon who one is with. It is impossible to 
speak to anyone without the use of vocabulary indicating the social distance 
between you and them. This is part of a culture where much depends upon its 
social place. In morality, for example, what is important in one area of life may 
not matter in another;
The shame that diffuses that part of the psyche which has to do with 
others in the world of work cannot diffuse into the system within which a 
Japanese manages his home life. 14
The self, therefore, is not immutable and absolute but is something which is 
defined relationally. Again, we would therefore expect that personal continuity 
depends upon the maintaining of these relations, not on psychological unity, 
except in the derivative sense in which psychological disunity could interfere 
with these relations.
What we seem to have here is a case where different sections of society 
place value only on those parts of the lives of persons which are relevant to 
those sections. This is really only a more extreme form of what occurs in any 
society where a person has a variety of roles. In any one day, a person can be, 
for example, a parent, a partner, a boss, an employee, a team member and so 
on. The fact that the person acts and is treated differently in each of these cases 
doesn't threaten the fundamental unity which underlies those diverse roles. It 
could be argued that without an awareness of the different roles we play, we 
would be unable to fulfil them properly.
There is, however, another view not dissimilar to the Japanese one, which 
believes there is an increasing fracturing of the self, which some see as part of 
the postmodern condition. The postmodernist claim is that we are witnessing a 
fracturing of our traditional views of the subject as a unified entity. As part of a
14 Harré. p109
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broader fracturing of thought and society, we will come to see persons, not as 
single uniform entities, but as beings without any essential unity whatsoever. 
Each person will have a variety of personae, and each of these can be seen as 
much as individual entities as the whole human being. We will consequently 
have to revise our views concerning the fundamental unity of the individual. 
This can be seen as a version of the view that for the Japanese it is incorrect to 
think of a single individual with various social facets but rather a collection of 
different persons which occupy different stages of the human being’s life. I call 
this conception “The Manifold Self” as it denies the psychological unity entailed 
by my own view and instead postulates the existence of a variety of selves 
within the single organism.
There are two points I would like to make about such a conception. Firstly, 
such a radical fracturing of the individual appears extremely unlikely. It would 
seem to make the unity we currently enjoy a kind of social construct. Certainly, 
the way in which society is organised could make us divide up our lives into 
more discrete compartments, but the unity which we experience is surely not 
something that can be swept away so easily. Even if we did make greater 
distinctions between our various public and private faces, these would 
themselves be unified by the thread of the I* relation. It is inconceivable that, for 
example, the bank manager would not be able to plan what they would do that 
evening after work or remember what they had done before, for example.
But secondly, even if the postmodernists are right, this doesn’t threaten my 
view. However fractured the individual human being is, in order for there to be 
any unity among the various characters, or whatever they are to be called, they 
must be I* related. What I suppose we are being asked to accept is the 
possibility of a number of I* related ‘threads’ running along the life of the human 
being, with each one taking it in turns to sit out while one continues its 
development. Within the single human life, each person-at-a-time would only be 
r  related to certain other persons-at-a-time. This is certainly compatible with my
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view, even if it does sound more like a wild thought experiment than an actual 
possibility.
So it seems that either way, the postmodernist view of the manifold self is no 
threat. Either there is a more fundamental unity which links together the distinct 
personae of the human being or the various personae themselves have their 
own internal unity, which can be fully explained by the I* relation. The fracturing 
of the self has to have limits if the result is to be persons at all.
(ii) The Human Self.
Finally, I would like to offer an example from our own society. When 
someone’s relative suffers terrible brain damage, so that they are almost 
certainly not I* related to their former self, one does not always consider that 
person to have died. Whatever happens, we are still the children of our parents, 
the siblings of our siblings. We can view this sentimentally or as the cold result 
of our genetic programming. But whatever the cause, it happens, and these 
relations do help define who we are. Even stronger than this, it could be 
claimed that this shows there is something immutable about our identity. We 
cannot entirely cease to be what we once were, no matter what changes occur. 
Such a view would support the animalist view of identity, as it seems that it is 
the human being in this case which is always considered to be the same 
person. It could be claimed that if we reduce personal identity merely to 
psychological unity, something which we value about ourselves has been left 
out. And all through this thesis I have been arguing that what we value about 
ourselves has to be included in the final analysis.
Of course, this is most apparent when we consider how we view others. 
When we think about ourselves going senile, for example, we tend to take the 
view that ‘it won’t be me there’ quite easily. That’s not such an easy position to 
take up with someone else. Many people say of senile people that the person 
they once knew is already dead. But if deeds speak louder than words, then we 
do not view the ending of a loved one’s unified mental life as the end of that
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person, merely the end of that person as we knew them. We still feel for them 
when they suffer and grieve for them when they die.
What is also apparent is that we cannot neatly distinguish the way we view 
ourselves and the way we are viewed. Our culture at least partly defines what 
we consider ourselves to be. It seems impossible for anyone to hold a vastly 
different notion of what it means for other people to be individual persons to the 
one they hold for themselves.
Cases like this demonstrate the difficulties of theory meeting practice. I 
believe that if we review the arguments, we will find psychological reductionism 
to be superior to animalism. All we can learn from cases of amnesia and terrible 
brain damage is that certain intuitive responses cannot be overruled by 
philosophical reflection. Hume found that, however bothered he was when he 
thought about the existence of real bodies in his philosophical mode, playing 
billiards his doubts soon melted away. Equally, it seems to me that however 
much we are convinced by psychological reductionism, our being accustomed 
to thinking of persons as individual human beings makes a complete transfer of 
theory into practice almost impossible. Parfit also candidly admits the same 
thing:
I can believe this view at the intellectual or reflective level. I am 
convinced by the arguments in favour of this view. But I think it likely that, 
at some other level, I shall always have doubts. [...] Something similar is 
true when I look through a window at the top of a sky scraper. I know I am 
in no danger. But, looking down from this dizzying height, I am afraid. 15 
As human persons, it seems our humanity is important to us. This may be 
hard to defend rationally. Indeed, it could be characterised as an example of a 
pernicious speciesismie. Alternatively, our attachments to human beings 
regardless of what has happened to their minds may be sentimental, explained
15 Parfit p279
16 As defined by Singer [1979], chapter 3. Speceisism is to deny equality to beings solely on the 
grounds of their specie.
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by the fact that we cannot but associate the unified mental life we cherish with 
the body which constituted or realised it. Whatever the explanation, to be 
consistent the psychological reductionist must argue that such body-based 
concerns are misplaced. The difficulty of putting this belief into practice is not an 
argument against it truth.
4. The Relevance Requirement.
The relevance requirement is the requirement for our account to address the 
first-personal question of survival. As this question is partly concerned with our 
interests and concerns in persons as persons ourselves, there can be no acid 
test for whether or not a theory meets the relevance requirement. We can ask, 
“does this really capture what is required for my survival, from my point of view?” 
and “does this theory leave anything important out?” but at the end of the day, 
such questions are not definitive and their answers are more judgmental than 
factual.
The relevance requirement has been used throughout this thesis in the 
development of the final conception. That the requirement has been met should 
therefore be clear from the way in which the whole thesis has developed in the 
light of the requirement. Throughout this thesis I have endeavoured to stray as 
little as possible from our fundamental concerns in persons. Crucial in 
formulating The Kierkegaardian Requirement in chapter one were 
considerations of how we view ourselves and how these views affect the way in 
which we live our lives. Kierkegaard stresses the existential as well as 
philosophical importance of self-understanding, which is a good deal of what 
philosophical anthropology is. The motivation for fulfilling the Kierkegaardian 
requirement is thus not the simple motivation for solving a philosophically 
vexing problem, but is the motivation to understand ourselves so that we may 
know better what we are. Thus at the very start of my thesis, the need to address 
the concerns of actual persons is given a central role.
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Chapter three could well appear to be a fairly dry piece of methodological 
and terminological analysis. But even here, the imperative of the relevance 
requirement was never far away. Part of my defence of the term person' was 
that this term captures what we value about ourselves and our survival in a way 
in which more precise but more limited terms such as ‘homo sapiens’ do not. I 
also defended thought experiments by showing how, even if impossible, they 
help us to understand the relative importance to our survival of uniqueness, and 
bodily and mental continuity.
Hence in Part One, I attempted to found my enquiry on pillars which meet the 
relevance requirement. The requirements I set for a philosophy of persons and 
the methods and concepts employed in such an enquiry were all justified at 
least partly on their meeting the relevance requirement. In Part Two, I turned to 
the Parfitian conception. These chapters were concerned with the details of 
Parfit’s reductionism, and how it could be revised to rid it of its more problematic 
features. Parfit’s position is notable for its stress on what matters in survival. As I 
have explained, the idea of considering “what matters" is to enable us to adopt 
the perspective on personal survival which is most important to us: the first- 
personal perspective. Because of this, we approach the question of personal 
survival from the point of view which is most relevant to our own concerns. So 
although the relevance requirement slipped into the background in part two, it 
was there, forming part of the reason for our interest in Parfit’s position in the 
first place. As I have said, it would be too lengthy a task to argue for Parfit’s 
basic position here and it would require much raking over old ground.
The foundations of my enquiry meet the relevance requirement. The 
relevance requirement is also apparent in the Parfitian position I have 
developed. In this and the previous chapter, the question of relevance has also 
come to the fore. Particularly, I have shown why it is that the first-personal 
perspective on survival is so important. It is important because as persons, it is 
the perspective we occupy on our own lives, and because it is the existence of
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this perspective which makes personal survival different from other questions of 
identity over time. Without the first personal perspective, we would not be 
persons, as trying to imagine a society where personal identity was decided on 
a merely functional basis showed. These reasons are also reasons why the 
approach adopted in this thesis keeps the issue of persons relevant to our first- 
personal concerns, addressing our concerns not just as philosophers but as 
persons.
5. The Kierkegaardian Requirement.
In chapter one I formulated what I called the Kierkegaardian requirement. 
This is the requirement for any philosophical description of persons to be able 
to account for both the aesthetic and ethical character of persons. As regards 
her aesthetic character, a person can be seen as a succession of moments, a 
being who is tied to the present with no existence beyond the now. As regards 
her ethical character, a person can view themselves and be viewed as a single 
subject with a continuous existence that stretches backwards and forwards in 
time. It is not obvious that these two ways of viewing the self are incompatible, 
but there is certainly a tension between them. Can the psychological 
reductionist account I have developed resolve this tension? I believe that it can. 
To show how, I will try to say a little about how my account can explain both the 
aesthetic and ethical views of the self, and about how the two can happily co­
exist.
(i) Aesthetic Persons.
The fundamental characteristic of the aesthetic person is that they are 
inescapably bound to the moment. The psychological reality of this is not 
something that requires any demonstration. The fact that we are only conscious 
in the here and now, the “specious present", is well known and is the cause of 
puzzles of its own. The fact that we are nothing more than individual human 
beings, as finite and bound to the present as any other animal, is also confirmed
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by the current thesis, but is, again, not a novel or illuminating explanation of our 
aesthetic character. What we need to consider here is rather the ways in which 
my conception of persons reinforces the sense in which we are bound to the 
moment.
Consider first ways in which we can understand something as not bound to 
the moment. The easiest way of doing this is to consider how a being or object 
which perdures or endures exists at different points of time. If X at Ti = Y at J2 
then X exists not only in the here and now but at various points of time. There 
are two ways in which this is more complicated in the case of persons. Firstly, 
on my account, there is no thing the endurance or perdurance of which is 
required for personal survival. A person's existence requires a brain and a 
body, but a person’s survival does not depend on the continued existence of 
either of these particular things. At any particular time, a person is a whole 
human being, but the person’s survival does not necessarily require the 
continued existence of that human being. As a person’s survival is not a matter 
of the survival of a body, this makes a person an aesthetic being, as there is no 
thing the continued existence of which constitutes personal survival. Personal 
survival requires certain psychological relations between persons-at-a-time, not 
identity between persons-at-a-time.
A person-at-a-time is, however, a being. As I argued in section 1, the force of 
Locke’s point is that though a person is a living being, survival of the person is 
not survival of that being. There is a sense then in which a person is not what 
they will necessarily become. That I am this particular human being now does 
not entail that I will survive as this particular human being later. The continued 
existence of the human being is just not a part of what my survival consists in. 
As Kant argued, the unity of our mental lives over time entails no identity of 
substance. We can trace the identity over time of any living thing and by doing 
so trace out a four-dimensional being not entirely bound to the moment. We 
could do the same with persons. But because survival does not consist in
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identity, the four-dimensional being we are tracing does not necessarily support 
the unified mental life which constitutes our survival. The fact of personal 
identity over time is thus not of importance to our first-person considerations of 
survival. Therefore, facts of identity cannot be invoked to relieve our sense of 
being bound to the moment, as facts of identity are not relevant to the idea of 
our survival.
So unlike other objects or beings, our survival does not entail identity at all. I 
have argued that the relation which unifies the life of a person over time, the I* 
relation, is not a relation of identity. This is one of the features of Parfitianism 
which my account has retained. This means if X at Ti is I* related to Y at T2, 
although Y would be seen as a survivor of X we cannot deduce that Y is X. 
There is always the logical possibility that fission has occurred, for example. 
There is nothing in the I* relation itself which rules out such possibilities. In this 
way, though a person can think of themselves and be thought of as the same 
person over time, this does not entail that there is actual personal identity over 
time, as identity is a one-one relation and is not entailed by the I* relation. 
Judgments of personal identity therefore have to be third-personal and 
empirical, based on the continued existence of the human being. So the fact 
that I have survived entails nothing about the continued existence of any being. 
This again shows how one cannot even consider the continued existence of the 
physical human being as evidence for our transcending of the moment, as it is 
simply not part of what personal survival entails.
What we can see here is that the aesthetic view of the self is tied up with the 
negative aspects of my conception: that survival is not survival of any substance 
and that survival does not entail identity. Both these factors together suggest 
that, even though beings exist beyond the here and now because they endure 
or perdure, this fact is not relevant to human survival. Therefore, it is not a fact 
that can remove our sense of being bound to the moment. Rather, because 
personal survival does not require identity of a being, the sense in which our
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existence is dependent on the being-at-a-time, the human being in the here and 
now, is accentuated. For Kierkegaard, this was the cause of the despair which is 
characteristic of the aesthetic. But when we consider how my conception fits in 
with the ethical view, we shall see that this despair is not inevitable.
(ii) Ethical Persons.
If the aesthetic character of persons is reinforced by the negative aspects of 
my conception, then the ethical characteristics emerge from the positive points. 
An ethical person is not bound to the moment, but has a continuous existence 
over time. It would appear that if my account makes persons aesthetic then they 
cannot also be ethical. At the end of chapter one, I made it clear that making the 
ethical and the aesthetic compatible with each other was only one possibility. 
We could also explain the appearance of one in terms of the other. This is what I 
shall now do.
The appearance of the enduring self has already been explained in Kant's 
paralogism. Despite the fact that T entails no substantial identity, the formal 
identity this entails leads us to think of of ourselves as substantially identical 
over time. We could then say that the ethical view we have of ourselves as 
single entities existing over time is an illusion. What I have made clear is that 
this illusion of substantial identity is not anything we should feel cheated by. I 
have argued that our survival just doesn’t entail identity, and if this is the case, 
we should accept Kant’s point with ease. As A. J. Ayer once put it, “it is perverse 
to see tragedy in what could not conceivably be otherwise.” What I believe is 
the correct view of what our survival consists in preserves all that was important 
when we thought of ourselves as substantially identical over time. The point of 
the relevance requirement was to make sure that our real interest in our 
survival, the first person question of identity, is addressed. Having addressed 
this, in the process we have found that in fact, the first-person question of 
identity can be answered without the concept of identity. Hence the important
17 A.J.Ayer [1956], The Problem of Knowledge, London; Penguin. p41
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issue of our survival just doesn’t involve the substantial identity of the self we 
perhaps thought it did.
The r  relation is thus the way in which we transcend the moment. By being 
capable of thinking of ourselves as ourselves over time we are able to live our 
lives outside of the present. Strictly speaking, we could call this an illusion. But 
to call it an illusion has certain negative connotations. It suggests we have been 
fooled, that there is no reality in what we perceive. But this needn’t be the case. 
The r  relation is real and we needn’t be fooled into thinking that it provides us 
with identity. Once we accept that we are beings for whom identity has no 
importance in survival, we can transcend the moment by thinking of survival in 
terms other than those of identity.
This is how I believe the Kierkegaardian tension can be resolved. The 
ethical self is in a sense an illusion, because there is no being whose 
endurance or perdurance is required for the survival of a person. The illusion of 
this is explained by Kant’s third paralogism. What I hope I have explained 
throughout this thesis is that when we consider what it means to survive and 
what it is that gives unity to our lives, we can see that these do not require an 
enduring or perduring self.
Kierkegaard wrote, “finitude’s despair is to lack infinitude."i8 I believe this 
despair can be dispelled by a proper understanding of what survival entails. As 
what matters is not the persistence of any entity, the lack of infinitude in this 
sense is irrelevant. What does matter is continuity and unity of mental life. This 
can and does transcend the moment and enables our lives to be lived in more 
than just the moment. So in a sense, Kierkegaard was wrong. The aesthetic 
person is not “ensnared by immediacy’’i9. Rather, she can escape immediacy 
by the ethical character of the I* relation.
The Kierkegaardian requirement had force because it demanded that in 
explaining what persons are, we must not neglect either the ethical or the
18 Kierkegaard, [1849], p60 & 63. See §1.4. for an explanation of these expressions.
19 Hannay, p56
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aesthetic. My conception of persons and their survival over time pays heed to 
both the ethical and the aesthetic. It brings together the lack of permanence in 
the self and the unity over time in the self. Because of this, I believe it truly meets 
the Kierkegaardian requirement.
6. Conclusion.
There are four main conclusions of this thesis. (1) There are two distinct 
questions in philosophical anthropology. One is the factual question of identity, 
the other is the first person question of survival. (2) Survival in the latter 
question should be understood as psychological connectedness and continuity. 
Parfit argued that psychological connectedness and continuity does not imply 
identity and is what matters in survival. Parfit’s account is flawed in several 
respects. His conception of “what matters” is incomplete, his account of thoughts 
as independent is mistaken and his account of psychological connectedness 
and continuity is inadequate. However, 1 have argued that (3) the flaws can be 
removed from Parfit’s account whilst retaining the key Parfitian claims that 
psychological connectedness and continuity is what is required for survival, and 
not identity. The I* relation is an attempt to show how this could be done. I have 
also argued that (4) this conception of persons meets two requirements that any 
philosophy of persons should meet, what I have called the relevance 
requirement and the Kierkegaardian requirement.
The project of the thesis can be seen as a compatabalist one. I have tried to 
reconcile the animalist’s claim that a person is a particular being with the 
psychological reductionist’s claim that a person can survive the destruction of 
her body. I have also tried to reconcile the aesthetic and ethical views of 
persons. How successful these attempts have been I must leave to others to 
judge. But I hope that at the very least, potentially fruitful directions of research 
have been suggested and started on.
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